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SUMMARY
In October 2017, the Heseltine Institute was commissioned by Onward 
Homes to evaluate the impact of interventions made by Peak Valley Housing 
Association (PVHA) in the regeneration of Hattersley and Mottram, a large 
former council housing estate in Greater Manchester. 
This evaluation is a snapshot of an ongoing process of regeneration, which 
has a further 10 years to run, that aims to provide lessons for Onward, the 
wider housing sector, policy makers in local and central government.
REPORT HEADLINES
Our evaluation found that the regeneration interventions have been 
largely successful and significant progress has been made in meeting 
the original objectives of the ‘Collaboration Agreement’, the founding 
legal document for the regeneration partnership. The quality of 
housing stock has been considerably improved – both the upgrading 
of existing stock and the construction of new housing. There is now a 
greater mix of tenures with an unprecedented increase in new-build 
owner occupation, and all housing stock now meets the Decent Homes 
Standard. Tenants feel that it is ‘a much nicer place to live’ and they 
‘… feel safer moving around the estate at all times’. They are also happy 
with improvements to the railway station and its use is up 30%. A new 
district centre has been developed with Tesco Extra which employs 
over 100 local people and has helped fund the development of the 
Hub, the new local community centre. 
Given that there are a further 10 years to run on the regeneration 
programme, much has been achieved thus far. As Onward enters 
the next phase of regeneration, we have identified priority areas that 
require specific attention and on which action is already being taken. 
In particular, improvements to the public realm are lagging behind 
and common concerns among tenants have focused on the lack of 
usable green space, play facilities for younger people and the lack 
of enhancements to streets, parking and verges. There are plans 
in place to address these issues and Tameside MBC will launch a 
public consultation this year on options for public realm investment, 
including their long-term management and maintenance. Significant 
improvements are also needed in the design and use of the Hub which 
suffers from under-use by the community and local public service 
agencies. An architect has been commissioned to look at the design of 
the Hub, including its disabled access and the position of the library. 
There are many lessons for future regeneration projects such as this. 
Referred to frequently by interviewees as a singular ‘act of genius’, 
the Collaboration Agreement has been the cornerstone of the 
regeneration programme, leveraging in private sector investment to 
pay for transformations to the estate’s housing, retail, community and 
transport infrastructures while retaining public control of the land and 
regeneration process. Much too can be learnt from the ‘relational’ 
as opposed to ‘transactional’ approach of PVHA which has been 
instrumental in cementing valued and trusted working relationships with 
all stakeholders. The over-arching approach to regeneration through 
tenure diversification coupled with school catchment area restructuring 
has been pivotal in encouraging social mixing between tenure groups, 
particularly for young people. 
This evaluation, however, has also underlined how deep-rooted, 
intractable socio-economic problems cannot be tackled through the 
actions and regeneration programmes of housing associations and 
local authorities alone, but require concerted action by a range of 
actors led by national, targeted policy interventions. 
The above lessons will help inform Onward’s approach over the next 
ten years of regeneration. We have identified other considerations to 
help guide their future course, including ensuring there is sufficient 
community involvement in the design of public realm improvements, 
addressing the lack of social space on the estate for community 
association, and embedding a governance mechanism that addresses 
concerns that Onward will function more remotely. 
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REPORT SUMMARY
1. In October 2017, the Heseltine Institute was commissioned 
by Onward to evaluate the impact of the interventions made 
by Peak Valley Housing Association in the regeneration of 
Hattersley and Mottram, a large former council estate located 
in Tameside Metropolitan Borough in Greater Manchester. Our 
evaluation focuses on the period since 2006, the date when the 
Collaboration Agreement - the founding legal document for the 
regeneration partnership - was agreed and underpinned the stock 
transfer of Hattersley and Mottram from Manchester City Council 
to Peak Valley Housing Association. In 2017, Symphony Housing 
Group, of which Peak Valley was a part, was renamed as Onward.
2. Built in the early 1960s by Manchester City Council to rehouse 
tenants decanted from inner-city areas such as Gorton that were 
subject to ‘slum clearance’, Hattersley and Mottram was originally 
home to around 15,000 people – the second largest overspill 
estate in Greater Manchester. By 2006, its population had fallen 
to around 6,6001. Through this period of inexorable decline, the 
estate suffered the now all-too-familiar symptoms of ‘residualised’ 
council estates: socioeconomic isolation, unemployment, spatially-
concentrated poverty, crime, housing vacancies, physical neglect 
and territorial stigma.
3. We have situated our evaluation within a narrative-driven 
methodology that deploys resident and stakeholder interviews 
as testimony to the ways in which various governments’ urban 
regeneration policies, the local agency of residents, and that of 
Tameside MBC have interacted to shape the estate’s social and 
physical infrastructure. In doing so, we have distinguished and 
assessed the key role played by Peak Valley in the regeneration of 
Hattersley and Mottram. 
4. Our evaluation should be interpreted in light of the fact that the 
regeneration process in Hattersley and Mottram is ongoing. The 
Collaboration Agreement commits its signatories to a further ten 
years of regeneration activity. Onward commissioned this report 
to ensure that the lessons thus far are captured and shared. This 
report, then, is a snapshot of an ongoing process of transformation 
that aims to provide lessons not only for Onward but the wider 
housing sector and policymakers in local and central government.
5. For ease of reference, we use the term ‘Hattersley Estate’, or 
‘Hattersley’ in the remainder of the report.
Regeneration Interventions
5. We have evaluated in detail the interventions made by Peak 
Valley since 2006. In order to assess the overall success of the 
regeneration process itself, and the contributions of specific 
interventions, we have evaluated Peak Valley’s progress against 
the original regeneration objectives set out in the Collaboration 
Agreement. Our overall assessment of regeneration on this 
measure to date is positive (See Figure 10: Regeneration 
Objectives and their achievement pages 27-28). Residents 
largely feel that it is a ‘…much nicer place to live’ and they ‘…feel 
safer moving around the estate at all times’. Tenants are happy 
with the improvements made to their housing in particular – both 
the upgrading of existing stock and the construction of new 
housing’ – as well as other physical infrastructures such as the 
railway station. This general success is reflected in the rising 
satisfaction rates recorded by Peak Valley’s own tenant surveys.
6. The following summarises our overall assessment of the main 
interventions made by Peak Valley since 2006:
(i) Housing upgrading: The priority for Peak Valley was to demolish 
the stock that was unfit for purpose to make way for new-build 
housing, both social rented and private sale. Since 2006, over 500 
housing units have been demolished. The housing built in its place 
– both the new-build Barratt homes for sale and the replacement 
social housing stock – is of far superior quality than comparable 
housing in other estates. 
a. Barratt Homes: The homes that Barratt have built – and 
are continuing to build – have been a huge success. This 
totals 830 new homes across 24 sites on the estate. Due 
to the unique circumstances of the Hattersley regeneration 
process, Barratt were asked to build to a much higher design 
standard than they would do usually. This was partly due to 
the influence of English Partnerships which insisted on high 
design specifications on the projects it helped fund. Barratt’s 
last completed site on Hattersley was one of their fastest 
selling developments in the country. 
 However, one potential problem is the growing incidence 
of private rented accommodation on the estate. This is the 
result of homeowners earlier Right to Buy sales selling on 
their homes to private landlords, who are often absentee, 
speculative landlords with little interest or commitment in 
maintaining their houses to the standards expected of Peak 
Valley.
1 Tameside MBC, “Supplementary Planning Guidance: Hattersley and Mottram,” 2004, https://www.tameside.gov.uk/tmbc5/hattersleyspg.pdf. 2Sam Cooper, “PVHA Community Investment Strategy: June 2014” (Peak Valley Housing Association, 2014).
c. New social housing: Just as diversifying tenures was a key 
priority of the regeneration partners so too was diversifying 
housing typologies for Peak Valley. This was done in order to 
meet demand for different housing types, such as bungalows 
and apartments, in ways which would ensure that all age 
groups and family situations could be accommodated in the 
estate and thereby help stem the flow of outward migration. 
The design process for the new social housing schemes 
was carried out in consultation with residents and there was 
a certain amount of flexibility in the approach as phases 
were completed so as to reflect changing local demand. The  
participatory approach by the architects has resulted in a 
very high standard and is almost universally appreciated by 
tenants. 
d. Existing stock improvements: All housing stock now meets 
the Decent Homes Standard. Residents are generally satisfied 
with improvements made. One problem is the relative lack 
of investment in privately-owned ex-council houses bought 
through the Right to Buy scheme, particularly in terms of 
roofing, but which now lie outside Peak Valley’s remit. 
(ii) Public realm: Compared to the achievements made with new 
and existing housing stock, improvements to the public realm are 
lagging behind. Common concerns amongst tenants and other 
stakeholders coalesce around three principal issues: the density 
of the infill housing and consequent lack of usable green space; 
the lack of facilities for younger people, particularly for play and 
games; and the lack of improvements to the streets, parking and 
verges. The delay in addressing these issues was the result of 
financial difficulties following the 2008 crash, which has forced 
Barratt to concentrate efforts on delivering housing construction. 
However, there are now plans to in place to address these 
issues. The strength of the partnership-working embodied in the 
Land Board is such that Tameside MBC are now in the process 
of developing an alternative plan to deliver all the public realm 
improvements via their own commissioned agency with Barratt 
contributions as per the Collaboration Agreement. Tameside 
MBC will launch a public consultation on options for public realm 
investment this year, including how it will be maintained and 
managed into the future.
(iii) Railway Station: The interventions made by Peak Valley and the 
Land Board to Hattersley’s railway station have been successful. 
The Land Board spent some of the regeneration funds procured 
through the Collaboration Agreement on redesigning Hattersley 
Road West in order to re-route the road closer to the station. A bus 
stop on the road now connects the train to the local bus network 
for quick, easy and safe access to the station. Consequently, 
station use has already risen by 30%. These initial improvements 
have opened up possibilities and interest in further improvements. 
The Land Board has secured £750,000 investment from the 
Greater Manchester Growth Fund to replace the existing booking 
office, and there are plans to replace the covered walkway to 
the station. The open land surrounding each side of the station 
is now being redeveloped by Barratt as homes for sale which will 
contribute further to place-making efforts in creating a safe, well-
used, connected and distinctive urban realm. A local community 
group, Friends of Hattersley Railway station, continue to play a 
significant part in driving this improvement forward.
(iv) New District Centre: One of the highest priorities in regenerating 
Hattersley was redeveloping the District Centre. Whilst incomplete, 
it has to-date delivered a new Tesco Extra and a multi-purpose 
community facility, The Hub. Bringing Tesco on board has been a 
success in terms of local employment where approximately 90% of 
its workforce live locally and either walk or cycle to work. However, 
Tesco drove a hard bargain for retail space that adversely affected 
the Hub’s design and created problems with how it is used by 
the local community. Apart from the Library, the building suffers 
from chronic under-use and, we would argue, local public service 
agencies. It is in danger of becoming a ‘white elephant’. Reasons 
for this include:  the multi-level design of the building, the co-
location of public agencies with community facilities, management 
issues both in the Council’s contractor and voluntary groups (which 
are being addressed) and insufficient branding as a community 
space. Tameside MBC has also commissioned an architect to 
look at how the use and design of the Hub could be improved, 
including its disabled access and position of the library.  
(v) Community investment Strategy: Since 2013 Peak Valley has 
committed to delivering a Community Investment Strategy with 
the  aim of developing sustainable communities through a process 
‘…that recognises that successful neighbourhoods, and therefore 
successful tenancies, depend on a complex balance of social, 
economic and environmental conditions.’2 By Peak Valley’s own 
measure of social return on investment, this strategy has been 
successful in delivering social impact for local residents. However, 
there is also a wider sense in which Peak Valley and its highly-
regarded staff have gone the extra mile in community investment. 
This is evident in how they have fostered a close working 
relationship with local schools, with staff now sitting as governors 
in the two local primary schools. 
(vi) Skills development: The success of skills development has been 
more uneven with the Tesco initiative representing a high point 
in offering much needed local employment. Other initiatives, 
such as jobs fairs, apprenticeship schemes, BASE courses and 
Talent Match have achieved small successes but not enough to 
offset the high levels of deprivation on the estate. Reasons for 
this lack of success are varied but focus on an abiding sense 
of social insularity. Related to this are the inherent difficulties in 
constructively engaging with a tightly bound community. These are 
issues which the tenure diversification approach may have begun 
to address, such that future attempts at skills development may 
prove more fruitful.
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The lessons of regeneration  
7. The Hattersley case establishes a set of principles that can help 
guide the successful regeneration of any area suffering from 
multiple deprivation and historical neglect. Our assessment 
highlights five fundamentally important factors which have 
implications for estate regeneration policy and practice: 
1. The Collaboration Agreement underpinning the stock transfer 
process and the regeneration masterplan, which enabled 
private sector investment whilst ensuring public sector 
control, high design standards and punctual delivery, and 
prevented speculative ‘land banking’;
2. The overarching approach to regeneration through 
tenure diversification coupled with school catchment area 
restructuring;
3. Peak Valley’s ‘relational’ – as opposed to ‘transactional’ 
– approach to the management of the estate and  its 
relationships with residents and key regeneration partners, 
notably Tameside MBC;  
4. The robust governance structure -  the Hattersley Land Board 
- constituted by the Collaboration Agreement; and
5. Tackling the deep-rooted, structural socio-economic problems 
often evident in regeneration estates like Hattersley is 
inherently complex and multi-faceted and cannot be achieved 
through the actions and programmes of housing associations 
and local authorities alone. The regeneration of Hattersley 
has, by necessity, focused on physical improvements to 
housing, amenities, safety and security and infrastructure over 
more social and economic programmes. This is borne out in 
the Government’s most recent Indices of Multiple Deprivation 
(2015) which show that Hattersley remains in the top 5% 
of most deprived areas in the country. This may point to a 
wider national failure, despite government policy, to develop 
sustainable local policy solutions that work with and for local 
communities.
8. We address each of these in turn, before concluding with 
recommendations for moving Onward.
The Collaboration Agreement
9. The successful physical transformation of the Hattersley estate 
can be traced back to – and is founded upon – the unusual, 
if not unique, way in which the stock transfer process to Peak 
Valley in 2006 was funded and the original masterplan created 
through the seminal Collaboration Agreement between central 
and local government, the private and third sectors, and the 
local community. This initiated a highly innovative mechanism 
of land value capture that levered in private sector investment 
to pay for substantial transformations to the estate’s housing, 
retail, community and transport infrastructures whilst precluding 
speculative land banking and maintaining overall public control 
of the land and of the regeneration process itself. Moreover, it 
instilled an institutional culture of close partnership working that 
has ensured a high level of commitment by all public and private 
partners to complete the regeneration process.
10. The Collaboration Agreement was a singular ‘act of genius’ 3 
without which the regeneration of the estate could have taken 
a very different turn. The demolition of some of the worst social 
housing and redevelopment as new homes for sale was the key 
strategic move – codified in the Collaboration Agreement – that 
paid for all other improvements, including to the existing stock 
and to the public realm, as well as for new retail, transport and 
community facilities. Moreover, the decision not to sell the land 
but only a licence to build and sell new homes was key to keeping 
the private sector developer on, albeit a slightly delayed, schedule 
particularly given the financial crash of 2008. This was supported 
by English Partnerships (now Homes England) – the government 
agency which provided the crucial financial guarantee in the 
Collaboration Agreement to underwrite the investments – who 
were at the time influenced by the Mixed Communities policy 
agenda.
Tenure diversification 
programme
11. Tenure diversification had two functions in Hattersley: first, to 
offer a source of private sector funding otherwise unobtainable to 
pay for all other improvements, including upgrading the existing 
housing stock; and, second, to inject a new, more diverse mix of 
tenures into what was a socio-economically isolated mono-tenure 
social housing estate in the hope of bringing new investment and 
residents with higher spending power for local goods and services, 
providing new opportunities for social mixing for existing residents, 
and raising aspirations particularly among young people. The latter 
aligned with the Mixed Communities agenda. This held that tenure 
diversification was itself a direct mechanism for regeneration, 
acting to counteract the additional disadvantages accruing 
through the spatial concentration of poverty – ‘neighbourhood 
effects’ – over and above deprivation per se, such as that deriving 
from an unfavourable labour market position.
12. The Mixed Communities agenda sought to tackle spatially-
concentrated poverty through a “more sustainable mix of housing 
types and tenures”4 – where housing tenures were seen as a 
rough proxy for socioeconomic class.5 At the heart of the mixed 
communities rationale is the ‘neighbourhood effect’ hypothesis 
which focuses on the spatial effects of poverty: defined by UK 
policy-makers as the “additional disadvantages that affect poorer 
people when they are concentrated in poor neighbourhoods.”6 
Despite ambiguous evidence for their existence, neighbourhood 
effects are seen to reinforce poverty through poor access to 
public services, social networks, role models, and employment 
opportunities.7
13. It is extremely difficult to measure how the introduction, for the 
first time on the estate, of new-build private homes for sale has 
affected the life chances of existing residents. This is a notoriously 
tricky question in the social sciences which hinges around the 
methodological controversy over whether ‘neighbourhood effects’ 
exist in any real or observable way, and rests on the cumulative 
assumption that spatial proximity leads to social mixing between 
tenure groups which in turn creates new opportunities for the most 
disadvantaged. Broadly consistent with the academic literature, 
we found little evidence of any significant social mixing between 
residents of the new build private houses and the longer-standing 
tenants of Peak Valley, but equally little evidence of any significant 
tensions or conflict developing between the latter and the new 
tenure group of owner-occupiers.
14. Hattersley’s tenure diversification strategy avoided the hostility 
that is usually associated with mixed communities. Perhaps 
the most damning critique of the Mixed Communities agenda 
is its tendency to displace existing residents in favour of more 
upwardly-mobile incomers – that it is ‘gentrification by stealth’; a 
form of ‘state-led gentrification’8. Such a charge cannot be levelled 
at the Hattersley regeneration programme, for all tenants of the 
old housing demolished to make way for the new have been 
rehoused by Peak Valley in better new-build housing. In many 
respects, this is one of its greatest achievements – to be able to 
fund improvements and replacement of existing stock, as well as 
new infrastructure and facilities, through the introduction of homes 
for sale, without displacing any existing residents. 
15. Resonating with the academic critique of the Mixed Communities 
agenda, the regeneration process in Hattersley appears to have 
done more to improve the material environment and cosmetic 
image of the area – thereby attracting newcomers and ‘diluting’ 
the deprivation – than to directly improve the life chances of 
existing residents themselves. The lack of any significant change 
in deprivation scores in Hattersley over the past decade, despite 
visible improvements to the estate and to facilities, supports 
this assessment. Nonetheless, this has done much to abate the 
persistent ‘territorial stigma’9 that has come to mark the estate, 
which may lower some of the barriers that many residents face in 
finding opportunities.
16. Despite the  lack of evidence to support the purported causal 
mechanisms of mixed communities, the tenure diversification 
project in Hattersley has had some positive – and some negative – 
impacts on the estate:
(i) Breaking up specific mono-tenure concentrations of social 
housing and moving families to new homes spread out across 
the estate has helped break down what many see as highly 
inward-looking, isolationist micro-communities on the estate; 
helping overcome through higher spatial mobility some of 
the more negative aspects of close-knit communities, such as 
gang culture, that were hindering upward mobility. Residents 
perceptions of crime and safety have improved as a result.
(ii) Imagined territorial barriers, such as that between the 
‘Hattersley’ and ‘Mottram’ sides of the estate, have become 
more permeable. This process was strengthened by 
rebuilding and relocating the district centre with community 
facilities, public services and Peak Valley’s offices at the 
centre of the divide, on Stockport Road, renamed The Hub, 
thereby creating a symbolic bridge between the two sides.
(iii) A problematic adverse effect of breaking down boundaries 
and increasing spatial mobility has been the displacement of 
anti-social behaviour and minor criminality from Hattersley 
to neighbouring town centres, such as Hyde. This reflects a 
common concern with the Mixed Communities agenda – that 
by moving people around and encouraging spatial mobility it 
tends to displace issues rather than resolve them directly10. 
17. Tenure diversification can be seen to have had most impact 
in combination with Tameside MBC’s earlier interventions in 
restructuring school catchment areas, thereby encouraging 
social mixing between tenure groups but in particular for young 
people. The process of territorial stigmatization of Hattersley also 
extended to school students on the estate, whose employment 
prospects were often hampered the moment they left school 
by unfavourable associations in the minds of local and perhaps 
even national employers. Part of the problem with one large 
feeder school serving a mono-tenure ex-council estate – asides 
from stigma – is that it concentrates children from disadvantaged 
families in one learning space which may therefore mean lower 
standards are achieved due to the compound effects of fewer 
resources to address greater learning needs. Moreover, as a 
microcosm of the estate itself, this situation intensified over time 
as social housing was ‘residualised’ – increasingly an option of last 
resort, rather than a mainstream tenure of choice.11 By demolishing 
Hattersley Comprehensive – located at the centre of the estate, 
now being developed as new homes for sale – and building 
new schools in neighbouring areas through a council-led Private 
Finance Initiative (PFI) programme, this self-reinforcing cycle of 
decline may have been broken. 
3 This and similar remarks can be attributed to various participants and stakeholders interviewed as part of this project.
4 ODPM, Sustainable Communities: Homes for all: A Five Year Plan from the office of the Deputy Prime Minister (ODPM, 2005): p.53
5 Rebecca Tunstall and Alex Fenton, “In the Mix: A Review of Mixed Income, Mixed Tenure and Mixed Communities,” 2006.
6 ODPM, Sustainable Communities: People, Places and prosperity: a five year plan from the Office of the Deputy Prime Minister. (2005): p.52
7 Alan Berube, “Mixed Communities in England: A US Perspective on Evidence and Policy Prospects,” Water, 2005.
8 Gary Bridge, Tim Butler, and Loretta Lees, eds., Mixed Communities: Gentrification by Stealth? (Policy Press, 2012).
9 Loic Wacquant, “Territorial Stigmatization in the Age of Advanced Marginality,” Thesis Eleven 91, no. 1 (November 1, 2007): 66–77
10 David Imbroscio, “Beyond Mobility: The Limits of Liberal Urban Policy,” Journal of Urban Affairs 34, no. 1 (February 26, 2012): 1–20.
11 Michael Harloe, The People’s Home?: Social Rented Housing in Europe and America (Wiley-Blackwell, 1995).
.
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Peak Valley’s relational 
governance approach
18. In examining Peak Valley’s role in the regeneration of Hattersley 
and its interaction with its community there has been no criticism 
of their approach. This we attribute to their ‘relational’ – as 
opposed to ‘transactional’ – approach to the delivery of their 
housing service. Such an approach potentially embodies and 
harnesses the concept of ‘social capital’ – high levels of which 
have been associated with socially and economically prosperous 
communities. 12 It has also been instrumental in cementing valued 
and trusted working relationships with all stakeholders and 
embedding successful governance of the estate with key partners: 
the local community; Tameside MBC; and, Barratt Homes, the 
developer of the new-build homes.
19. Faced with an existing local community infrastructure, Peak 
Valley’s challenge was to develop and manage the inter-
related component parts of social capital, namely trust and the 
networking features of bonding and bridging capital. It is evident 
that Peak Valley has developed trusted relationships. However, 
given the prevailing high level of deprivation on the estate, it 
is not yet clear if it managed the nurturing of bridging capital – 
important for developing inclusive and prosperous communities 
- whilst maintaining healthy levels of bonding capital, a feature 
of strong, robust communities. As  mentioned above,  tenure 
diversification and school rationalisation may deliver the required 
levels of bridging capital, but it is apparent that some residents 
are mourning the loss of associational activity and community 
spirit. We argue that while this may be a function of the lack of 
appropriate social space to congregate (see below) it is also likely 
to be a function of age. Existing community activists, particularly 
those associated with the still influential Hattersley Community 
Forum, are elderly and nostalgic for their past successes. 
Interestingly, the new build homes may serve to supply this 
missing generation of community activists as it appears that it is 
largely the 24-44 age group that are moving into these properties. 
20. Peak Valley’s relational approach has important implications 
for a current debate amongst practitioners and public 
administration academics about how public services can better 
address the increasingly complex needs of residents. The 
New Public Management paradigm – a bureaucratic, market-
led means of service delivery – rested upon assumptions that 
public services were products that were delivered to people. 
Some commentators 13 argue that this has proven to be an 
inefficient, often unjust and costly way of meeting  contemporary 
requirements of individuals and communities. Rather, what is 
required now is a new model14 of governance that emphasises a 
holistic, inter-agency and relational approach to service delivery; 
and, moreover, one that is predicated upon a notion of public 
service delivery as a process, the end outcome of which is likely 
to be more effective the more involved the service user is in the 
design and delivery of that process, towards a process of co-
production. 
21. In the absence of a more detailed comparative study it is also hard 
to assess the extent to which Peak Valley embodies the more 
relational principles promoted by the protagonists of ‘New Public 
Governance15 – as opposed to New Public Management – models 
of service delivery. It is arguable16 that small housing associations, 
such as Peak Valley, are particularly well-suited to delivering these 
kinds of relational services: they generally deliver a local housing 
management service; they have knowledge and understanding 
of the area; and, they tend to have strong relationships with local 
networks that can help make things happen. 
22. Peak Valley’s approach has been enhanced by their physical 
presence on the estate. This is not solely about the on-site location 
of a local housing office, though the accessibility of this is an 
important factor – it is also about how Peak Valley have embedded 
themselves into the living fabric of the community, through for 
example: hiring local residents to staff the office; enabling staff to 
become governors of the local primary schools; their involvement 
in the local football club; and, sponsoring community garden 
projects. It is this depth of immersion in the everyday, quotidian 
life of the estate that explains how the organisation has become, 
certainly in one resident’s eyes, ‘…like family’.
Partnership-based 
governance
23. The governance of the estate has been largely successful, 
principally due to the close partnership working between 
key public partners, which was written into the Collaboration 
Agreement from the outset. The following summarises our 
assessment of the governance of Hattersley since 2006:
1. Community: Peak Valley did not step into an empty cultural 
or political space when assuming housing management 
responsibility for the estate. A cadre of community activists 
had been developed in the years  up to 2006, largely through 
adversity, when they ‘…were the only ones running the estate’. 
Regeneration interventions by Tameside MBC – most notably 
the Single Regeneration Budget (SRB) and Neighbourhood 
Partnership Pathfinder initiative – had further developed this 
layer of community activism. They were a key component part 
of the governance platform, the Hattersley Land Board, which 
facilitated Peak Valley’s role in the regeneration process.
2. The Hattersley Neighbourhood Partnership no longer exists 
but it was an influence on the estate for almost ten years, 
four of those coinciding with Peak Valley’s tenure. Its legacy 
is contested. For some it delivered little impact relative 
to its resources; for others it was an important arena for 
connecting those participating residents – and by extension 
their networks – with governance issues, a way of developing 
bridging social capital. For the local ward councillors, the 
Neighbourhood Partnership was an important initiative as it 
co-ordinated different agencies’ activity on the estate. This, 
they feel, is a current gap in public service delivery on the 
estate.
3. Tameside MBC has been highly invested in the Hattersley 
estate for several decades, which has helped drive forward 
the regeneration process beyond the capabilities of Peak 
Valley alone. Part of this derives from the loyalty and political 
commitments to Hattersley shown by a number of powerful 
local politicians, many of whose constituents live on the 
estate. Some of these councillors have taken on key functions 
of the Land Board and helped direct council funds towards 
the regeneration of Hattersley. Council officers too have 
played an important part. The move to develop more bridging 
capital on the estate had already begun with Tameside MBC 
rationalising and relocating Hattersley’s schools. This is 
arguably one of the most decisive factors in the regeneration 
process.
4. Land Board: The primary mechanism for the governance of 
the regeneration of the estate is the Hattersley Land Board. 
This was established to deliver the Collaboration Agreement, 
and currently functions as an effective working partnership 
that facilitates ‘robust discussion’ between the key agencies 
of Tameside MBC and Peak Valley. Also represented are 
the Homes and Communities Agency (HCA) – incorporating 
English Partnerships and now Homes England – alongside 
four residents from the estate. There was some legitimate 
concern about the representativeness of residents attending 
the Board; in other words, it is not  clear that any of the 
residents are representing any other views other than their 
own. However, the meetings are also attended by Hattersley’s 
ward councillors who provide an alternative route for local 
democratic representation.
Tackling socio-economic 
problems 
24. Urban regeneration policy at the time of the stock transfer, 
driven as it was by recommendations of the Urban Task Force17 
and concerns of the New Labour Government’s Social Exclusion 
Unit18, was based upon narrowing the gap between the poorest 
neighbourhoods and the rest of the country to achieve the vision 
that ‘… in ten to twenty years’ time nobody should be seriously 
disadvantaged by where they live.’ 19. 
25. Our evaluation attempts to explain a singular paradox: Peak 
Valley’s tenant surveys20, and indeed its own legacy review21, 
reveal high, widespread and rising levels of satisfaction with all 
aspects of the organisation’s activities; and yet Hattersley remains 
in the top 5% of the most deprived areas in the country, a position 
it has maintained since Indices of Multiple Deprivation (IMD) were 
first collected in the 1990s. It is now estimated that around 95% 
of Hattersley residents live in the top 20% of the most deprived 
areas in England as captured by income, employment, education 
and health domains22. Almost half of the children (47%) on the 
estate live in poverty23. The causes of such persistent spatially-
concentrated deprivation are complex and not the purview of this 
report. The fact that tenant satisfaction and service performance 
have continued to rise in Hattersley since 2006 despite no 
improvements in life chances, is instructive of the positive impact 
of the interventions made by Peak Valley and its regeneration 
partners. 
26. Our findings point to a number of explanations:
(i) The Hattersley estate regeneration has focused primarily 
on physical improvements to housing, amenities, safety and 
security, and infrastructure over and above more social and 
economic interventions. Indeed, the IMD score that relates to 
barriers to housing and services shows an improvement for 
Hattersley, in stark contrast to consistently high deprivation 
on other domains. For the physical and financial accessibility 
of housing and local services, the area is only in the bottom 
half of most deprived areas in England24 – suggesting a 
very high performance in this area relative to other domains. 
Consistent with this picture, we found that residents largely 
feel that it is a ‘…much nicer place to live’ and they ‘…feel safer 
moving around the estate at all times.’ Tenants are happy with 
the improvements made to their housing in particular – both 
the upgrading of existing stock and the construction of new 
housing – as well as in other physical infrastructures, such as 
the railway station, whose redesign has proven a significant 
success in making it safe and attracting greater use. 
12 Robert Putnam, Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community (Simon & Schuster, 2000).
13 Osborne, S (2013) A New Theory for Public Service Management: Toward a (Public) Service-Dominant Approach. American Review of Public Administration 43 (2) p135-158
14 Muir, R., Parker I (2014) Many to Many: how the relational state will transform Public Services. IPPR
15 Osborne, S. (2006). The New Public Governance? Public Management Review, 8(3) 377-387
16 Muir, R., Parker I (2014) Many to Many: how the relational state will transform Public Services. IPPR
17 Department for Environment Transport and the Regions, 1999 ‘Towards an Urban Renaissance’
18 Social Exclusion Unit ( 2001) A New Commitment to Neighbourhood Renewal: national Strategy Action Plan, London SEU.
19 ibid page 8
20 See Peak Valley STAR surveys
21 see Peak Valley Performance Legacy Review 2017
22 Community Insight Profile for Hattersley, 2017. Symphony Housing Group.
23 Ibid. Poverty here is defined as living in in families in receipt of out of work benefits, or in receipt of tax credits where their reported income is less than 60% median income.
24 English Indices of Deprivation 2015 available online https://www.gov.uk/government/statistics/english-indices-of-deprivation-2015
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(ii) The statistical paradox suggests that regeneration efforts 
undertaken by housing associations and local authorities 
are not enough alone to address fundamental structural 
inadequacies in the local economy, largely created by the 
economic restructuring of the 1980s, with which successive 
governments’ urban regeneration policies and area based 
initiatives have struggled to contend. This has left local 
governance organisations such as Peak Valley with limited 
agency to effect and offset these deep and complex socio-
economic problems. This may point to a wider national failure, 
despite government policy, to develop sustainable local 
policy solutions that work with and for local communities. 
(iii) Within this constrained context, the post-2006 regeneration 
process may nonetheless have made significant impacts 
on life chances, but which have yet to materialise. Whilst 
relatively cosmetic improvements and consequent changes 
in satisfaction levels have been quick to emerge, the 
socioeconomic impacts of the regeneration of the Hattersley 
estate have been slower to take effect. There is a time 
lag between the interventions made and their translation 
into socioeconomic benefits; whilst satisfaction levels 
are more immediately discernible from general service 
and environmental improvements. We believe this is due 
to the generational nature of the specific regeneration 
process in Hattersley: young people have most to gain 
and are only beginning to enter the labour market. The 
fundamental intervention that will affect the life chances 
of younger generations is the innovative dual strategy of 
school catchment area restructuring and housing tenure 
diversification.
Moving Onward
27. As noted above, this evaluation of the impact of the interventions 
by Peak Valley on the regeneration of Hattersley is premature. 
The Collaboration Agreement commits its signatories to a 
further ten years of regeneration activity. Moreover, as we 
have emphasised, the ongoing generational impact of tenure 
diversification and school rationalisation may yet affect the social 
and economic prosperity of the estate. It is arguable that it is only 
at this future point that the impact of Peak Valley can be fully 
appraised. Nonetheless, it is evident that Peak Valley have made 
a remarkable contribution to Hattersley’s regeneration, one that 
has left a largely positive legacy for Onward to contemplate. In 
summary, Peak Valley have:
•	 made a significant contribution to the regeneration of the 
estate by developing innovative approaches to funding, 
designing and delivering largely successful interventions;
•	 garnered an enviable institutional reputation for integrity – we 
found this to hold true for all stakeholders involved in the 
regeneration process;
•	 provided a local, accessible housing management service; 
•	 afforded sufficient weight to their social responsibilities to 
make a positive difference to how they are perceived upon 
the estate.
28. Almost all participants in this research, however, were concerned 
about the future of Hattersley once Peak Valley’s governance 
structure was fully incorporated into Onward’s. They fear the return 
of a more remote landlord. One resident in pointing to the end of 
their involvement on the Board of Management asked ‘… how will 
they know us?’
29. In light of these concerns – and the themes raised in the report – 
the main issues for Onward to address are the following:
(i) Ensuring that there is sufficient community involvement in 
the design of public realm improvements being developed 
by Tameside MBC/Land Board, as well as in any future 
redevelopment plans for the estate.
(ii) Rethinking and addressing the chronic under-use of The Hub 
without unsettling community relations and in ways which 
promote co-located multi-agency working.
(iii) Related to (ii) is the need to address the lack of social space 
on the estate for community association. There is a resident 
perception that The Hub has too much institutional oversight 
to work as an attractive community centre. The loss of pubs 
– from 11 to 1 – over the years has also served to diminish the 
facilities for social activity. 
(iv) Embedding a governance mechanism to address the ‘how will 
they know us?’ question. New resident/tenant recruits to the 
Land Board is a start but needs more collective community 
involvement beyond the Land Board, in ways which replace 
the role of the Hattersley Neighbourhood Partnership.
(v) Developing new governance approaches for managing all 
housing, increasingly split between owner-occupiers, buy-
to-let landlords, Right to Buy owners and Peak Valley, which 
threatens the integrity of estate management.
(vi) Tackling the persistent levels of socioeconomic deprivation 
through policy innovation. Jobs fairs and skills training 
initiatives have had limited success and other solutions are 
needed. These should look to develop the endogenous 
capacities of Hattersley and its residents rather than rely 
on spatial mobility to connect residents with exogenous 
economic opportunities.
CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCING 
OUR REPORT
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This report bears testimony to Peak Valley’s legacy for the Hattersley estate 
over the 12 years from 2006 to 2018. It has been written to provide Onward, as 
it undertakes its stewardship of this estate, and wider housing sector, with an 
independent assessment of the ways in which a social landlord can improve 
the quality of peoples’ lives in such areas. In potentially providing a template 
for urban regeneration activity elsewhere, we have sought to highlight 
Hattersley’s particular socio-economic and political history. The rich culture of 
local community organising and poor condition of physical infrastructure that 
Peak Valley inherited 12 years ago was profoundly shaped by the preceding 
half century of various urban regeneration policies and initiatives. Our task 
here is to identify and appraise Peak Valley’s singular contribution within this 
historical context.
To do so, we collated and analysed historical textual and visual 
documentary material and drew upon descriptive statistics of Hattersley 
compiled by various agencies. Our observation of the estate included 
walking tours and regular visits, totalling 16, over a period of three 
months, from October 2017 to January 2018, as well as specific 
multiple visits to The Hub, the Tesco, local schools, the precinct shops 
and railway station. We talked with a cross-section of individuals 
and groups of people who have had, or continue to have, a stake 
in the regeneration of Hattersley. This included 26 semi-structured 
interviews, each averaging around an hour, detailed in the Appendix. 
We also conducted two focus groups of five and six residents, as well 
as speaking informally with a variety of people we met on our walks 
around the estate. We recorded and later transcribed and analysed 
these multiple conversations to get a deeper sense of the fundamental 
issues raised by different stakeholders. In doing so we used the 
regeneration objectives detailed in the Collaboration Agreement – 
the founding legal document signed by all partners, underpinning 
Hattersley’s stock transfer and regeneration process – as criteria to 
assess Peak Valley’s performance. This approach has enabled us to 
develop and present a rich narrative with stakeholder testimony, which 
sets out Peak Valley’s role within the broader story of Hattersley. 
Our evaluation should be interpreted in light of the fact that the 
regeneration process in Hattersley is ongoing. The Collaboration 
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Agreement commits its signatories to a further ten years of 
regeneration activity. Onward commissioned this report to ensure 
that learning from the Hattersley case is captured and shared. This 
report, then, is a snapshot of an ongoing process of transformation 
that aims to provide lessons not only for Onward but for the wider 
housing association sector and for policymakers in local and central 
government.
Two sets of descriptive statistics, useful as a quantitative measure of 
Peak Valley’s performance, underline the validity of this line of enquiry. 
On one hand, Peak Valley’s own tenant surveys25, and indeed its own 
legacy review26, reveal high, widespread and consistent levels of 
satisfaction with all aspects of the organisation’s activities. On the other 
hand, according to the Government’s Indices of Multiple Deprivation, 
most recently compiled in 2015, Hattersley remains in the top 5% of 
most deprived areas in the country, a position it has maintained since 
these statistics were first collected in the 1990s. These statistics beg 
the question why levels of tenant satisfaction and service performance 
have continued to rise since 2006 – suggesting the interventions made 
by Peak Valley and its regeneration partners on the estate have been 
positively impactful – whilst concomitant, or indeed any statistically 
significant, improvements to life chances have failed to materialise. 
We adopt a research approach that might help explain how Peak 
Valley’s performance in Hattersley can be viewed positively despite the 
persistently high levels of socio-economic deprivation prevailing upon 
the estate.
These facts also serve to furnish an explanation that points to 
fundamental structural inadequacies in the local economy, largely 
created by the economic restructuring of the 1980s, which successive 
governments’ urban regeneration policies and area based initiatives 
have barely touched. This has left local governance organisations such 
as Peak Valley with limited agency to effect and offset these deep and 
complex socio-economic problems. It is one that also points to a failure, 
despite government policy, to develop sustainable local policy solutions 
that work with and for the local community.
Nonetheless, it is Peak Valley’s agency that is the focus of this report. 
It is within this explanatory framework that we offer a fine-grained 
narrative of Peak Valley’s role in the regeneration of Hattersley. In what 
follows we first present a short introduction to Hattersley written to 
familiarise the reader with the salient characteristics of the estate that 
resurface throughout our evaluation of the regeneration process. Here, 
we provide a brief history of Hattersley’s socioeconomic trajectory as 
way of background to the stock transfer process that has defined the 25 See Peak Valley STAR surveys
26 see Peak Valley Performance Legacy Review 2017
regeneration since 2006. In the main part of the report, we explore in 
detail the various interventions that Peak Valley and its partners have 
made on the estate since 2006, focusing on tenure diversification, 
housing stock upgrading, public realm improvements, new retail and 
community amenities, transport infrastructure and skills training. This 
provides an assessment of how Peak Valley has performed against 
their agreed regeneration objectives captured in the Collaboration 
Agreement. We then proceed to examine the governance of the 
estate by presenting an assessment of how effectively the key local 
organisations, namely Tameside Metropolitan Borough Council (MBC) 
and Peak Valley, have used their institutional influence to shape the 
regeneration process. We define governance here as including social 
actors and, in so doing, we also explore in detail how Peak Valley has 
engaged the local community. Finally, we consider how Peak Valley’s 
legacy might inform Onward Homes in its ongoing stewardship of the 
estate. We conclude by drawing out a number of lessons learnt for 
estate regeneration policy and practice. 
Figure 1: Aerial view over the Hattersley estate, looking west towards Manchester city centre.
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Hattersley is a large housing estate that sits in the Longdendale Valley close 
to the Peak District National Park. It lies 13 miles to the east of Manchester 
on the edge of the Greater Manchester conurbation and is situated adjacent 
to and south of the M67 motorway which links the M60 to the trans-Pennine 
Manchester-to-Sheffield routes. Hattersley falls within two electoral wards 
of Tameside Metropolitan Borough: Hyde Godley and Longdendale. Its 
administrative centre is five miles away at Ashton-under-Lyne. Other nearby 
centres are Hyde town centre (approximately 1 mile away) and the small 
villages of Mottram and Broadbottom adjacent to the area. 
Figure 2: Map showing Hattersley’s location. 
Source: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hattersley
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Figure 3: The original outline plan for the Hattersley overspill estate.
Source: Courtesy of Manchester City Archives, Engineers Microcard Collection, Ref. 5460/-/12.
Figure 4: Typical housing in Hattersley, with green hills always in sight
The Hattersley estate was constructed by Manchester City Council 
between 1962 and 1972 as one of several ‘overspill’ estates built 
to accommodate the extensive post-war east city centre clearance 
programme during that period. Built at a cost of around £10 million 
on 480 acres of greenfield land, mostly farmland, Hattersley was the 
second largest of 22 overspill sites, housing over 12,000 people.27  
Providing new homes with all the ‘mod cons’ arranged within plentiful 
green open space and set against a backdrop of hills, the Peaks 
only a walk away, Hattersley promised its first residents, as a popular 
slogan had it, “Fresh Hope, Fresh Air.”28  For a variety of political and 
socioeconomic reasons, which we outline below, life on Hattersley 
down the decades did not always live up to such early promises. 
Originally comprising 4150 properties, this had fallen to 1,725 (of 
which 1,404 were tenanted) by the time of the stock transfer in 2006, 
mainly due to the demolition of the notorious tower blocks, the ‘Seven 
Sisters’.29  At this time the population of the area was estimated to be 
around 7,000 30 , with an age structure biased toward the younger (5-19 
years) and older (55-74) age groups. The pattern of housing tenure 
was weighted heavily in favour of social rented accommodation, at 
70.6%, with 29.4% privately owned, almost all through the Right to 
Buy programme initiated a few decades earlier. By 2015 the local 
population had fallen slightly to 6,550 31 , the overwhelming majority 
of whom (95.5%) classified themselves as White British. The local 
population’s age structure retained a higher than average proportion 
of young people aged 0-15 years although its proportion of older 
residents had fallen to slightly below the national average. By 2015 the 
pattern of housing tenure had changed to 37.8% owner occupation, 
56% social rent and 6.2% in other rented accommodation32 .
High levels of social and economic deprivation, relative to the rest of 
England, characterise this area. Deprivation and relative inequalities 
were entrenched, as in other parts of the country, during the economic 
restructuring in the mid to late 1980s. By the late 1990s Hattersley 
was in the top 10% of most deprived areas in the country33 and these 
levels had shifted little by 201534. It is now estimated that around 
95% of Hattersley residents live in the top 20% of the most deprived 
areas in England as captured by income, employment, education and 
health domains35. Almost half of the children (47%) on the estate live in 
poverty.36
The spatial geography used to enumerate the various domains of 
deprivation undoubtedly mask pockets of relative affluence in nearby 
villages such as Mottram or indeed amongst recently arrived residents 
of the new-build properties within the estate itself. However, the 
prevalence and persistence of high levels of deprivation across most of 
the domains captured by these Indices should remain a policy concern. 
Urban regeneration policy at the time of the stock transfer, driven as 
it was by recommendations of the Urban Task Force37and concerns of 
the New Labour Government’s Social Exclusion Unit38, was based upon 
narrowing the gap between the poorest neighbourhoods and the rest 
of the country to achieve the vision that ‘… in ten to twenty years’ time 
nobody should be seriously disadvantaged by where they live’39. The 
causes of such persistent deprivation are complex and not the purview 
of this report. Suffice it to say that some comfort for local agencies and 
policymakers attempting to address this problem can be gained from 
the area’s score on the domain that captures barriers to housing and 
services. On this measure, the physical and financial accessibility of 
housing and local services, the area is only in the bottom half of most 
deprived areas in England40 – suggesting very high performance in this 
area relative to other domains.
Indeed, Hattersley residents are relatively well provided for by local 
services, amenities and employment opportunities, albeit generally low 
paid. These include: a local housing office; a health centre; a dentist; 
four primary schools; two secondary schools; a library; a sports centre; 
27 Keith Kintrea, “Policies and Programmes for Disadvantaged Neighbourhoods: Recent English Experience,” Housing Studies 22, no. 2 (March 2007): 261–82, 
doi:10.1080/02673030601132920.
28 Tameside MBC, “Supplementary Planning Guidance: Hattersley and Mottram,” 2004, https://www.tameside.gov.uk/tmbc5/hattersleyspg.pdf.
29 PVHA Annual report 2016
30 Development and Delivery Strategy, 2006, English Partnerships
31 ONS, Mid-year estimates 2015
32 Community Insight Profile for Hattersley, 2017. Symphony Housing Group
33 Indices of Deprivation 2000 available online at http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20100407204456/
http://www.communities.gov.uk/archived/general-content/communities/indicesofdeprivation/indicesofdeprivation/
34 English Indices of deprivation 2015 available online https://www.gov.uk/government/statistics/english-indices-of-deprivation-2015
35 Community Insight Profile for Hattersley, 2017. Symphony Housing Group.
36 Ibid. Poverty here is defined as living in in families in receipt of out of work benefits, or in receipt of tax credits where their reported income is less than 60% median income.
37 Department for Environment Transport and the Regions, 1999 ‘Towards an Urban Renaissance’
38 Social Exclusion Unit ( 2001) A New Commitment to Neighbourhood Renewal: national Strategy Action Plan, London SEU.
39 ibid page 8
40 English Indices of Deprivation 2015 available online https://www.gov.uk/government/statistics/english-indices-of-deprivation-2015
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a community facility (The Hub), three churches (Church of England, 
Catholic and Baptist); a railway station providing two 20 minute services 
every hour to the centre of Manchester; a regular local bus service to 
the nearby centres of Ashton and Hyde; a large supermarket (Tesco 
Extra), six local shops; one public house; and a community garden. 
Local employment opportunities – those within walking distance – are 
provided by a McDonalds, a British Gas Call Centre and the Tesco Extra; 
whilst a number of jobs are provided by the local housing association, 
Peak Valley. Four of these were won by local residents.
The high performance in public service and housing provision 
relative to other domains can be attributed in part to the successful 
management of the estate by Hattersley’s dedicated community-based 
housing association. Peak Valley was established as a social landlord 
on 25th September 2006, specifically to own and manage the housing 
stock transferred from Manchester City Council. Its structure and name 
were developed and agreed with residents, Tameside officers and local 
councillors, and Manchester City Council. Its roots in the community can 
be traced back to its parent company Portico’s intensive consultation 
exercises with residents in developing the regeneration masterplan 
with Tameside MBC, but also to the process by which Peak Valley 
was christened as such. There was a competition among tenants for 
the name, and the two names with the highest votes were ‘Peak’ and 
‘Valley’, evoking the natural landscape of the estate. It was decided to 
combine the two names for Peak Valley Housing Association. 
The way in which Peak Valley was conceived and christened illustrates 
the strength of community that has always marked Hattersley. From the 
outset, the early residents arriving in the 1960s, mainly from working 
class areas of East Manchester, such as Gorton, noted a ‘strong sense 
of community’41.  However, these were city dwellers used to the hustle, 
bustle, noise and opportunities of a big city – a marked contrast 
from the bucolic environment that did, and still does, characterise 
Hattersley. Unsurprisingly, notions of community were tempered by 
feelings of ‘isolation and being cut off from facilities of the city’42. 
These feelings are still very much in evidence today.  It may have been 
these sentiments or the fact that many of the early properties were 
‘jerry-built’ – remaining in use well beyond their original purpose to 
provide temporary accommodation – that prompted the folk song the 
‘Hattersley Lament’:
‘Ee dear what can the matter be?
Some silly bugger has moved us to ‘attersley.
We’ve been up ‘attersley three weeks on Saturday,
‘Ee how I wish we weren’t ‘ere’.43
Such lament is not a common currency amongst Hattersley residents 
today. If it lingers still it will be with people who, if they have heard 
of Hattersley at all, will know it by a reputation forged from the three 
dreadful, but isolated, criminal incidents that have punctuated the 
estate’s history over the last half century, namely: the Moors’ murderers; 
the serial killings of Dr Harold Shipman; and the recent murders 
of PCs Nicola Hughes and Fiona Bone. These incidents appear to 
have only galvanised the local community, reinforcing – certainly in 
older residents – their sense of isolation from the outside world and 
determination to overcome adversity. Many interview participants 
remarked to us that older residents describe themselves as living ‘on’ 
Hattersley – evoking an island cut off from the surrounding mainland 
– whilst newer residents live ‘in’ Hattersley. Others described their 
‘long struggle’ to improve their area. This singular drive to persevere 
is evident in the elderly activists that maintain the influence of the 
Hattersley Community Forum in the management of the estate. It is also 
seen, albeit in a more quixotic fashion, in the last remaining individual 
resident still refusing to move and make way for the next phase of the 
new district centre, including a Lidl supermarket and a Costa coffee 
outlet.  
The social history that bears testimony to this community spirit is 
inscribed not only in the memories of long-standing residents but in 
various outlets from the (above) ‘Hattersley Lament’ to groups like 
Mancunian Reunion.44 The latter was prompted by the Hattersley 
Neighbourhood Partnership as part of the regeneration process, 
and now enjoys an independent life as a social group dedicated to 
preserving the history of the original residents of Hattersley. It is also 
evident in a short film for the BBC, ‘Songs from Hattersley’45, where we 
hear five unique and personal stories direct from the residents, who 
each sing their story in their own words to music specially written for 
the film.
It is this sense of community that has not only helped the area to 
cohere after the shocking criminal incidents of the past but also helped 
to doggedly drive much of the impressive resident engagement in the 
regeneration process since the late 1990s. It is perhaps no surprise 
that the local community newsletter published as part of the Hattersley 
Neighbourhood Partnership regeneration programme was entitled, 
following community consultation, ‘the Hattersley Terrier’46. Their 
dogged determination has helped Hattersley residents stay strong in 
the face of severe urban-economic decline and the drag brought to 
bear on their and their children’s life chances by the persistent stigma 
attached to the estate. It has also informed their particular approach to 
engaging with, and helping shape, the regeneration process that began 
in earnest in the late 1990s. 
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Figure 5: New district centre (The Hub and Tesco Extra car park) nestled behind housing.
41 Hattersley Neighbourhood Partnership (2007) ‘Hattersley 40 years on’ http://www.hattersley.org.uk/videos/index.html
42 ibid
43 ‘the Hattersley Lament’ on the album ‘A Lancashire Lad’ (1972) Mike Harding.
Figure 6: Some of Hattersley’s first residents at a Mancunian Reunion event
44 https://mancreunion.wordpress.com/about/
45 Songs from Hattersley’ https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=TFf_EpGj5vo
46 http://www.hattersley.org.uk/2011/10/hattersley_terrier_magazine/index.html
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2.1 A brief history of 
regeneration
The post-war history of housing regeneration records a general trend 
away from simple ‘neighbourhood improvement’ approaches that 
seek to tackle issues of housing vacancy, environmental neglect and 
spatially-concentrated deprivation by working directly with residents, 
towards more market-led and interventionist ‘neighbourhood 
transformation’ approaches that attempt to radically restructure 
housing estates through changing their position in the housing market 
hierarchy often via the introduction of new tenures.47 Hattersley 
stands at the forefront of this historical trajectory – embodying an 
innovative approach to tenure diversification that not only seeks to 
create new opportunities for the upward social mobility of existing 
residents, but so too provides a sustainable source of funding for a 
more traditional programme of improvements in the realms of housing, 
retail, transport and employment. In this way, Hattersley combines both 
an ‘improvement’ and ‘transformation’ approach: the latter pays for the 
former. 
Such a strategy represents an alternative route to fund the regeneration 
of large ex-council estates that remain expensive to regenerate 
owing to high levels of deprivation and dereliction and which have 
exhausted or been bypassed by all conventional sources of funding, 
such as government programmes and stock transfer receipts. This is 
certainly the case for Hattersley, which remained outside the political-
geographical reach of well-funded programmes such as the Housing 
Market Renewal Initiative Pathfinders, and whose housing stock was too 
low in value for Peak Valley to be able to borrow the capital investment 
required for expensive improvements from private providers. Due to 
these factors, a straightforward improvement approach to upgrading 
housing stock via a stock transfer process coupled with government 
grant – for instance, the Decent Homes Programme – was simply not 
an option for the regeneration partners. A more transformative solution 
was called for. In this section, we summarise the socioeconomic 
conditions and policy process that led to the birth of this approach.
Due to its physical isolation on the edge of Manchester – a city that 
began its industrial decline as Hattersley was conceived – economic 
opportunities remained limited. Since the 1970s and ‘80s, many of 
the large local employers began to close or shed their workforce in 
response to growing global competition and economic restructuring. 
Many residents have therefore struggled to find work, especially within 
easy reach, and unemployment soon became a major problem on 
the estate. Socioeconomic isolation was amplified by poor planning 
decisions. For instance, for much of its history, Hattersley lacked good 
transport links to the city: it took nearly twenty years for a train station 
to be built on the line running into central Manchester.48 This not only 
deepened the sense of isolation that entrenched itself on the estate 
but so too cut its residents off from easy access to job opportunities 
outside the immediate vicinity. One of the many successes of the post-
2006 regeneration of the estate – as we highlight in this report – was 
to improve access and use of the train station that was for so long 
neglected and dangerous to use.
By the late 1990s, the situation in Hattersley – dilapidated poorly-
maintained properties, ‘hard-to-let’ flats, escalating social problems, 
and deepening deprivation all concentrated in one estate, placing 
additional demands on already over-stretched public services – 
was perhaps worse than in other comparable ‘overspill’ estates. 
This was due to interlocking socioeconomic and political factors 
compounded by a lack of investment or maintenance by remote 
landlord, Manchester City Council. An accident of geography meant 
that the estate was owned by Manchester City Council but located 
outside of its administrative boundaries, in Tameside MBC, instilling 
little incentive to invest. Adequate investment in Hattersley was further 
discouraged by constraints levied by central government on local 
authority capabilities to borrow capital for council housing regeneration 
and the policy shift towards stock transfer to housing associations from 
the late 1980s.49This meant that conventional funding methods were 
simply not adequate to pay for the regeneration required. A number 
of regeneration programmes, including a Single Regeneration Budget 
bid by Tameside MBC, failed to make much headway with addressing 
Hattersley’s acute needs.  
At the turn of the century, Hattersley appeared to be in terminal 
decline. The estate was originally built to house around 15,000 people, 
but by 2006, its population had fallen to about 6,600.50 Such a huge 
drop reflects the general decline of the estate over this period – and 
suggests why a radical new approach to regeneration was required. 
Indeed, this was recognised in the final masterplan produced in 2003 
and adopted by Tameside MBC as Supplementary Planning Guidance 
in 2004:
Efforts by Tameside, Manchester City Council, the Hattersley 
Development Trust and residents groups have seen many 
improvements including new schools. However they have not 
stemmed the tide of decline. These groups, together with English 
Partnerships, the Housing Corporation and Portico Housing 
Association are agreed that only a radical change of image, and 
the injection of a possible £200million investment will succeed in 
regenerating The Hattersley and Mottram area. 51
That radical new approach came in the form of a stock transfer 
proposal and Collaboration Agreement between the public, private 
and third sectors that guaranteed the funding necessary to transform 
the estate. The physical transformation since 2006, but starting in the 
late 1990s with interventions by Tameside MBC, has been remarkable. 
Figure 6 outlines the major historical milestones for Hattersley’s 
regeneration both before and after the 2006 stock transfer, and the 
following provides a sketch of these changes.
At its nadir, in the late 1990s, the Hattersley estate contained vast 
swathes of poorly maintained timber-framed housing originally built 
as temporary accommodation but soon unfit for habitation, as well as 
‘hard-to-let’ flats in notoriously unpopular tower blocks, known as the 
‘seven sisters’. A number of ‘problem families’ and amongst Manchester 
City Council’s most vulnerable tenants were relocated to Hattersley, 
47 Ruth Lupton and Crispian Fuller, “Mixed Communities: A New Approach to Spatially Concentrated Poverty in England,” International Journal of Urban and Regional Research 33, no. 4 
(December 2009): 1014–28.
48 Martin Dodge, “Mapping the Geographies of Manchester’s Housing Problems and the Twentieth Century Solutions,” in Manchester Geographies, ed. W Theakstone (Manchester 
Geographical Society, 2017), 17–34.
Figure 7: notorious tower blocks ‘seven sisters’ coming down in 2001
which placed pressure on the already over-stretched public services 
managed by Tameside MBC. The estate had earned a poor reputation 
locally and nationally, having been vilified in the national press for a 
series of shocking criminal incidents. Minor criminality, drug use and 
gang culture were rife. Hattersley Comprehensive school had seen 
student numbers drop from over a thousand to around 300. The district 
centre was in an advanced state of dilapidation, having seen dozens 
of shops and small businesses close. The train station was considered 
dangerous and chronically under-used. This only deepened a powerful 
and abiding sense of physical and social ‘isolation and being cut 
off from facilities of the city’52; that people lived ‘on’ rather than ‘in’ 
Hattersley, as if an island cut off from the rest of society.
Today, all that has changed. Hattersley’s housing stock has been 
considerably upgraded and diversified, with a new mix of tenures 
and an unprecedented increase in new-build owner-occupation. The 
‘seven sisters’, along with other unfit-for-purpose housing, have been 
demolished, and bungalows, apartments and houses built in their 
place. A new district centre has been developed with a Tesco Extra 
which employs over a hundred local people and which helped pay for 
a bespoke community centre, The Hub. Hattersley Comprehensive  has 
been demolished and new schools built in different locations with more 
diverse catchment areas. The train station has been redesigned and 
use is up by 30%. All housing stock now meets Decent Homes standard 
and tenant satisfaction has risen dramatically. A number of skills 
training and community development programmes, such as community 
gardens, have been developed and prove popular among residents of 
all ages. Hattersley’s reputation is improving and the new housing for 
sale by regeneration partner Barratt Homes is amongst their fastest 
selling developments in the country. For the first time since its heyday, 
Hattersley’s population is growing once more, as new residents move 
in and former residents move back. We explore these interventions 
made by Peak Valley in greater detail in the next chapter. In chapter 4, 
we identify the principal factors of success.
49 Tameside MBC, “Supplementary Planning Guidance: Hattersley and Mottram.”
50 PVHA, “10 Year Legacy & Financial Business Plan 2017-2022” (2017).
51 Tameside MBC, “Supplementary Planning Guidance: Hattersley and Mottram.”
52 Hattersley Neighbourhood Partnership (2007) ‘Hattersley 40 years on’ http://www.hattersley.org.uk/videos/index.html
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Figure 8: Historical timeline of significant events
Date Milestone
1960 Manchester City Council begins buying up farmland near Mottram 
1962 Construction of the Hattersley Estate begins
May 1963 First tenants move into new homes from inner-city Manchester
1972 Hattersley estate completed
1978 Railway Station is opened
1981 Hattersley Community Forum formally constituted as charitable body
1982 Portico Housing Association formed
1997 Single Regeneration Budget programme commences
1999 Stock transfer proposals announced by Manchester City Council
2000 First masterplan produced by Harvest Housing Association
2001 Seven sisters demolished
2002 New schools built through PFI scheme by Tameside MBC
2002 Hattersley Neighbourhood Partnership established
2003 Harvest business plan proves unviable and Portico invited to submit proposal
2003 Second and final masterplan produced by Portico
2004 Masterplan adopted as Supplementary Planning Guidance by Tameside MBC
2004 Portico merges with another association to form Contour Housing Group 
2005 Tenants vote ‘yes’ for stock transfer to Contour Housing Group 
2005 Mancunian Reunion established through Neighbourhood Partnership
2006 Collaboration Agreement signed by regeneration partners
Sept 2006 Peak Valley founded as a subsidiary of Contour Housing Group to take on the stock 
Sept 2006 Stock transfer to Peak Valley
Oct 2007 Planning approval for Phase 1a of new Barratt developments
2008 Global financial crisis creates uncertainty for Barratt Homes and delays construction
April 2010 Phase 1 of Barratt developments begins: Hare Hill, 196 units various property types
2011 Contour Housing Group merges with Vicinity to become Symphony Housing Group 
Feb 2011 Work begins at the Padstow Walk development, 8 bungalows for over 55’s
July 2011 Friends of Hattersley Station founded by local residents
Aug 2011 Work begins on The Hub
2012 Tesco begins skills training scheme with Hattersley residents
July 2012 Tesco Extra officially opens
Oct 2012 The Hub officially opens
2015 Re-routing of road to Railway Station completed
March 2017 Peak Valley agrees to become part of common board at Symphony Housing Group
March 2017 Demolition of last remaining tower block, Tameside Court
May 2017 Symphony Housing Group changes name to Onward Homes
March 2018 All members of Onward Homes, including Peak Valley, now operate as one organisation and trade as Onward.
CHAPTER 3
EVALUATION OF 
INTERVENTIONS
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Figure 9: New apartments: a successful example of a more physical intervention
EVALUATION OF INTERVENTIONS3
In this section we evaluate in detail the various interventions made by 
Peak Valley since 2006. First, we consider the more physical and structural 
interventions, such as housing upgrading, before moving onto more 
community-oriented and social aspects, ending with skills training. We start 
by considering the principal approach to regeneration, tenure diversification 
through the introduction of homes for sale, which frames the context for 
exploring housing upgrading and physical infrastructure: the new-build 
homes for sale and new social housing, the existing stock and public realm, 
and the railway station. Next we address the new retail facilities, focusing on 
the new district centre, and in particular the Tesco Extra, before considering 
the flagship project, The Hub, the new home of many public and community 
services, such as the library. Finally, we assess the impacts of the community 
investment and skills development strategies.
In sum, we find that these interventions have largely been a success, 
albeit to varying degrees. In order to assess the overall success of the 
regeneration process itself – and the contributions made by specific 
interventions – we have evaluated the progress achieved for each 
regeneration objective set out in the Collaboration Agreement. A 
summary of this is presented in Figure 12 below, which also acts as a 
guide to the Interventions section.
Regeneration Objective Progress made
Deliver a more sustainable mix of residential 
accommodation across the Project Areas in 
favour of owner occupation;
- Achieved (see section 4.2)
- from around 70:30 social/private to 60:40
- The private element has been diversified from 100% ex-council Right to Buy to include mostly 
new-build owner-occupied
- Although some problems with buy-to-let landlords are emerging
Secure an increase in the resident population in 
the project Area;
- Achieved
- Population decline has been arrested and reversed
- New residents are moving to Hattersley for the first time in decades
Secure the development of the District Centre; - Partly-achieved (section 3.3)
- Tesco Extra and The Hub are complete
- New precinct shops on Honiton Avenue are complete
- But second site south of Ashworth Lane (for Lidl and Costa Coffee) yet to be secured
Secure the delivery of sustainable facilities for the 
community;
- Partly-achieved
- The Hub’s community facilities are much improved on the old community centre, but remain 
under-used and poorly-managed (section 3.4)
- Recreational space, particularly for young people, has been reduced through housing 
redevelopment, and yet to be reconstructed through the delayed public realm improvements 
(section 3.1.4)
Construct the Principal Infrastructure; - Largely achieved
- New housing and retail completed (sections 3.2 and 3.4)
- Railway station improved (section 3.2)
- But public realm yet to be improved (section 3.1.4)
Assist the parties in achieving their commitment 
to improve Hattersley;
- Highly successful (section 4.4)
- The Land Board has been very effective governance model
- Partnership approach underwritten by Collaboration Agreement very successful in 
maintaining commitment from all partners 
Deliver a landmark project in partnership with the 
private sector;
- Largely successful
- Partnership with Tesco has been very beneficial to the estate, through the £4 million planning 
gains secured for the development of The Hub (section 3.3.1)
- Partnership with Barratt Homes has produced amongst their fastest selling and most popular 
new housing developments in the UK (3.1.1)
Facilitate the development of a series of high 
quality character areas; 
- Largely achieved (sections 3.1.1 and 3.1.2)
- excellent architectural design quality in comparison with peers, in both social and private new-
build housing
- some concerns over secured-by-design character of earlier phases of Barratt developments 
creating defensive urbanism
Engage the community in the development and 
regeneration of the Project Area;
- Partly successful
- Consultation exercises have been carried out periodically throughout the regeneration, 
particularly for the masterplan, but the process was driven by public partners
- Hattersley Neighbourhood Partnership provided a useful bridge between regeneration 
partners and residents, until it was disbanded in 2010 (section 4.4.3)
- The Land Board has two positions for resident representatives (section 4.4.2)
- Peak Valley’s Board also had resident representation until it was incorporated into Onward 
Homes in 2018 (section 4.5)
Figure 10: Regeneration Objectives and their achievement
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3.1 Housing stock and public 
realm improvements
One of the major targets of the post-2006 regeneration process was 
the poor condition of the housing stock and physical environment of 
the estate. By the transfer date the housing stock had been reduced to 
1725, mainly due to the demolition of the notorious tower blocks, the 
‘seven sisters’.  With further demolition planned, 1,400 properties were 
still occupied at the time of transfer.53 Much of this housing was in a 
really bad condition, particularly the timber-framed houses, constructed 
as temporary accommodation in order to rehouse decanted residents 
from the slum clearances swiftly, but lacking many of the modern 
standards of insulation and heating we now take for granted, and 
designed only to last around 15-20 years, as these residents recall:
When I was a kid you could put your hand through the window 
frame; it was that rotted you could feel the wind blowing through 
it. So if you put your hand through it they’d [Manchester City 
Council housing maintenance team] come up with a plank of 
wood, cut it, chisel it and slot it, you know, it was just patchwork.
There was some reports in the papers that one man was 
complaining because he was knocking icicles off his ceiling inside 
his bedroom, because there was a one inch gap right at the 
top.  Some of the houses have really been badly built, in fact just 
thrown up, some of the earlier ones.
3.1.1 Barratt Homes
The homes that Barratt have built – and are continuing to build – have 
been a huge success. In total, Barratt are to build some 830 new homes 
across 24 sites on the Hattersley estate.54 We have already heard how 
this is one of their fastest selling developments in the country. Part of 
this is due to the very reasonable cost at which Barratt are selling them, 
as this Barratt Director exclaims: “a four bed detached house for maybe 
160, 170 grand it’s, you know, there aren’t many other places that offer 
that!” A first-time buyer, recently moved into Hattersley, explains how 
her new Barratt home was so much more attractive than comparable 
products on the market:
We actually went to the housing estate in Denton to buy through 
Wimpy and they were so small and so expensive and they were so 
rude as well the customer service was shocking.  But then when 
we come up here and see them all it was just like yes! It was the 
price… [in Denton] you was looking at over 200 [grand] for a three 
bed which we didn’t even think about, we weren’t even looking at 
that.  It was a new estate that they had built so it was away from 
everybody else, one of the houses next door which is a smaller 
two bed was coming in at around 128 and then we got this [three 
bed] for 134!
Maximise the regeneration benefits of the parties’ 
activities;
- Successful
- the partnership approach embedded by the Collaboration Agreement has led to parties 
working together for mutually-beneficial outcomes
- synergies created for Tameside MBC and Peak Valley (e.g. school restructuring and tenure 
diversification, section 4.2.2)
Encourage environmental sustainability and 
high quality design in the built environment 
throughout the Project Area;
- Partly achieved (sections 3.1.1 and 3.1.2)
- excellent architectural design quality in comparison with peers, in both social and private new-
build housing
- some concerns over drop in Building for Life standards and lower environmental sustainability 
than originally envisaged due to Barratt’s financial difficulties post-2008 crisis.
- More work could be done to retrofit housing stock to higher environmental standards
Deliver the Development and Delivery Strategy; - Achieved
Secure planning permissions and obtain all 
necessary consents and approvals required 
to enable all housing, infrastructure and other 
required works to be constructed on the Project 
Area to deliver the Development Milestones;
- Achieved
Service and maintain the existing Management 
Team and Collaboration Board;
- Achieved.
- The Land Board has had a positive and sustained presence on the regeneration process 
(section 4.4.3)
Deliver the Development to an agreed design 
and within an agreed timescale.
- Partly-achieved
- The global financial crisis has delayed the Barratt housing developments and its contributions 
to public realm improvements, which remain undelivered (section 3.1.4)
53 Michael Harloe, The People’s Home?: Social Rented Housing in Europe and America (Wiley-Blackwell, 1995).
The number one priority for Peak Valley, therefore, was to demolish the 
stock that was unfit for purpose to make way for new-build housing. 
Since 2006, over 500 housing units have been demolished by Peak 
Valley’s contracted demolition company, Connell Brothers. The housing 
put up in its place – both the new-build Barratt homes for sale and the 
replacement social housing stock – is by all accounts of far superior 
quality than much comparable housing in other estates. Furthermore, 
the remaining social housing stock has been significantly upgraded. 
Although the public realm works are incomplete, everyone we spoke 
with agreed that the interventions made to physically transform the 
estate have been very successful. In the following, we address each 
particular strand of this intervention in turn – Barratt Homes; new social 
housing; existing stock upgrading; and public realm improvements.
Figure 11: Demolition of the last tower block, Tameside Court, in 2017
Part of the reason that Barratt have been selling the houses at such low 
prices is a peculiarity of Hattersley’s history:
…probably because of the value, there is a ceiling to what you can 
charge in Hattersley because mortgage values will only value a 
property up to a certain level there. Barratt Director.
This curious consequence of the stigma attached to Hattersley – 
infecting the calculations of mortgage providers – has meant that, 
paradoxically, the new housing can only be sold at a certain price 
if it is ever to be granted a mortgage. This, of course, has proven 
very popular amongst homebuyers – helping abate the stigma. The 
new home-owner goes onto  reveal that it was not just the price that 
attracted her and her partner to buy in Hattersley:
My partner who lived in Hyde, in Godley, who obviously drives up 
this way because he passes it for work and we’ve seeing them 
and because of the prices I was like why not shall we just go and 
look at it, let’s go and have a look and then once I seen them I 
was like “yes I’ll have, I’ll just have it”  But yes I love the house, 
the area – I worried at first about coming up here just because 
of everything in the news, what had happened… So then we 
just come up, our friends actually when we was looking bought 
a house as well round the corner, a new build as well – they 
54 Tameside MBC, “Supplementary Planning Guidance: Hattersley and Mottram.”
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had no problems so I said “why not just go and do it?” and we 
haven’t had, touch wood, one problem since. The neighbours are 
all lovely, the kids that hang around if you tell them to move on 
they’re respectful they move – no issues at all.
Of the reasons other than price that owner-occupiers had for buying 
here – including the excellent location and good transport connections 
into Manchester city centre via the railway and the M67 – it was 
the design quality and standard of construction that proved most 
persuasive. The housing built by Barratt is of excellent quality: the 
windows are larger than most new-build properties, the materials 
are of a higher standard – many clad in stone – and the designs 
are varied and appear to respond to local context and cartography 
beyond that apparent in comparable developments elsewhere. This, 
the Barratt executive explains, is a fortuitous product of the Residential 
Development Agreement that BASE (now Barratt) entered into with 
other regeneration partners in March 2007 in order to fulfil the 
objectives of the Collaboration Agreement55:
Those early days were very difficult – mainly because of the 
design, it was all non-standard house types.  So just to explain: 
Barratt like are a major builder you know we basically build, 
we have a core range of standard house types that we build 
throughout the country and they may be re-elevated to suit the 
local vernacular.  But basically we are best when we are building 
the types that we know how to build that we have fully costed, it 
suits our systems… Using the analogy of a car manufacturer – Ford 
will sell you a Ford Mondeo and lots of different specs and lots of 
different colours but they won’t sell you one with a base that’s a 
foot longer, that would mean changing their machine – well that’s 
like our standard house types.  So phase 1 had non-standard 
house types and that was in response to the design criteria that 
was in the license agreement.  Anyway to cut a long story short, it 
was quite challenging initially but anyway we got on with it we got 
on with the hurdles with the non-standard house types.  
Due the unique circumstances of the Hattersley regeneration process, 
Barratt were asked to build to a much higher design standard than 
they would do usually. This was partly due to the influence of English 
Partnerships in the early days of the deal – the national agency for 
regeneration insisted on high design specifications on the projects it 
helped fund. Many of the projects English Partnerships were involved 
with were promoted as ‘sustainable communities’ and exemplars 
to the wider regeneration industry. Although Hattersley was not 
formally one of EP’s demonstration projects – such as the Millennium 
Communities Programme that gave rise to New Islington in Ancoats, 
Manchester, and Greenwich Millennium Village near the Dome in 
London – it nonetheless benefitted from having English Partnerships 
as one of the main regeneration partners driving forward the 
project. Likewise with Tameside MBC who saw Hattersley as a major 
political priority and exemplar for future intervention. Underwriting 
these commitments to high design standards was, of course, the 
Collaboration Agreement.
However, these design standards soon came into conflict with other 
priorities. Barratt Homes were caught in a near-impossible predicament 
in being legally-obliged to build and sell houses according to the 
specifications set out in the agreement yet were also prevented from 
selling them at a rate high enough to cover the costs of the high build 
quality. This was due to the mortgage lending ceiling imposed on 
home-buyers which translated into lower sales prices for Barratt. At the 
same time, the floor fell out of the market following the 2008 financial 
crisis – just months after Barratt signed – which meant that house 
prices were further deflated. It was in Barratt’s interests to wait for the 
market to recover before embarking on building and selling properties 
but, as the Collaboration Agreement dictated, the payments to Peak 
Valley and the Land Board partners had to follow the pre-agreed annual 
schedule such that the regeneration process kept its momentum and 
the promises made to tenants were honoured. In this extraordinarily 
difficult context, Barratt have struggled to fulfil all their obligations 
without losing significant sums; indeed, it has been acknowledged by 
Barratt that they have not made money on the Hattersley development.
In the event, the regeneration partners took a more pragmatic and 
flexible approach than that written into the Collaboration Agreement 
and worked with Barratt to ensure that the housing was at least 
built rather than insist on the letter of the law and risk bankrupting 
the company. This involved softening the initial requirements for 
Building for Life Silver Standard. Part of the reason this worked for the 
regeneration partners was that Building for Life Silver standard entailed 
that the housing be built according to secured-by-design principles, 
which is problematic in the case of Hattersley for a number of reasons:
The problem with that is… I was involved in a meeting where 
we went to see the police’s consultant on phase 1 because they 
knew it was a high crime area they wanted really high boundary 
treatment walls.  So 2.1 metre high brick walls and things like that 
around properties and I know some of the feedback from the 
local community was we were sort of creating a gated community.  
Which is exactly what the police want and it’s almost like this is 
between that and the design standards in that Building for Life 
also pushes you towards an open feel in a development.  You 
know lots of openness and no boundaries… making sure that 
the development itself, you know in terms of dark alleyways and 
things like, that those are designed out… with footpaths you know 
connectivity and footpaths linking different culs-de-sac.  Just the 
kind of place you and I would want to live… whereas secured-
by-design is the opposite… everything enclosed we don’t really 
want sort of people that don’t live on there coming onto the 
development and using the spaces etc. So all these things caused 
problems early on and I think if you were to even view phase 1 on 
Google Earth or have a drive round I think it’s for the detriment 
of that development.  You know we achieved what we needed to 
achieve but I don’t think it really hangs together particularly well.
Because Building for Life Silver insists on both secured-by-design 
accreditation by the police and on design principles that favour 
openness and permeability, Barratt found it almost impossible to 
achieve all requirements simultaneously. The result, as the Director 
points out, is that “in order to achieve everything you end up kind of not 
really achieving anything to a great standard in my view.”
Aside from design inconsistencies, the regeneration partners were also 
at risk of alienating the local community from the new developments, 
if they continued to be designed and built according to such exacting 
secured-by-design standards. The defensive urbanism embodied 
by secured-by-design would only act to create new spatial divisions 
within the estate and hinder through-flow, interaction and social mixing 
between tenure types. For the new developments to be accepted 
by the community, and for the urban design to seamlessly integrate 
with existing street patterns for an interconnected and legible urban 
landscape, these initial design standards were quietly relaxed in further 
Barratt developments after phase one.
Another oversight of the Collaboration Agreement was the lack 
of control on subsequent sales that homeowners might make 
independently with buy-to-let landlords, who are becoming a problem 
on the estate. Although the licence agreement with Barratt places
a very strict limit on  how many sales that Barratt’s can actually 
sell to investors buyers to let landlords.  We can’t do anything 
about subsequent sales. Former Peak Valley official.
The growing incidence of private rented accommodation on the estate 
is the result of homeowners selling on their homes in this way to private 
landlords, who are often absentee speculative landlords with little 
interest or commitment in maintaining their houses to the standards 
expected of Peak Valley:
The other thing I am concerned about they tell me it’s the fastest 
selling development in the country... but I don’t want to see a 
whole load of private landlords either because I know quite a few 
have been bought by the same people to rent out, it’s a growing 
concern really I obviously have no control over it but my fear is 
because a lot of these private landlords will be and I’m using this 
is as a blanket example, from down South from London,  prices 
look pretty reasonable to them, that we’re going to have a lot of 
private landlords who are miles away and have absolutely no 
input to the area. Local councillor.
This represents one potential grave weakness in the design of the 
masterplan, in that the future governance of the estate may be 
splintered between multiple parties who may not share the same ethos 
and vision – or uphold the same standards of customer service – that 
Peak Valley and the Land Board have for the estate and its tenants.
3.1.2 New social housing
One of the key objectives for Peak Valley in building new housing was 
to diversify the range of housing options. A problem on the estate 
was not just the mono-tenure nature of the stock but also the lack of 
different designs and sizes for particular needs, such as larger families, 
single people, or the elderly. Responding to rising demand from the 
latter, Peak Valley built a substantial number of bungalows. Building 
new houses for sale was thus not the only way in which the housing 
offer could be transformed so that different groups of people who may 
otherwise have moved away could be rehoused within the estate; it 
applies just as much to older residents with specific needs as it does to 
aspirational families:
To keep that community spirit there and to keep you know 
successive generations in Hattersley we looked at the typologies 
on the estate and it was very clear that the people were saying 
we needed bungalows.  So the first couple of phases were just to 
build bungalows and what that meant was that we could free the 
family housing up then for people that wanted to remain in the 
area and then obviously BASE came in and offered the housing 
for sale. Architect.
Figure 12: construction on site of new Barratt homes 56 Sam Cooper, “PVHA Community Investment Strategy: June 2014” (Peak Valley Housing Association, 2014).
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The design process for the new social housing schemes was carried 
out in consultation with residents and there was a certain amount of 
flexibility built into the approach as phases were completed so as to 
reflect changing local demand, as one of the architects explains:
Like the Barratt homes, the new-build social housing that Peak Valley 
has provided on the estate to replace the stock that was demolished is 
of a very high standard and is universally appreciated by tenants. 
3.1.3 Existing stock upgrading
Another big challenge for Peak Valley was in bringing all existing stock 
up to Decent Homes standard. A local resident and community worker 
describes how successful Peak Valley have been in meeting this 
challenge:
You know the houses were grotty, really run down, there’d been a 
chronic lack of investment for a number of years from Manchester, 
you cannot say Peak Valley haven’t rectified that, you know, the 
houses, they’ve had new windows and doors, they’d had new 
heating, they’ve had new plumbing.  They’ve been painted a 
less grey colour so you know the majority of them they’ve been 
insulated properly they are warmer, the housing stock is better… 
[whereas] 15 years ago it was some of the grottiest houses. 
Through the multiple improvements made to existing stock since 
2006, all housing stock now meets Decent Homes Standard.57 This has 
generally been well received by tenants:
I believe they’re very nice, I mean they’ve done all the outside 
they’ve painted the outside, they’ve put new porches on, new 
kitchens, new heating system and I think they’ve put new 
bathrooms in.  So that is a big update because they’re 50 odd 
years old and they always need updating
This is evident in the rising rates of satisfaction amongst tenants 
recorded in periodic surveys conducted by Peak Valley: from 75% 
satisfaction with ‘quality of home’ in 2008 rising to 89% in 2014; and 
from 70% satisfaction with ‘repairs and maintenance’ in 2008 rising 
to 84% in 2014.58 One area of particular interest here is the jump in 
satisfaction for the ‘value for money’ of rent, from just 70% in 2008 to 
82% by 2012, from which point it has remained steady. This can be 
explained by the fact that many tenants were shocked by the sudden 
rise in rents upon Peak Valley becoming their landlord in 2006, which 
was due to the higher rental rates that housing associations were 
enabled to charge compared to local authorities.59 Part of the rise in 
this case – as in most stock transfers – was to cover some of the costs 
of improving the stock that had been neglected by Manchester City 
Council under the lower ‘fair rents’ regime. However, in the very early 
days of the transfer, tenants would have seen a sudden increase in their 
rents but not yet the corresponding improvements promised by Peak 
Valley, and so therefore were unsatisfied with the value for money. This 
tenant recalls the general mood in the community:
so it [rents] went up twice a year didn’t it, and everyone was 
complaining, then they [PVHA] said “well you’ve not had a rate 
increase in 3 or 4 years”, “yes fine but you’ve not done anything so 
why has it suddenly gone up?” and then they started on the they 
started to slowly do the works .
The lag time between charging higher rents and making a start on the 
stock improvements accounts for the low satisfaction levels of 70% 
and the sudden jump to 82% by 2012, as the improvements began to 
tangibly benefit tenants.
One of the major improvements has been in re-roofing homes. Despite 
general success, this has highlighted the fragmented distribution of 
ownership on the estate and the lack of uniformity to improvements. 
One problem frequently voiced is the deteriorating condition of the 
roofs of ex-council housing bought through Right to Buy, as this 
councillor explains:
I’ve now got people coming to see me who have bought their 
council houses as it was then and bought it fairly cheaply because 
they were entitled to the discount and now we’ve got houses that 
are falling to bits around their ears.  Because they haven’t got the 
maintenance budget and we’ve got houses where we’re reroofing 
you know six on that side leaving three, we’re doing another six 
on that side and there’s and there’s that to contend with and I 
don’t want to see that any worse than it is now
This issue has come to a head partly because Peak Valley have 
successfully re-roofed their housing stock, leaving owner-occupied 
houses, often on the same terraced row, without any improvement. 
Although this lies outside of Peak Valley’s legal powers and 
responsibilities some residents believe they could have done more to 
address the situation, which has left some older, often more vulnerable 
residents ‘trapped’ without the resources to maintain their property:
I used to say this when I was on Peak Valley Board: what about 
the owner/occupiers that are trapped in their properties?  Because 
you’re putting new roofs on all over the place and you’ll see a 
house what hasn’t got anything there and that elderly person is 
trapped in that property and in a way to me the Council needed 
to have done something about that in a way.  Because they 
were building they were getting money Peak Valley from the 
Government to build bungalows and I think there should have 
been lock in at some of the owner occupiers to perhaps offering 
them the opportunity to move out of these properties and perhaps 
buy them their own property to do it up and to make into a family 
property.  But they seem to be very rigid and very strict on what 
they were doing was just what was in the bid around there, I don’t 
think there was any flexibility and in a way a third of the estate like 
I said was owner-occupiers but most of them would have been 
older people that would have lived there, the families have grown 
up... Local resident.
For Peak Valley, and now Onward Homes, to maintain a coherent 
approach to governance and regeneration of the estate in future, more 
attention needs to be paid to those houses not directly in their purview 
– both new-build private rented homes owned by absentee buy-to-let 
landlords and ex-council housing owned by older, vulnerable tenants 
who exercised their Right to Buy but who may now lack the resources 
to maintain their properties. In order to avoid Hattersley dividing into 
Figure 13: Diverse typologies of new-build social housing for Peak 
Valley tenants
Figure 14: Tameside Court being demolished in 2017, and the 
replacement apartments at Honiton Avenue
Well some schemes we changed the mix on because people 
you know we put some housing in and people said “oh no we 
want more bungalows”, so some of the sites changed back to 
bungalows.  Because you know we were getting to a point where 
we I think we built about 70 bungalows and we were like we really 
need to start building some houses now…
This relatively participatory approach to the development of new social 
housing – if not for the Barratt homes – has continued through to the 
present. The last remaining tower block, the 11-storey Tameside Court, 
was demolished only last year, in 2017, and involved the architects 
working closely with the community to design their replacement 
accommodation: 
The tower block’s just recently come down and one of the 
key projects to empty that was Honiton which was to take the 
community in the tower block and keep it together but rehouse it 
in a new form of accommodation.  That’s where Honiton [Avenue] 
came from which was this sort of extra care light principle where 
everyone had a spacious 1 or 2 bedroomed apartment but it had 
a sort of centre space in the glazed atrium down the centre and 
we worked with those residents from day one to find the site, to 
design the scheme and then that meant that we could do the 
commercial block of shops next to Honiton. Architect.
57 PVHA, “10 Year Legacy & Financial Business Plan 2017-2022.”Ibid.
58 PVHA, ‘Board of Management & Peak Performance Legacy Report’, Peak Valley Housing Association Board meeting, 1st March 2017.
59 Ibid.
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two or three distinct estates, in respect to the condition of properties, 
some thought as to how a more integrated approach to governance 
can be achieved is required.
3.1.4 Public realm
Compared to the achievements made with the new and existing 
housing stock, improvements to the public realm are sorely lacking. 
Common concerns amongst tenants and other stakeholders coalesce 
around three principal issues: the density of the infill housing and 
consequent lack of green usable space; the lack of facilities for younger 
people, particularly for recreation; and the lack of improvements to 
the streets, off-road parking and verges. We will consider each in turn. 
It is important to note, however, that Tameside MBC, have employed 
a contractor and developed a plan to carry out improvements to the 
public realm on which they will launch a public consultation this year. 
The consultation will set out options for investment, including the long-
term management and maintenance of the public realm.
First, some residents are fearful that the new housing developments 
are not leaving enough room remaining for the green open space and 
vegetation that Hattersley has become famous for:
I think the infrastructure is still lacking, they’ve obviously built on 
some of the green spaces so that’s left smaller green spaces and 
in some places no green spaces. Local councillor
But the thing is I don’t want it to change so much that we don’t 
have open spaces and that’s what they’re doing.  They’re building 
on all the open spaces, they’re going to build houses near the 
station right the way up to where our garden site is…that’s always 
been on it was on the master plan.  So we can’t stop it and 
actually it would be better for the station because there’s people 
overlooking it, security wise.  But I don’t want every single space 
built on this estate it was built as a green place you know open air, 
we’ve got a booklet called Fresh AiR60, you know have you seen 
that?  …there is a need for housing but by God you don’t have to 
cram them in like you’re doing it now.  It’s ridiculous and every new 
estate if you look at every new estate it’s the same thing, houses 
smaller gardens, well where’s your fresh air? Local resident.
It must be noted, however, that much of the open space currently 
on the estate is brownfield land that was once housing or the site 
of the old district centre, cleared in the regeneration process and 
awaiting redevelopment. There is a sense among practitioners that the 
masterplan contains sufficient green space once it is completed.
Second, there is now a notable absence of children’s play areas or 
spaces for older children and young adults to play sport or simply 
gather in a convivial setting:
We’ve not improved the play areas and things for young people 
to do.  That’s still an ongoing thing but as far as I’m concerned as 
a local councillor it’s not happening fast enough… where we’ve 
knocked it down, there used to be a basketball court there and it 
used to be lit up at night and you could go past at any time and 
there would be children playing, kids playing on there... because 
I’m not talking about children but young adults playing on there 
until 10 o’clock at night and it will be lit up and they’ll be playing 
well that’s all gone.  Well where have they gone? 
Local Councillor
Interestingly, this may explain why some of the problems associated 
with gatherings of young people and gang culture have to some extent 
been displaced to nearby towns such as Hyde:
They [residents] want the facilities with easy access but “not too 
close to my house please” – would you want a group of 20 kids 
congregating outside your house? – but you do want somewhere 
for the kids to go so they’re not vandalising bus shelters or 
whatever. So it’s hard isn’t it…so it’s taken forever to establish the 
new location of a multi-use games area and having established 
the area it’s taken forever to materialise.  It’s not because, it’s not 
due to finance, I’m sure there’s money sat in a pot there for it, I’m 
sure there is. Community worker and local resident.
Indeed, there is plenty of money set aside for improvements to the 
public realm, and as noted above, Tameside MBC will launch a public 
consultation on the detail of the improvements this year. 
One of the original negotiators of the Collaboration Agreement 
explains how the improvements to the public realm were a fully costed 
component of the final masterplan, which was then translated into 
the annual cost schedule for Barratt written into the Collaboration 
Agreement:
So we literally mapped the estate in terms of you know things like 
improving parking provision, improving tree planting, the provision 
of amenity spaces, play areas for young children older children. 
So all that work was included at cost schedule for the developers 
to price and originally it was priced at five million pounds and that 
was broken down, we’ve reduced that down through negotiation 
with Barratt’s since then.  But we have a legal agreement in place 
with Barratt’s that they, as they draw down licenses for each 
individual phase of residential development they’re required to 
pay over a tranche of public realm payments totalling just over 
four million pounds. Planit have been appointed by Tameside 
Council on behalf of the partnership with HCA, Peak Valley and 
the Council to re-scope that original public realm work because 
that was done originally by GVA back in, would have been 
2005/6.  Things have moved on so we have a new aspirational 
plan to cover this four million pounds of the investment which 
if we were to do everything in that aspirational plan would cost 
significantly more than the four million
This is another reminder of how the Collaboration Agreement can only 
go so far in stipulating development outcomes for Hattersley. In the 
event of financial difficulties and understandable delays on the part of 
Barratt, the regeneration partners have had to take a more pragmatic 
approach and re-negotiate a deal that would enable the public realm 
improvements to go ahead without further delay and without any 
additional cost to the public, by employing a new contractor. 
The third complaint concerning the public realm is traffic and parking. 
Traffic has become a major problem in Hattersley partly because of its 
location at the end of the M67, where three lanes get funnelled into 
one in the trunk road on to Glossop, which is consequently always 
congested at peak hours. Many commuters have learnt to bypass 
this stretch of road by taking a detour through Hattersley, which 
unfortunately has also become congested at rush hour. This is an issue 
that cannot be expected to be resolved by the regeneration process 
but through external improvements to the road network that lie outside 
the remit of the regeneration partners. However, there are aspects of 
the urban design of the estate that have contributed to the problem, as 
a local councillor suggests:
Figure 15: Cleared housing sites and a basketball court before redevelopment as new housing (along with Tameside Court in background)
Figure 16: Typical quality of public realm in Hattersley
60 Ibid.
36  |  THE HATTERSLEY AND MOTTRAM HOUSING ESTATE: AN EVALUATION OF ITS REGENERATION
One of the issues in Hattersley and what they did in the ‘60s was 
all these residents from Manchester didn’t have cars so why put 
in car spaces for them.  So all these houses loads of grass verges, 
loads of green space, nowhere to park your car or say that’s your 
house there, you park your car over here.  Well nobody’s going 
to do that so the garages and the parking bays were away from 
the houses so you get all this green around your houses which 
you know they didn’t have when they were in the terraced houses 
no green around there…. Now that everybody tends to have cars 
and we’ve got to try and develop it so part of the public realm is 
putting parking bays in. local councillor
As a result of a lack of parking bays in front of houses, people park 
their cars on the grass verges that separate pavements from roads, 
and often on the curb, which narrows the available space for vehicles 
and contributes to congestion. Moreover, the car parking problem 
also damages the aesthetic and ecological value of the grass verges, 
which are often in a poor condition, more mud than grass, due to tyre 
damage. 
Tidying up the general look and feel of the public realm – not just car 
parking bays and grass verges, but also boundary fences and walls, 
green and brownfield sites and other residual open spaces – is one of 
the last remaining regeneration priorities yet to be completed. This may 
seem a rather insignificant, cosmetic issue in comparison with some of 
the more substantive priorities around housing stock, retail, transport, 
community facilities and skills training, but it nonetheless gives the 
wrong impression of how much has been achieved. The generally 
poor, under-maintained condition of the public realm not only fails to 
reflect the wider achievements of regeneration but so too seems out of 
kilter and jars with the generally high levels of care and attention that 
residents pay to their own properties and gardens. This may not have 
always been the case, but is certainly something that is evident today. 
Gardening has been further encouraged by the garden competition 
that Peak Valley has initiated:
People are proud of their houses… lots of people do look 
after their gardens.  So to incentivise it we’ve had the garden 
competition running for the last 10/12 years. We get a prize and 
they get a prize at the end of it and we invite the residents up 
and go round to the gardens, give them a prize for it and then a 
couple of members of staff go round and they’ll tell us which are 
the best garden.  We’re putting this garden in for the competition 
they’re really good and what have you and the houses you know 
you get 30/40 people putting in for it it’s really good so we had 
the presentation recently and I awarded all the prizes for it.  Get 
a bit of money off a couple of our partners who supplied the 
trophies and people are dead chuffed. 
Local councillor.
3.2 Railway station
One of the most successful – and simplest – interventions made by 
Peak Valley and its Land Board partners over the past decade or so 
has been the improvements to Hattersley’s railway station. Today, the 
direct train into Manchester Piccadilly takes only around 20 minutes, 
runs every half an hour, or more during business peak times, and a 
return ticket costs around £6, making it certainly the fastest and most 
convenient if not the cheapest means of transport into Manchester City 
Centre. This direct connection with the city represents a major piece 
of infrastructure for Hattersley’s ongoing economic development – a 
crucial lifeline for daily commuters, jobseekers and shoppers alike.
However, the station has had a troubled past. Following the 
construction of the estate, it took almost another two decades for 
the station to be built, and far less time for it to fall into disuse and 
disrepair.. 61  Opened in 1978 as an island platform with a covered 
footbridge providing access to the ticket office and the estate, the 
station once used to contain a glass waiting room, but this was 
subjected to an arson attack by local youths. 62 For fear of cars being 
vandalised, set alight or stolen, local residents refused to park in the 
old station car park:
It had a car park where there was only one car ever parked there 
from 9 to 1 was the person who was in the ticket office...  that was 
the only person and they parked the car right just outside the 
ticket office so they could see it and eyeballing it from where they 
were sat all the time.  Local resident
Sometimes when I when I left my car at the car park and went 
into Manchester my car would be the only car parked, the car 
that was there and people were saying “aren’t you frightened of 
leaving your car there?”   
Local councillor
Many residents forfeited use of the station altogether and drove to the 
next station along the line, Broadbottom, to catch a train from there. 
However, it was not just for fear of their car’s safety that residents 
chose to bypass the station. Almost as a microcosm of Hattersley 
itself, the station was physically cut off from the surrounding streets 
and houses, isolated from the estate it was meant to serve. Likewise, 
the deep cut central platform felt “isolated” – as many interviewees 
remarked – from the ticket office, only accessible via a “dingy” and 
“horrendous” covered walkway that “stunk of urine”, which was not 
only slippery underfoot from the leaking roof intermittently dripping, 
but so too was it dark, unwelcoming, without easy escape and 
potentially unsafe. The lack of natural through-flow from passers-
by or casual surveillance from surrounding houses, whose back 
garden fences backed onto the station, meant that crime could go on 
unobserved here. This resulted in a spiralling decline in usage, placing 
the station under threat of closure:
Figure 17: Proud winners of the Garden Competition
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61 Ibid.
62 Friends of Hattersley Station wesbite: https://www.friendsofhattersleystation.com/
Figure 18: Railway Station improvements map
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The numbers for the train station, the passenger usage, numbers 
for the train station, were going down and down and down and 
through it CFG was pretty clear that there was going to be a date 
for... when they would of just said “look it’s not viable” and shut it 
down and people who live next to the station were actually driving 
to Broadbottom to get on a train because they just didn’t want to 
use that station. Tameside council officer.
Something desperately needed to be done to save the station and 
realise its full potential for socioeconomic development. Tameside MBC 
suggested that the Land Board use some of its funds to re-route the 
road closer to the station. Despite initial reticence about what might 
seem a “bonkers idea” to “spend all this money moving a road about 
30 feet” (ibid), the Land Board approved it and spent some of the 
regeneration funds procured through the Collaboration Agreement on 
redesigning Hattersley Road West so that it came around the back of 
the houses that then fronted it and right up to the station entrance (see 
figure 18). A bus stop on the road now connects the train to the local 
bus network for quick, easy and safe access to the station. This initial 
investment also enabled Tameside MBC to apply for further funding 
from local growth fund resources. They are awaiting the results of a 
bid submitted to the Government’s third Growth Deal to rebuild the 
pedestrian footbridge and provide disabled access to the platform via 
a lift.  
On the back of the road realignment, the Land Board has created a 
much more secure parking area, with a perimeter fence, monitored 
by CCTV in addition to natural surveillance from the street. This cost 
around half a million pounds – partly from Collaboration Agreement 
receipts and partly from additional transport infrastructure funding. 
As a consequence, station use has already risen by 30%. These initial 
improvements have opened up possibilities and interest in further 
developments. Through negotiations with Network Rail and Transport 
for Greater Manchester, the Land Board have now secured £750,000 
investment from Greater Manchester Growth Fund63 to replace the 
booking office, and there are plans afoot to do likewise with the 
covered walkway, which remains the most problematic feature left 
to address. The open land immediately surrounding each side of the 
station is now being redeveloped by Barratt as homes for sale, which 
will contribute further to place-making efforts in creating a safe, well-
used, connected and distinctive urban realm.
3.2.1 Friends of Hattersley Station
This is only one half of the story. In July 2011, long before the road 
was re-routed in 2015, the Friends of Hattersley Station was founded 
by local residents who come together to bring their station back from 
the brink. Voluntary work has since focused on planting a community 
garden, cleaning up and maintaining the general environment, planting 
and hanging flowers, painting and decorating the ticket office with 
colourful artistic murals by students of the local primary schools, 
painting the covered walkway, and hosting a number of community 
events, from a ‘Santa at the station’ and Christmas carols to Easter egg 
hunts and Teddy Bear Picnics. Their do-it-yourself efforts in making the 
station a better place has garnered the Friends of Hattersley Station a 
plethora of awards, particularly for their gardening, from the 2012 Royal 
Horticultural Society’s North West In Bloom award to 1st prize in the 
‘Green Spaces’ section of the annual Tameside MBC Pride of Hyde & 
Longdendale Awards 2014. 64 
Not only has this helped galvanise a community spirit on the estate, 
so too has it placed pressure on the Land Board to act. By showing 
that they care through so many volunteer hours, the community has 
made the case for additional investment in regenerating the station 
and its environs. Unfortunately, their celebrated community garden was 
tarmacked over in 2014 for the construction of the new car park – a 
small price to pay, perhaps, for a safe, secure station car park – but 
of course replanted in a new location. A resident describes how this 
groundwork paved the way for the more systematic regeneration of the 
station:
A lot of people put a lot of hard work into it. So what they [Friends 
of Hattersley Station] wanted to do was to try and encourage 
people to use it by making it nicer.  So then with Peak Valley then 
saying “well fair enough we’ll divert that road so all the buses go 
past it.”  The car park is more secure, more people are coming up 
here now so more people are using it and improving it…. 
This serves as another reminder of how the regeneration of Hattersley 
was a dual effort between the more formal, substantive approach taken 
by Peak Valley and Tameside MBC coupled with, and harnessing, the 
more informal grassroots energy of the community. It is also a lesson 
in how Hattersley has had many allies and much political support over 
the years. The station was originally the product of tireless campaigning 
in the 1970s by local councillor and Hattersley resident, Paul Smith, 
who with the aid of local MP Lord Tom Pendry lobbied the then 
Department for Transport for a station to be built for Hattersley. On 19th 
December 2015, the Friends of Hattersley Station dedicated to these 
two politicians a marble memorial seat just outside the station entrance. 
The marble itself was donated by Tameside MBC – a reminder of the 
continued commitment that the local authority makes to the estate.
Figure 19: New car park for railway station
63 Malpass and Mullins, “Local Authority Housing Stock Transfer in the UK : From Local Initiative to National Policy Local Authority Housing Stock Transfer in the UK :”
Figure 20: colourful murals painted by primary school children from Hattersley
Figure 21: young and old residents preparing plants together for the 
community garden
64 https://www.friendsofhattersleystation.com/
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3.3 New District Centre
One of the highest priorities in regenerating Hattersley was 
redeveloping the District Centre. The old district centre was built in 
the early 1970s and had by the late 1990s fallen into decline – much 
like Hattersley in general, whose population fell from around 15,000 to 
not much more than 6,000 over this period. The decline in population, 
rising deprivation and changing shopping habits combined with 
the district centre’s poor design and layout to result in an under-
used and under-maintained set of buildings suffering high vacancy 
and disrepair. Originally, the centre contained 30 shop units but by 
the late 1980s it was down to a paper shop, bookies, launderette, 
hairdressers, greengrocers, chippy, butchers, a post office, a Co-op 
shop and a Greggs. In being rationalised down to just 10 commercial 
units, including a credit union, an internet café, and the Hattersley 
development Trust offices, the majority of the original district centre 
site was taken up with community uses, including a community centre, 
library, public house, health centre, housing office, church, and the 
new Sure Start centre, as well as a base for the Hattersley Community 
Forum and Hattersley Neighbourhood Partnership. Part of the problem 
here was that the usage of the centre was tilting far too heavily away 
from commercially trading businesses that provided economic activity 
and towards publicly-subsidised facilities – a sign of the economic 
dependency of Hattersley.
In the masterplanning process circa 2003-4, it was decided by the 
regeneration partners in consultation with the community that the old 
centre would be demolished entirely and rebuilt as a new district centre 
in a more prominent and accessible location on Stockport Road. The 
land upon which the old district centre stood would then be freed up 
for redevelopment as new housing – a key part of the Collaboration 
Agreement and the means by which these improvements could be 
paid for. The rationale for this planning approach is outlined in the final 
masterplan, adopted in 2004 as Supplementary Planning Guidance65, 
which characterises the weaknesses of the old centre thus:
It does not have a prominent location, being largely hidden from 
Stockport Road. This means the location is not attractive to new 
retailers, particularly supermarket operators, who could provide 
the anchor for additional retailers and other uses. The shop units 
themselves turn their back on the surrounding area with a layout 
that is not attractive to new users. Redevelopment of the existing 
site would require the relocation or temporary relocation of the 
existing uses. This would be disruptive and expensive and given 
the fact that the existing location is not attractive, redevelopment 
would be overly reliant on public funds and yet the centre would 
still not totally serve the needs or aspirations of existing residents 
or new residents to the area.
Another motivating factor was to diversify the range of shops available 
to residents as well as diversify the locations, as this local councillor 
describes:
The old centre was just all concrete blocks really, it was just a real 
mess; you wouldn’t really go there shopping because you know 
it’s quite dilapidated.  The Co-op was in there and the Co-op was 
the only shop really in there, so we managed to build some more 
shops down at the bottom end of the estate, one shop down at 
Honiton and then they’ve obviously got the Tesco’s up at the top. 
The Co-op’s practices have been identified to us as particularly 
problematic in this regard:
Co-ops have variable pricing structures in their shops, so if you 
go to a Co-op shop you don’t pay the same. One of the models 
they adopt in deciding what the pricing structure should be is what 
condition are the people locally, what’s the level of car ownership 
locally, and how easy is it for those guys to come to the shop to go 
somewhere else; if they can’t, if the car ownership levels are low 
and the there’s no competition then they put you on the highest 
price band! …it’s a captive audience isn’t it, you just had nowhere 
else to go.  
Tameside council officer.
The proposals for new retail intended to inject renewed competition 
into the area so that residents were no longer being treated unfairly 
in this way – by a dubious pricing strategy that only exacerbates high 
levels of deprivation and feelings of isolation. The resulting plan was 
to move the smaller shops into a new precinct parade to be built 
next to the Honiton development of apartments on the western side 
– or ‘bottom end’ – of the estate. All existing businesses that leased 
premises in the old district centre were offered new premises in the 
new precinct. The only business to object to the process was the 
Co-op, who consequently refused the offer. In its place, a One Stop 
opened, and quickly became successful:
The One Stop just took two units and within 12 months it had 
smashed all its predictions and it took another unit. Architect.
All the shops on the new site appear to be thriving. The move has been 
particularly successful for the chippy:
The chippy has just recently re-opened at, there was quite a lot of 
excitement... it’s the same guy that’s running it as well.
3.3.1 Tesco
The most important part of the new retail offer was to be a new district 
centre with space for a retail park with larger premises for superstores 
as well as community facilities such as the library and Peak Valley’s 
offices – all not far away from the old district centre, but with better 
access on the main arterial road, Stockport Road. A deal was struck 
with Tesco to take on a large part of the site – the northern side of 
Ashworth Lane – as a major new superstore, a Tesco Extra. Tesco 
had for a long time been trying to extend its existing stores in the 
area – Stalybridge and Glossop – to cope with rising demand. Their 
planning application to put a mezzanine level in their Stalybridge store 
was refused. They also had rising demand for online deliveries, so the 
natural solution was to build a new store that could act as a logistic 
hub for online deliveries to the wider area. The site was ideal as a 
superstore that could act as a distribution centre as it was located 
between Stalybridge and Glossop and right on, and at the end of, 
the M67. With such specific demands, and as the only large retailer 
interested in the tender for a new superstore on the site, Tesco became 
an increasingly central and powerful partner in the regeneration of the 
new district centre:
So this area in the original SPG [Supplementary Planning 
Guidance] there was a requirement for a food retailer with a store 
capacity of about 50 thousand square feet. When we actually got 
to market the land and appoint a commercial developer partner 
for it, very soon it was established that Tesco were very interested, 
they were actually the only food retailer that was really interested 
and they soon realised that, and then Tesco do what Tesco 
generally do and started negotiating or renegotiating the terms of 
the deal – 50 thousand square feet didn’t work for them. It had to 
be a Tesco Extra which was 90 thousand square feet plus or they 
were off and by the way you’re not getting any increase in your 
rental value, so that was the deal unfortunately.  
Peak Valley executive.
As it turned out, the deal with Tesco was far from unfortunate for 
the residents of Hattersley. One of the great selling points of the 
partnership with Tesco was their forward-thinking approach to local 
employment and skills training:
Tesco has a load of critics but they were doing that in a number 
of places already with stores... I’ve got it in my mind… that there 
was contact with Tesco, you know over 12 months before the store 
opened, to start skilling people up for, and the reason I remember 
that was that Tesco were adamant that they wanted people who 
lived within you know, and I can’t remember the exact distance, 
but definitely within under a mile of the store, as the people who 
would work in the store.  So I mean obviously it was very good in 
terms of their trade but they wanted local people working at the 
store yes.  
Tameside council officer.
In the 12 months or so run up to the store opening on 9th July 2012, 
Tesco worked closely with Tameside MBC, Jobcentre Plus, Work 
Solutions, the Skills Funding Agency and Peak Valley to target local 
populations for training for the some 300 new jobs created. Over 
1,500 applications were received for 301 full and part-time positions, 
of which a hundred were given to local people who had been out of 
work for over six months. 66 The skills training for local people was 
delivered through the Hattersley Neighbourhood Partnership based in 
the old district centre before it was pulled down, and was written into 
the contract with Tesco for a 30 year lease on a new bespoke building, 
which is actually owned by West Midlands Pension Fund. 
Although we do not know precise figures, Tesco claim that over 90% 
of their employees either walk or cycle to work and are drawn from the 
immediate vicinity, and in particular the Hattersley estate. They also 
claim an unusually high staff retention rate – the highest number of 
retained employees, in fact, across all Tesco stores in the UK. A local 
councillor provides a more fine-grained picture of the good this brings 
for people in Hattersley:
Figure 22: typical dereliction in Hattersley before regeneration process
65 Richardson, Gee, and Power, Fresh Hope Fresh Air: Starting A New Life In Hattersley.
66 Kate Weir, “New Tesco in Hattersley will create 300 jobs”, Manchester Evening News, 2nd July 2012
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So the shop was virtually, not entirely but virtually, staffed by 
people from Hattersley.  I understand that more have stayed than 
the average if you look at all the Tesco stores in the country that 
have done that, that more here have stayed.  Which is quite an 
achievement considering some of them, I know one in particular 
that had been out of work for a considerable time, probably ten 
years or so a woman in her early 40s who not only went there 
and was successful but has been transferred to another store in a 
management role.  I think that’s probably as successful a story as 
you’re going to get in reality!
The woman in question is highly skilled in community organising, 
having volunteered as a representative and campaigner for resident 
interests on various regeneration boards for Hattersley over the many 
years, decades, that she was unemployed and looking for paid work, 
but may never have found it were it not for the Tesco opportunity. She 
is also a good example of how the regeneration process itself provides 
opportunities that might not otherwise have existed for many residents 
– if perhaps the more vocal – to learn new skills and develop their 
talents and capacities that then become increasingly attractive and 
marketable to companies like Tesco. She had this to say:
Yes I’ve got a very good CV – I’m a sort of like jack of all trades, 
master of none – that’s how it came to the point where I did this 8 
week training thing and I got a job at Tesco’s.  I was offered two 
jobs, so it was Team Leader on checkouts or community you know 
the Community Champion but that was minimum wage same as 
GAs.  So I went for Team Leader which was a little bit more and I’m 
now a manager so within five years I’ve gone from Team Leader 
to Manager that’s on a job for what 23 grand a year whatever it is.
The benefit is not all one way, of course. Tesco profit from having 
employees who are, able to control for any minor criminality or anti-
social behaviour, particularly among the younger residents who might 
otherwise like to congregate in and around the store were it not for the 
presence of their mother, father, aunt, uncle, neighbour or friend who 
works there.
This is an excellent example of how multiple strands in a regeneration 
programme – from the planning gain in development agreements 
with large retailers to community-based partnerships that involve 
local people in governance decisions – can be joined up and brought 
together in a holistic strategy to create synergies for multiple parties. A 
senior council officer explains the benefits it has brought to Hattersley 
and how this was the result of a robust and sustainable partnership 
working approach built into the architecture of the Collaboration 
Agreement and the Land Board from the outset:
The Tesco development – because I was involved with that and 
I know how that’s all happened – is a great example of how 
that relationship which when it comes to Peak Valley actually 
delivering something, that if we’d all sat around and wrung our 
hands a bit longer perhaps it wouldn’t have happened.  I don’t 
know if you’re aware that Tesco development was the last store 
that the Tesco board approved before they pulled the plug… if 
you look at what benefits that has bought to Hattersley you might 
think well you know all they see is there’s going to be traffic chaos 
and whatever…. Tesco agreed to do the pre-employment training 
programme for Hattersley residents and I think something like 200 
people went on that and they did that months before the store 
opened.  Just giving people the opportunity to get themselves 
up to the position where they could compete for jobs when they 
became available and they did that completely at their cost.
It must be acknowledged that several hundred new jobs is not 
insignificant for an estate with a several thousand working age 
population. Just like the Collaboration Agreement itself, this is another 
example of the pitch perfect timing – luck, some might say – that the 
Hattersley regeneration project has had over the years. Indeed, this 
was the last Extra superstore of its kind that Tesco approved before 
it suffered severe financial difficulties and strategically refocused its 
business model on the smaller neighbourhood-based Express stores. 
In 2015, just a few years after the Hattersley deal, Tesco recorded the 
UK’s biggest ever retail loss – £6.4 billion – with Extra hypermarkets, 
superstores and city centre Metro outlets all experiencing decline in 
sales, and only Express stores achieving sales growth, amid a switch in 
shopping habits.67 But just as the Collaboration Agreement was signed 
with Barratt a mere months before the financial crisis, so too was the 
deal with Tesco done – the lease signed and the store opened – just 
months before Tesco’s strategic redirection.
Not all is so benign about the new superstore, however. There are 
common misgivings about the urban design, in particular the defensive 
urbanism of the store frontage and the way it turns its back on 
Stockport Road:
Every time I drive round that roundabout and I see that fence of 
Tesco it galls me that, you know gosh, if there was one thing I 
should have insisted on it’s that, but what can you do? You park 
up in a car park you go across the planting area and get your 
trousers torn to shreds as you’re doing that and I think bloody hell 
who’s bright idea was this you know?! There’s a thousand and one 
things you would have done different. 
Here, this senior Tameside officer is referring to the compromises made 
with Tesco not only on  the final design of the store itself but also with 
the way that Tesco insisted on a larger floorplate that encroached on 
the space allocated for The Hub, where all the community functions 
and Peak Valley’s offices were to be relocated. As he alludes to 
above, as part of the development agreement Tesco invested around 
£4 million into the construction of The Hub and so negotiations over 
the amount of land granted to them were coloured by this essential 
source of capital funding. The end result is a building that is squeezed 
into a small and inconvenient corner site that slopes down back from 
Stockport Road. This meant that certain compromises were made on 
the design of the building – more vertical than horizontal and on an 
awkward multi-level site, which has resulted in access issues. We will 
discuss some of these design flaws in the section below dedicated 
to The Hub. We mention it here merely to point out that the deal with 
Tesco was both a blessing and a curse – paying for the majority of 
The Hub and for the regeneration of this large site, but thereby putting 
pressure on the public partners to make concessions to a powerful 
retailer that ultimately, despite admirable efforts to employ and upskill 
local people, put its interests first.
Progress with the second half of the district centre, south of Ashworth 
Lane, has been less successful. Plans for a Lidl store as part of a 
retail park to complement the Tesco offering have been delayed over 
protracted negotiations with just one remaining resident, who refuses 
to move from his home. This part of the estate remains mostly cleared 
of its timber-framed housing and now lies overgrown and in wait for 
redevelopment. Peak Valley have offered the resident a number of 
alternative properties – including better equipped new build houses 
– around the estate, at no additional cost, but the resident refuses to 
move. 
Community concerns
Not all residents are happy with the new retail offer, seeing the new set 
up as a hollowing out of the middle:
I’ll tell you what we do need on this estate some more shops because 
all we’ve got, two extremes, One Stop, Tesco’s there’s nothing in 
between now since they took the old community centre down there 
was 7 or 8 shops there
Indeed, this can also be understood in a wider social and spatial 
sense: that the regeneration process has turned the estate inside out, 
relocating many of the important functions for community life – the 
shops, community centre, the comprehensive secondary school – from 
the centre of the estate to the periphery, in an attempt to reorient the 
estate and transform an inward-looking culture built on bonding social 
capital into a more (socially and spatially) mobile and outward-looking 
culture built on bridging social capital.
Much of the antipathy towards the new district centre appears to be 
motivated by a general nostalgia for how the estate used to house a 
variety of independent stores:
There used to be shops at the train station, then there was other 
shops… when I was a kid it had toy shops, shoe shops, every kind 
of shop you wanted.
This observation identifies the way in which retail has evolved in 
the country as a whole, rather than Hattersley per se – from small 
independent businesses located on every town and village high street 
towards larger companies located out-of-town and designed to be 
accessible by car rather than foot. The design of the new district centre 
in Hattersley, particularly Tesco where the car park takes centre stage, 
epitomises these wider trends. 
In a similarly nostalgic sentiment, which reflects broader trends in 
consumption habits, almost all the residents we listened to lamented 
the loss of public houses on the estate. Indeed, a shocking number 
have closed down over the past few decades, eleven in total, including: 
the Hustage, Four in Hand, Centurion, New Inn, Chapman Arms, Legion, 
Underwood Social Club, Pack Horse, JFK (aka Flat Cap), The White 
Hart, and The Junction.68 There is now just one pub remaining on the 
estate, the Harehill tavern, where Ricky Hatton can sometimes be 
seen having a pint at his local (when he’s not boxing). This is located 
in the west of the estate, next to the new precinct shops, leaving 
large swathes of the estate without a pub within walking distance – a 
dramatic change from a situation where “we all had our own pubs”. 
67 Sarah Butler and Sean Farrell, “Tesco reports record £6.4bn loss”, The Guardian, 22nd April 2015.
Figure 23: last remaining resident refusing to move for Lidl development
68 Dodge, “Mapping the Geographies of Manchester’s Housing Problems and the Twentieth Century Solutions.”
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Indeed, many residents complained that “there’s nowhere to go on 
a Saturday night” and that they now have to drive to a pub – which 
defeats the point – or else take an expensive taxi out of the estate. 
Although the decline in pubs is driven by changing leisure patterns, 
some believe that Peak Valley could have done more to reverse the 
flow: 
Looking back I think more should have been done to perhaps 
make them into community pubs or make them more like where 
the Chapman, that’s another pub which is now a nursery… But in 
today’s world you could have a pub that can be a little post office 
inside or a paper shop so it has a multipurpose use, and usually 
pubs are embedded in a community so they’re in good locations.
Another gripe among residents – particularly the owner-occupiers who 
have recently bought their new home from Barratt – is the lack of a café 
or coffee shop to frequent on a Sunday morning perhaps. Although 
Tesco have an in-store café and The Hub has a small café run by 
volunteers, these appear to be rarely used by residents, perhaps partly 
due to their location within the estate and in buildings that principally 
contain other functions that run counter to being a social space. The 
planned development with Lidl is due to contain a Costa coffee shop, 
but this is still years away from completion, that is, of course, if the 
resistant resident ever does acquiesce.
As it stands, Hattersley suffers a lack of convenient and convivial 
meeting places within the estate; the famous community spirit and 
bonding social capital – that did so much to keep the community alive 
in times of adversity as well as fuel the regeneration process – is in 
danger of ebbing away and becoming a thing of the past. Much of what 
motivated Mike Harding to write the popular folk song The Hattersley 
Lament may have been resolved by the regeneration process, but 
there may be something more profound, albeit less tangible, that is 
lamentably lost in the Hattersley of the future.
3.4 The Hub
The Hub is the new centre of administrative and social life on the estate 
– the jewel in the crown of the new district centre. We have heard 
how it was built with planning gain accrued from the adjoining Tesco 
development and how this new site was chosen to be more accessible, 
located on the arterial Stockport Road. Indeed, it stands directly on 
the border between the Hattersley and Mottram sides of the estate – 
notoriously socially segregated in the past – as a symbol of new unity 
perhaps, and a way to reconcile territorial divides. 
Work on The Hub began in August 2011 and was completed in October 
2012, at a total cost of £3.8 million.69 The exterior design is sleek and 
modernist and it is light and airy on the inside. There are a number 
of generously sized rooms on the ground floor for community use, 
including offices for the Hattersley Community Forum, and a library on 
the lower ground floor at the rear. There is also a neighbourhood police 
unit located here, at the entrance. On the first floor are Peak Valley’s 
offices and meeting rooms; whilst the second floor is used by Tameside 
MBC and the NHS. In sum, The Hub is celebrated by Tameside MBC as 
the latest addition to its roster of “prestigious civic buildings in every 
town” – on a par with the grand Victorian municipal architecture of 
Dukinfield and Hyde Town Halls and Stalybridge Civic Hall (see photo 
above).
However, The Hub is perhaps the most contentious issue of all in the 
various interventions made by Peak Valley, Tameside MBC and the 
Land Board in Hattersley. The people we spoke with had far more to 
say about The Hub than any other issue – including employment and 
skills – and so we have dedicated an entire section to it. Some go so far 
as to suggest that The Hub is “in danger of becoming a bit of a white 
elephant”, for reasons we explore below.
3.4.1 Design flaws
First, there is common confusion among residents – perhaps derived 
from a confusion in the minds of the designers of the building 
themselves – about what The Hub is meant to be, what it is for. Part of 
the problem stems from locating so many disparate functions within the 
same, relatively compact space, without due delineation between uses. 
A council officer explains the rationale for the shared space design:
The police were in the original community hall, they always had 
a post in there. So we tried to replicate what we had then the old 
centre, we had a police post in there and then it was just to have 
them in the neighbourhood and work and it worked quite well and 
then obviously we had the hall and everything else.  So we tried 
to replicate that in the Hub so when we were doing the designs 
for the Hub we asked residents “what did you want in there?” “We 
want a police station in there, we want a hall, we want a café, we 
want this that and the other” and at the time it was viable to give 
all that to the community.  As it’s progressed through the years 
over the 10 years with the cuts that we’ve had to make, we’ve had 
to make changes.  So it’s become quite complicated now.
The Hub currently provides offices for three public service agencies: 
the NHS; the police; and Tameside Council’s library. The latter, along 
with Peak Valley’s housing office, are the only ones that offer a directly 
accessible service to local residents. The NHS presence is purely 
administrative and not advertised and the Police office appears to be 
used exclusively for the convenience of the local Police and Community 
Safety Officers as one local resident informed us:
You can’t go and knock on the door and report anything, it is used, 
people come in open the door, lock it behind them and go and do 
whatever they’re doing and then disappear again, it’s not part of 
the community
Compounding the lack of public access is any sense that these services 
are located here with a rationale to join-up local service delivery. A 
common theme from the local councillors we interviewed was that 
since the demise of the Hattersley Neighbourhood Partnership there 
is no one locally accessible place70 in which agencies work together to 
co-ordinate public service provision on the estate. 
This is a missed opportunity. In an era of austerity-enforced budget cuts 
a multi-use building like The Hub offers real potential for co-locating 
services for the benefit of residents and not solely the service provider. 
This is particularly true in light of the success of the existing library 
facilities. Notwithstanding the less than ideal design of the Hub there 
is a move towards multi-use buildings within the UK that house not 
just libraries but other local services as well. This sometimes proves 
controversial but offers big benefits both for customers, who have the 
convenience of more services in one place, and service-providers, 
who save money by sharing costs. There is no set pattern to multi-use 
partnerships but there are several working examples71. 
It is important to note that Tameside MBC has commissioned an 
architect to look at how the use and design of the Hub could be 
improved, including whether the existing health centre in Hattersley 
could be relocated within the Hub, broadening its use, and to the 
above points, a positive starting point for co-ordinating public service 
provision on the estate. The architect will also look at the Hub’s 
disabled access and the existing position of the library. 
Even though there is not much functional benefit to these providers 
sharing The Hub, their co-location in the same building nonetheless 
puts up barriers to more extensive use by the community. To residents 
of the estate this now appears to work against the grain of what a 
community centre is for, or indeed conspires against the knowledge 
that this even is a community centre at all. A local councillor explains 
the conundrum:
We had much more of a sense of community when our community 
centre [in the old district centre] was a community centre. This 
doesn’t feel anything like a community centre… For one there’s 
nothing actually on the outside of the building that says it 
incorporates Hattersley Community Centre – anybody walking 
past would think that it’s Peak Valley’s offices and nothing else. 
The police post have got a sign up outside so they’re obviously 
here but there’s nothing identifying this building as part of the 
community and you talk to people who’ve not been living in 
Hattersley very long who say “oh I thought it was Peak Valley’s 
offices?” 
Figure 24: Tameside Council poster (left) in nearby Ashton-under-Lyne showcasing The Hub (right) 69 PVHA, “10 Year Legacy & Financial Business Plan 2017-2022.”
70 There exists a Neighbourhood Services Team run by Tameside MBC but this covers all of Tameside South, a much larger geography than Hattersley.
71 See for example: https://iflalbes.wordpress.com/2017/11/15/evolution-not-extinction-making-the-case-for-co-locating-services-in-multi-use-buildings/
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A resident suggests that “what it is, it’s become an office complex... 
and it’s become what the community already thought it was before 
it was that.” Nobody is denying that the facilities themselves and the 
general condition of the environment is far superior to the dilapidated 
old district centre. However, the way in which the community facilities 
are designed in relation to other uses and the way they are managed is 
widely criticised. We will take each point – design and management – 
in turn in the following.
As we have already touched upon, the design of The Hub was 
compromised by the fact that Tesco wanted its extra store to have a 
larger footprint than originally intended in the masterplan. This has 
resulted in a somewhat squeezed footprint for The Hub, which has 
had to go up rather than out in order to accommodate all the functions 
envisaged. This, coupled with a sloping site, has resulted in a building 
which lacks sufficient disabled – or indeed any – access at certain 
times of the day. The car park is located at the back of the building, 
whilst the main entrance fronts onto Stockport Road at the other side. 
Furthermore, access from the car park is via the library entrance, 
which is located on the lower ground floor, accessible to the rest of 
the building only by a lift. Unfortunately, the library is only open certain 
days of the week – Monday, Tuesday and Thursday afternoons – which 
means that access is restricted to The Hub from the car park outside 
of these times. The only option in this event is to walk around the 
building, up the hill to the front entrance. Yet even this is made more 
difficult by the lack of footpaths connecting the car park at the nearest 
point to the street – people have to walk back on themselves, away 
from the building in order to access the pavement. The ‘desire line’ in 
this instance – that optimal route in urban design that describes where 
people naturally choose to walk, often in contravention of designated 
footpaths – is through a planting area and over a wooden fence, where 
you risk, as one council officer remarks, getting “your trousers torn to 
shreds”. 
This may well appear of minor annoyance for many, but imposes 
considerable constraints for those with less physical mobility. A local 
councillor describes the problem:
Disabled access is a major problem here, absolutely major 
problem.  When we were discussing the building, I wasn’t there 
right at the very beginning, but when I became a councillor we 
were at the old community centre and the thing that we said is 
for us this building is back to front.  We’ve got disabled access at 
the car park, when the library is closed if you’re in a wheelchair 
have you tried pushing a wheelchair up that hill to get in this? The 
architect said we didn’t know what we were talking about... well 
we might not be architects but we know what it feels like to push 
someone in a wheelchair up that hill.  So we have access when 
the library’s open because we can use the lift but with no life when 
the library’s closed we’ve no access to the lift for people to go up 
to.
Moreover, there is a general dependency on the lift, even when the 
library is closed and the lift only operates from the ground floor up. This 
appears to be the only route for residents or members of the public – 
like us – to access the first or second floors. There are a set of stairs 
but these are closed to the public, accessible only by employees of 
Peak Valley or Tameside MBC etc. with a swipe card. With just one lift 
servicing Peak Valley’s offices, this sometimes causes delays and is in 
many respects a danger to safety in the event of a fire for instance. In 
general, it represents a bottleneck in the otherwise open flow of the 
building – and acts to dissuade rather than welcome people to the 
library or Peak Valley’s offices. It is a major design flaw that requires 
addressing through making available the stairs to members of the 
public. Such a design flaw, therefore, can be mitigated through more 
effective management of the building – an issue we turn to next.
Partly as a result of the confusion over its identity, partly due to its 
complex design – and partly due to its management, as explore below 
– The Hub is, for whatever reason, woefully under-used by residents, 
and in particular by the younger generation:
For me I think it lacks an identity at the moment… when we speak 
to the tenants or when we deal with anybody it’s where they go 
to Peak Valley to sort out their housing issues on level one.  So 
any other purpose, for example we wanted young people to use 
it because the [Hattersley Community] Forum does have a very 
strong presence there but it’s like that clique kind of atmosphere, 
it’s just, you’re not going to get young people coming in there and 
where is that next generation who’s going to keep that community 
kind of element of it going when the Forum kind of move on.  So 
it does lack that to me, and I think the footfall would significantly 
increase if they would actually be able to engage the younger 
people of the estate to come in.  
Tameside council officer.
That said, there exists a real opportunity, perhaps spurred on by the 
work Tameside MBC have commissioned to improve the design and 
use of the Hub, for the younger generation and new residents to 
become more engaged in it. 
Whenever we have visited The Hub, the café on the ground floor – 
generously staffed by volunteers, invariably older residents associated 
with the Forum – was generally almost empty, even at peak lunchtime 
hours. This is odd considering the very competitive prices, in relation to 
the Tesco café next door, and the quality of the food – “the best cheese 
and ham toasties in the North West!” as one volunteer remarked. So 
why so little custom – at most around six or seven people at lunchtime, 
again almost solely older residents – in an estate of several thousand? 
The reasons given for this are four-fold. First, as we have already 
discussed, The Hub lacks a distinctive identity universally known by 
residents as a community centre for their use as such. Second, for 
those that are aware, the multi-function and official use dissuades its 
use as a space to socialise or gather. For instance, many residents 
highlighted the fact that the presence of formal governance bodies did 
not exactly help create an atmosphere of conviviality:
Looking back, you know what I mean, the community centre went 
and that wasn’t attached to anything that was its own little hub, 
you know, where people can go.  Here you’ve got the community 
centre where the housing [office] is – who’s going to want to come 
in here; who’s going to want to relax in case somebody walks past 
and says you’ve got debts yes what are you doing in here when 
you owe us so much for your rent? Do you see where I’m coming 
from? And you’ve got a police there, then you’ve got Tameside up 
on the top floor – do you see where I’m coming from? So you’re 
walking to basically offices, it’s not community.
The third reason for the lack of use can be traced to how the 
community spaces are managed by the Hattersley Community Forum, 
who for whatever reason fail to make full use of the facilities. Whilst it is 
widely acknowledged that the Forum play a big part in, and do a good 
job for, the community – through voluntary labour – they nonetheless 
act as gatekeepers to The Hub.  There are several issues here. Some 
residents feel that the representatives of the Forum receive special 
treatment, such as favourable room rents, and that this is unfair on 
the rest of the community, who due to other commitments, such as 
childcare and work, may not be able to give the requisite hours of 
volunteering to be a member. This is exacerbated by the generational 
divide between the Forum and the rest – Forum representatives tend to 
be much older, female, often retired, and who have gained this position 
for themselves through earlier community organising and activism. 
Fundamentally, the grievances among the community boil down to the 
relatively unaccountable discretion with which the Forum manage the 
rooms for hire, which are consequently under-used. 
3.4.2 Carillion 
Fourth and finally, an equally major problem is the way in which The 
Hub is managed outside the Forum’s hours. Whilst the Forum enjoys 
effective operational control over the majority of the ground floor from 
9am until 4pm each working day, Tameside MBC have contracted 
facilities management (FM) out to a third party, Carillion. This was – up 
until very recently that is – part of a borough-wide FM outsourcing 
agreement with Carillion. Whilst the Forum charge next to nothing yet 
deny access on a discretionary basis, the problem with Carillion is the 
reverse – they market the rooms to anyone, and beyond Hattersley, 
but at an extremely high price. A central figure involved in the running 
of the local football club – very popular particularly among boys on the 
estate – describes how Carillion have priced the club out of using what 
are otherwise good facilities:
It’s better [than the Community Centre], it’s just too expensive 
and not as accessible because Carillion are running it and that’s 
stupid – it’s crazy that’s the only reason. You talk to anyone, trying 
to book that space, I try and use it for the club to have meetings, 
it is […], way too expensive… well I think they work out about, a 
meeting room is about 10 or 15 pounds an hour. But if you look 
at the old centre, I guess what people are probably saying is it 
wasn’t the accessibility in terms of where it was […] but for me if 
you’ve got a community service or a community initiative based 
in Hattersley run by Hattersley people, so as a football club we’ve 
got 170 kids, majority are from Hattersley so we’re doing some 
really good stuff and it should qualify for one hour a month in The 
Hub free of charge or a nominal fee
A similar sentiment exists among others involved voluntarily in 
organising recreational activities for young people:
They’re [Carillion] pricing the community out of the buildings. So 
what I had at St Barnabus Church, I’ve got a kick boxing group 
who could take on more young people which keeps them off the 
street and gives them a discipline. But for health and safety they 
can’t have any more people in that building because everyone 
wants to play football, right, so they came to me and I said well 
we’ve got that big hall, we’ve got this, we’ve got that we’ll get 
you a subsidised rate, we’ll do this we’ll do that. Well then all the 
barriers start coming, Carillion won’t lose the money it will cost the 
150 pound to have it for two hours on the Monday, how ridiculous 
is that?!
It is not just high costs for hiring rooms that prevents its use. A charity 
youth worker who lives on the estate explains the difficulty in using 
what is meant to be an accessible community facility outside of the 
opening hours set by Carillion: 
It is tricky to use out of hours. So we were desperate to deliver, 
we were really wanting continuity of services for young people to 
move from the old community hub and cyber café to here and it 
took two years before we could physically use the building out of 
hours… You could be a key holder to the cyber café, we were key 
holders and it was a simple building you could be a key holder 
for [although] it was shocking where the kids could escape all 
over the place and it was really badly designed. This one’s not 
actually that badly designed but, and again, the local authority’s 
FM company Carillion couldn’t caretake the out of hours activities.  
So Peak Valley opened the building in the day time and they 
closed at night… and when we were trying to build the building 
you couldn’t get funding for one that wasn’t open from 8 in the 
morning until 10 at night, it’s like no you can’t have a community 
facility that doesn’t open when people have finished work… For us 
it took the threat of me parking a mobile youth centre in the car 
park and running the youth club from a mobile youth centre to be 
able to get the building opened and to be able to run the youth 
club.
With all these numerous problems, why would Tameside MBC employ 
Carillion to manage their premises? Part of the answer can be found 
in the prevailing practice associated with New Public Management71 of 
outsourcing public services to big for-profit companies specialising in 
public sector contracts – Serco, G4S, Capita, Interserve and, of course, 
Carillion. Tameside were clearly not alone among public bodies in 
employing Carillion as their facilities management contractor. Such 
practices are now under increased scrutiny and may well soon be a 
thing of the past given recent events, not least Carillion’s dramatic 
financial collapse, the fallout of which is still – two months on, at 
the time of writing – yet to be resolved.73 What motivated Tameside 
specifically to hire the company was a concern with cost. Tameside 
MBC, like its northern urban Labour-controlled counterparts, has 
72 Tameside MBC, “Supplementary Planning Guidance: Hattersley and Mottram.”
73 Rob Davies, “Carillion: a month on, employees, partners and rivals feel the pain.” The Guardian, 14th February 2018.
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suffered with some of the biggest budget cuts in the country: £144 
million since 2010 according to the councillors we spoke with. Carillion, 
like the other big outsourcing firms, can undercut smaller and often 
more socially-conscious competitors – although as a result may 
also provide an unsatisfactory service as in the case of The Hub. A 
councillor explained to us – before the news of its financial failure – 
why choosing Carillion seemed like the best way to limit costs: 
It seemed a good idea at the time but looking back you know it, 
because we let Carillion do all our FM they take all the risk as 
well so it’s less risk with the Council if something happens then its 
Carillion who take the risk.  That was one of the reasons we sort 
of outsourced our facilities management really and plus the fact 
we had to make savings within the Council. So we are looking at 
that whether that, whether we can change that and it’s something 
that we are looking at, now Carillion may win the contract but I’m 
hoping it will be a better contract than what we’re getting.
3.4.3 Success stories: the Library
It is not all doom and gloom, of course, for The Hub. Part of the reason 
Tameside MBC continue to subsidise its running costs through their 
support of community space and the Forum’s activities – however 
questionable they may be – is that The Hub provides a much-needed 
resource and focal point for social activities outside of the home for 
many of the estate’s most vulnerable people:
so by subsidising the Hub with lots of people coming out, they’re 
going in there and they’re meeting up with people and they’re 
having a chat you know they’re wellbeing is far more improved 
which in a sense is the same for the Council.  Because otherwise 
we might have to pick up adult social care, so there is always that 
about it and that’s what we recognise with a lot of our community 
centres now especially with the elderly.  You’ve got to try and get 
people, people just sit in the house they vegetate and it’s not just 
about costs obviously people’s lives but you know there’s also, 
create downstream problems I suppose. Yes it does so early 
intervention in a sense so rather than doing that we’d rather 
people coming into the Hub, give them something to get up for in 
the morning. Local councillor.
One of the little known success stories of The Hub is the library. When 
we met the librarian, she explained to us that the old library, when 
it was located in the old district centre, was losing custom – a trend 
which, since its relocation into The Hub, has been reversed. Part of 
the problem with the old library was its location, on the other side of 
Stockport Road. This meant that residents on the Mottram side never 
bothered to use the library due to the territorial divide between the two 
sides:
Because the estate was split by the main road always, so the 
people on this half as ludicrous as it sounds never bothered 
to cross to come down to the library which was on that side. 
Librarian.
The old library, therefore, had a much smaller catchment population 
than the estate as a whole – “1500 users a month would be a 
reasonable expectation”. However, by 2010/11, usage had fallen to 
around about 700 per month. So there were two problems with the 
old library service: first, a location and catchment area that excludes a 
large proportion of the estate’s residents and deepens social divides; 
second, declining usage due to poor facilities. The librarian explains 
how the new library in its new location has helped resolve these two 
issues:
So you have Hattersley here, you have Mottram here, that’s when 
we moved to the new Hub and of course people started to move 
across.  Not quickly because there was a stigma attached to using 
Hattersley but they did come across.  Now the example I can 
give you is every week in libraries we run what we call ‘time for 
a rhyme’ sessions aimed at babies to school age, mums, carers, 
fathers, whoever, come to the session and it’s only half an hour 
but it develops children so on and so forth.  At the old library in 
the old precinct if we could scrape one it was as much as some 
weeks – many weeks you never even got one.  Now when we 
moved across to the Hub we started them there, well in fact in the 
year prior to the library moving we had just ten children and five 
adults – I’ve got this written down – attending the session over a 
12 month period, so that’s all.  In the 12 months after we opened 
in the Hub and we ran the same thing – nothing was any different 
– we had 400 children and 400 adults attending… Since we’ve 
moved across here, I haven’t seen anything deteriorate, I would 
say it’s done nothing but be positive for the library service.
However, despite an initial rise in numbers in the year following the 
opening of the new library in October 2012 – with a record high in 
August 2013 and September 2014 at around 2,500 – in the past few 
years numbers have begun to fall back to pre-Hub levels (see graph 
below). One explanation for this may be to do with the budget cuts 
imposed by austerity, which saw opening hours and staffing levels 
reduce along with resources. In this light, the rise in footfall and use of 
the library, despite these wider trends, is a remarkable success story.
Figure 25: visitor figures at Hattersley Library since 2010
Figure 26: young residents outside The Hub
The move to The Hub, therefore, is a very positive transformation 
– not least in moving towards the centre of the estate and helping 
heal the divide between the two halves. This effect also holds for the 
other functions relocated to The Hub – the building itself represents 
a symbolic suturing of an historically territorially-divided estate. The 
issues with the opening hours of the library may be a product of 
austerity-driven budget cuts landed on a council that has dwindling 
resources to spend in areas suffering increasing need. The services 
offered by Tameside and Peak Valley in The Hub – if not the design and 
management of the building itself – have been relatively successful if 
we take into account the huge challenges presented by austerity since 
2010.
3.5 Community Investment 
Strategy and skills 
development
Since 2013 PVHA has committed to delivering a Community Investment 
Strategy. PVHA owns and manages approximately 1504 homes and, 
like many Housing Associations, sees itself as an investor for change 
in its community. Indeed, with the onset of austerity driven budget 
cuts to other local public service providers, it may well be the biggest 
investor for change in Hattersley. Community investment aimed to 
develop sustainable communities through a process ‘…that recognises 
that successful neighbourhoods, and therefore successful tenancies, 
depend on a complex balance of social, economic and environmental 
conditions.’74
Peak Valley employ a dedicated officer, Sam Cooper, to deliver their 
strategy who has, by all accounts relayed to us, developed a trusted 
relationship with the local community:
He’s built up a reputation on the estate, people know him, I’ve 
seen him approach kids you know who’ve started causing trouble 
here saying “hey what’s your problem?” and talking to them, you 
can do this you can do that and it gets them thinking.  You know 
he’s a good fella.
The strategy presents as integral to PVHA’s core values and activities. 
They exist as a not-for-profit organisation with any surplus generated 
being reinvested into the community. In 2014/1575 this amounted to 
£53,269 spread over 11 different projects along the themes of Jobs, 
Training and Opportunities; Health and Wellbeing; Young people; and, 
Community Strengthening. Such projects included for example: a jobs 
fair, BASE (Barratt) construction courses and Peak valley apprentice 
scheme; the Zest project and Hattersley Community Gardens; Winter 
warmers and Peak Performance.
74 Peak Valley Housing Association Community Investment Strategy: June 2014
75 These are the only years we have figures for see: Programme Report Peak Valley Symphony Housing 2014
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We have already touched upon some of these projects but some like 
the Zest initiative and the Community Gardens were designed to not 
only strengthen community ties but to help address local health and 
well-being issues. One resident commented: 
…and it [the community garden] is pretty independent now 
because they sell their own fruit and veg but people who suffer 
with depression or mental health issues, he [Sam Cooper] gets 
them in there, he doesn’t make them go in there, but it’s like a 
therapy to them.
By PVHA’s own measure of social return on investment76 this strategy 
has been successful in delivering social impact for local residents. 
However, there is also a wider sense here in which PVHA and its staff 
have gone the extra mile in community investment. This is evident 
in how PVHA have fostered a close working relationship with local 
schools to the point where they now have staff sitting as governors in 
the two local primary schools. The local head-teacher explains how this 
came about:
They’re always trying to liaise with us and it’s in our interest to get 
the best out of them, so they’re always coming up with ideas and 
funding streams and will help us out and we just thought it made 
sense to have someone from the housing stock on our Governors 
so we just asked and both people added greatly to the governors.
He also is clear on how PVHA’s presence and community investment 
strategy has benefited the schools.
in the past we might have had some parents with housing 
difficulty going back before Peak Valley and you’ve got this family 
and they’re going to be evicted and they owe a thousand quid 
or something the parents who previously were having to go to 
Manchester or and we would have had to phone up Tameside.  So 
that role for the school which we weren’t very good at because 
that’s not our skills but we tried. But now that role was taken over 
by Peak Valley. So, now the parents’ issues have been addressed 
so there’s less agro for us and it calms them down and also I think 
they’ve also been strict with some people […] and said if you carry 
on behaving like that you’re not living here.
Although Peak Valley appears to have achieved a great deal in respect 
to community initiatives that tackle mental health and social issues on 
the estate, they have been less successful at addressing the root cause 
of such problems: unemployment and a local skills gap.
3.5.1 Routes through to employment
Several skills and training initiatives, aimed at boosting employment 
levels in the estate, have been attempted over the period of PVHA’s 
tenure.  By far the most successful is the employment opportunities 
provided by the new Tesco superstore which claims that 90% of their 
work force either walk or cycle to work. This was no accident and 
while Tesco were open to employing local staff it was the Land Board 
76 ibid
Figure 27: Hattersley Community Gardens
that ensured, with PVHA’s help, that local residents were trained to 
successfully apply for the advertised jobs. Other schemes PVHA have 
initiated directly, such as their employment of (currently four) local 
residents as housing management staff. In addition to this they run their 
own apprenticeship scheme which has successfully employed one 
person in their property team. 
The main approach to skills and training has involved partnership 
working.  One such example was the Greater Manchester Talent Match, 
a Big lottery funded programme that aimed to support young people 
aged 18-24 on the estate who had been out of employment, education 
or training for twelve months or more and who needed extra support 
to help them along their pathway to work. A skilled professional 
from outside the area was employed on a two-year contract to run 
the programme on Hattersley. This appears to have been less than 
successful as only two out of a target of ten young people were placed 
into full-time education or training.  The recollections of the worker 
involved point to a number of explanations for the low take-up of this 
opportunity. First, in comparison to other areas Hattersley did not 
appear ready to fully exploit this funding opportunity given the relatively 
short, two year contract period:
I think the Broughton Trust – they cleverly saw the value of the 
project.  They had everything in place, I mean everything in place, 
they had the work placements in place because they’d worked for 
years in Lower Broughton which is very deprived.  So, when they 
took the contract on it was just purely a case of well all we’ve got 
to do we’ve got the contract, we’ve got the lads and we’ve got a 
guy that owns an engineering firm that will take them on.  
Second, the worker also came up against residual perceptions of 
Hattersley isolationism:
I’m used to working on these estates and I actively seek out these 
areas of... But when I first got on there, you know, I was thinking 
there’s something strange round here, time has stood still and 
it’s a bit here and nowhere, there’s transport links, but what’s 
wrong with these people? Why aren’t they going into Manchester? 
There’s very good transport links and let’s be clear there’s no work 
in Hattersley… 
Third, alongside this there was also the abiding problem of an outsider 
breaking into and earning the trust of a tightly bound community within 
a short period of time:
The sheer volume of woven links that were going on: that she 
was related to this person who was related to that person and 
was it really a surprise to me? No, because I grew up on a rough 
old council estate in Luton and it was just exactly the same there.  
Everyone knew everyone, people know what’s going on, people 
communicate with each other, you think you’re going but you can’t 
really go anywhere because everyone knows what you’re up to 
because everyone knows what the people are doing.
Circumstances might have been different for the Talent Match 
programme if it had coincided with the Hattersley Neighbourhood 
Partnership. Unfortunately, the Partnership closed in 2010, seven years 
prior to Talent Match.  However, in the early days of PVHA’s tenure on 
the estate they worked with the Neighbourhood Partnership to broker 
service level agreements, opening up local employment opportunities 
with contractors coming onto the estate. A local resident who used to 
work for the Neighbourhood Partnership recalls:
If we had to get service level agreements with the colleges and 
stuff around that, Peak Valley would be there, they would be part 
of this group that was formed in order to like, it was called Jobs 
training enterprise Group and so they became a strong player 
on that.  So even when we got the apprentices and stuff like that 
they would, so when their say the roofers came on the estate to 
do stuff they would, we would negotiate that and take so many 
apprentices off the estate.  So then Peak Valley would push that 
or they would say to us we’re bringing a contractor in for this or 
for that and then they would broker a meeting with myself and the 
contractor.
This partnership approach to skills and training continued with Barratt, 
Tameside MBC and even the Army. By 2014, a total of 53 people had 
attended BASE courses; 22 a Hattersley Jobs Fair; and five an Army 
personnel development programme77. Interviews with people who 
have been involved in these partnerships testify to the need to work 
with the prevailing cultural grain in Hattersley. This is a Tameside MBC 
official describing why jobs fairs and training have been organised on 
Hattersley:
I liaise with Sam Cooper on a regular basis at Peak Valley Housing 
Association and in terms of bringing training into Hattersley 
because it’s so hard to get people from there to actually go out 
regardless of what transport is available.
The importance of PVHA’s relationship with the local community is 
again underlined:
I think it’s been important for us to work in partnership with 
them [PVHA] to make sure we were making the right choices.  
Strategically we could go away and implement a number of things 
independently but in order to ensure the success of a project why 
would you not use the people closest to that community
It is perhaps also significant that PVHA has understood that barriers 
to employment are not solely a lack of qualifications but can also be 
a product of poor mental health. Their contribution in this regard was 
acknowledged by a local councillor:
It’s been a hard slog really because it’s not just about 
employment, you’ve got you’ve got the unemployment element of 
it but then you’ve also got health issues as well.  So there’s been 
a very it has to be a dual effort really to kind of help them, not just 
with physical illnesses but with mental health challenges as well.  I 
think there’s an organisation that is still operating in there called 
Zest so they had a kind of health element to them as well and 
they were supporting residents, somewhere to go and somewhere 
to actually get support to try and move forward.  Even just work 
offering voluntary work for people and they’ve done a lot of work 
in that area to, so it’s much wider than just the housing element 
of it.
Clearly these attempts to improve the ability of local residents to access 
employment opportunities, given the prevailing levels of deprivation, 
remain important. PVHA have had some successes and the Tesco 
intervention is significant but more needs to be done. The lessons 
from the Talent Match programme are perhaps to avoid short-term 
projects and a full-time worker dedicated to building relationships and 
employment opportunities for and with the local community would be a 
good first step forward.
77 Programme Report Peak valley and Symphony Housing 2014
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The Hattersley case establishes a set of principles that can help guide the 
successful regeneration of any area suffering from multiple deprivation and 
historical neglect. Our assessment highlights five fundamentally important 
factors which have implications for estate regeneration policy and practice: 
first, the Collaboration Agreement structuring the stock transfer process and 
the regeneration masterplan, which enabled private sector investment whilst 
ensuring public sector control, high design standards and punctual delivery, 
and prevented speculative ‘land banking’; second, the overarching approach to 
regeneration through tenure diversification coupled with school catchment area 
restructuring; third, Peak Valley’s ‘relational’ – as opposed to ‘transactional’ – 
approach to the management of the estate and to its relationships with tenants 
and key regeneration partners, notably Tameside MBC; fourth, the robust 
governance structure centring on the Hattersley Land Board constituted by the 
Collaboration Agreement; and fifth, the deep-rooted, structural socio-economic 
problems often evident in regeneration estates like Hattersley are inherently 
complex and multi-faceted and cannot be achieved through the actions and 
programmes of housing associations alone. We address each in turn in this 
section. Lastly, we make recommendations for Onward.
CHAPTER 4
KEY FACTORS 
OF SUCCESS
KEY FACTORS OF SUCCESS4
4.1 The Collaboration 
Agreement
The Collaboration Agreement was a singular ‘act of genius’78 without 
which the regeneration of the estate could have taken a very 
different turn. The demolition of some of the worst social housing and 
redevelopment as new homes for sale was the key strategic move 
– codified in the Collaboration Agreement – that paid for all other 
improvements, including to the existing stock and to the public realm, 
as well as for new retail, transport and community facilities. Moreover, 
the decision not to sell the land but only a licence to build and sell new 
homes, we believe, was key to keeping the private sector developer 
on, albeit a slightly delayed, schedule particularly given the financial 
crash of 2008. 
After the first stock transfer proposal from Harvest Housing Group 
proved unviable, Portico were invited to submit their plans for the 
estate. Through the successful partnership Portico established with 
Tameside MBC, Manchester City Council and English Partnerships, an 
innovative approach to the regeneration of Hattersley was conceived. 
The £18.5 million shortfall identified by Portico in its business plan 
presented the conundrum of finding an alternative source to plug 
the gap. The novel solution devised was a form of land value capture 
78 This and similar remarks can be attributed to various participants and stakeholders interviewed as part of this project.
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that secured large inward investment from the private sector whilst 
maintaining total control of the regeneration process by the public and 
third sector partners. 
What was eventually agreed in the Collaboration Agreement – the 
founding legal document for the regeneration partnership – was for 
the land owned by Manchester City Council to transfer directly into the 
hands of a newly-formed housing association, Peak Valley, set up as a 
special vehicle subsidiary of Contour Homes, and to offer up some of 
this land, on which the most derelict housing stood, for redevelopment 
as homes for sale by the private sector, in this case Barratt Homes. The 
sale of the land to Barratt would then pay for the £18.5m funding gap. 
However, this in itself is not such a radical proposition: consolidating 
public land for private redevelopment is a commonplace form of 
leveraging the finance needed for costly regeneration schemes. What 
was rather unusual – if not unique – in this case was the mechanism 
innovated to govern the sale.
Rather than sell the land outright – as would normally be the case 
in such deals – or even offer a leasehold rather than freehold 
arrangement, Barratt was invited to buy the “right to sell completed 
houses” on land that would remain under the ownership of Peak Valley 
throughout. In this way, Barratt was granted a licence to build new 
houses on land newly-owned by Peak Valley and profit from the sale 
Figure 29: Public consultation for the masterplan for Hattersley
of these houses. Upon their sale, the land, therefore, was transferred 
directly from Peak Valley to the new owner-occupiers, without ever 
passing through Barratt’s ownership. This condition of the Collaboration 
Agreement enabled this crucial investment whilst preventing all 
possibility of speculation or ‘land banking’ by the private sector.
Fortunate timing cannot be overstated as a factor of its success. The 
Collaboration Agreement was signed in September 2006 with BASE 
– a company now part of Barratt Group – only around nine months 
before the crash of 2007 that triggered the global financial crisis. The 
BASE bid for the land was £26.5 million, £7 million of which was to be 
paid up front on the date of the agreement and the rest in four annual 
instalments until 2010.79 This would pay for the £18.5m shortfall in Peak 
Valley’s business plan and leave a substantial remainder to provide 
additional regeneration funding as well as pay other partners for the 
land that they owned. This included large swathes of land owned by 
Tameside MBC, particularly school sites and other public facilities that 
were being rationalised and rebuilt as part of the masterplan.
Had the agreement been signed a few months later, during or after the 
financial crisis, both the private sector partner, Barratt Homes, and the 
central government agency English Partnerships, who provided the 
financial guarantee for value of the land in case of market failure, would 
doubtful have agreed to these terms. This raises a number of issues 
79  PVHA, Peak News, vol. April 2016 (Peak Valley Housing Association, 2016). Page 14
around whether the interesting approach undertaken for Hattersley is 
at all replicable in our current post-crash era of political austerity, one 
in which regeneration policy has faded from the national government’s 
agenda and is all but a thing of the past.80
A key achievement of the Collaboration Agreement, as we will go 
on to explore in the section on Governance, is that it ensured the 
commitment of not just Barratt but all regeneration partners in working 
together towards a set of regeneration objectives.81 These objectives 
are set out in figure 10 in chapter 3. They provide the basis for the 
criteria against which we assess the success of the interventions 
made by Peak Valley. Although our focus is on Peak Valley and its 
interventions, we also highlight the important roles played by the 
other partners in the regeneration process, notably Tameside MBC. As 
we show in what follows, the success of the Hattersley regeneration 
programme since 2006 is the product of a close partnership approach 
forged between the central, local and arms-length state with the private 
sector.
4.2 Tenure diversification
The most fundamental element of the post-2006 regeneration of 
the Hattersley estate is the restructuring of its housing stock through 
tenure diversification. The particularly poor state of the stock and 
estate – coupled with high levels of deprivation and a dearth of funding 
options – meant that an alternative route to fund these improvements 
was required. The demolition of some of the worst social housing, 
and redevelopment as new homes for sale, is the key strategic 
move – codified in the Collaboration Agreement – that pays for all 
other improvements, including to the existing stock and to the public 
realm, as well as for new retail, transport and community facilities. 
This amounted to consolidating the land on the estate into parcels 
marketable to the private sector for redevelopment as new houses 
for sale. At the same time, the plan enabled some of the most poorly-
designed and under-maintained housing to be demolished and the 
sites cleared and consolidated for precisely this purpose. A resident 
actively involved in governance puts it succinctly: “it’s always been rich 
in land it’s not rich in money; we’ve got a lot of land, and land’s money 
now isn’t it, it’s like gold.”
Other than funding, this tenure diversification approach fulfilled the 
overall rationale for regeneration, summarised in the opening pages of 
the final masterplan, adopted as Supplementary Planning Guidance by 
Tameside MBC in 2004:
 Without new development in the area it will steadily fail to be 
viable as a community. It will continue to be an area that the 
younger more affluent and more mobile groups will tend to 
leave, taking with them the potential expenditure and social 
characteristics that are important in establishing a vibrant and 
stable community.82
80 Dave O’Brien and Peter Matthews, After Urban Regeneration: Communities, Policy and Place (Bristol: Policy Press, 2015)
81 See schedule 1 (p.109) in English Partnerships, Tameside MBS, PVHA, Manchester City Council, Contour Housing (2006). 
Collaboration Agreement relating to Hattersley, Greater Manchester. Forshaws Solicitors. 
82 Peter Malpass and David Mullins, “Local Authority Housing Stock Transfer in the UK : From Local Initiative to National Policy Local Authority Housing Stock Transfer in the UK :,” 
Housing Studies 17, no. 4 (2002): 673–686. page 5
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Regenerating Hattersley, the masterplan states, is not simply about 
improving existing stock for Peak Valley tenants but, crucially, about 
improving the environment, boosting the image of the estate and 
building new homes for sale in order to attract new residents, as well as 
retain those groups that might otherwise leave, who are purported to 
have the right “social characteristics” and sufficient purchasing power 
to establish and sustain “a vibrant and stable community”. The tenure 
diversification logic was pushed by English Partnerships, who were 
strongly influenced by the Mixed Communities agenda permeating New 
Labour thinking on regeneration and social exclusion at the time, as this 
former Peak Valley officer explains:
 One of the principles that English Partnerships wanted to address 
was the sort of, using that word again, the monolithic nature of 
the estate in terms of it was predominantly public social housing 
and I think the tenure mix was roughly sort of 70% social to 30% 
private and the private element was mainly Right to Buys. Their 
[EP’s] Sustainable Communities programme, which is now out of 
date, looked to sort of reverse that tenure mix in favour of home 
ownership, to about 60%, with 40% social and I think they were 
well on the way to sort of doing that.  
Significantly, the social housing in need of demolition was not 
concentrated in any one area but rather dotted around in small patches 
across the entire estate. This meant that the new homes for sale would 
also be spread out throughout the estate and relatively intermingled 
amongst social housing. Figure 29 from the masterplan gives an 
impression of the distribution, although the blue sites represent only 
phase 1 developments and not the complete picture. For instance, it 
does not record the large areas of housing demolished to make way for 
the new district centre to the east of Stockport Road, represented in red 
on the second masterplan map in figure 30.
The sites numbered 27, 28 and 32 in Figure 29 were once schools, 
owned by Tameside MBC. This shows how the council – a major 
landowner – was as intimately involved in the project as Peak Valley; 
and how the school rationalisation strategy that Tameside initiated 
in the years preceding the stock transfer was an integral part of 
the overall vision to break up existing mono-tenure agglomerations 
of social housing. The schools strategy anticipated the Mixed 
Communities approach towards housing, in that it broke up the 
concentration of secondary students on the estate in just one 
school – the ‘Comp’, site 27 on the map – and forced students to 
travel outside the estate to schools in different catchment areas with 
different, more mixed social class compositions. In this way, the tenure 
diversification project led by Peak Valley – and backed by English 
Partnerships – in the post-transfer period simply continued the logic of 
the school catchment rationalisation strategy that was first undertaken 
by Tameside MBC. We consider each related approach in turn, first 
housing, then schools.
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Figure 29: phase 1 
new housing sites
4.2.1 The impacts of tenure mixing
The Mixed Communities agenda sought to tackle spatially-concentrated 
poverty through a “more sustainable mix of housing types and 
tenures”83 – where housing tenures were seen as a rough proxy for 
socioeconomic class.84 At the heart of the mixed communities rationale 
is the ‘neighbourhood effect’ hypothesis which focuses on the spatial 
effects of poverty: defined by UK policy-makers as the “additional 
disadvantages that affect poorer people when they are concentrated 
in poor neighbourhoods.”85 Despite ambiguous evidence for their 
existence, so-called ‘neighbourhood effects’ are seen to reinforce 
poverty through poor access to public services, social networks, role 
models, and employment opportunities.86 
It is extremely difficult to measure how the introduction of new-build 
owner-occupiers for the first time on the Hattersley estate has affected 
the life chances of other residents. This is a notoriously tricky question 
in the social sciences which hinges around the methodological 
controversy over whether ‘neighbourhood effects’ exist in any real or 
observable way. Measuring them is problematic due to the difficulties 
in isolating the additional effects that spatial concentrations of poverty 
might have on life chances over and above more structural causes, 
such as a lack of access to good services, education and employment 
opportunities. Moreover, the mechanisms purported to affect this 
relationship between deprivation and spatial concentrations are highly 
contentious.87 Many of the alleged benefits of tenure mixing for the 
disadvantaged rely on the emergence of meaningful social interaction 
between different social classes – i.e. tenure groups – which in turn 
rests on the assumption that spatial proximity alone translates into 
interaction. However, a growing body of empirical research88 has found 
that tenure diversification in mixed communities has not resulted in 
any significant interaction between neighbours of different tenure 
classes and has, moreover, acted to increase social tensions and class 
divisions. Evidence of earlier mixed communities such as the post-war 
new towns suggests that increased mixing might cause neighbourly 
disputes and that residents prefer relative social homogeneity or like-
mindedness in their neighbours. 89 Official findings from DCLG are at 
best ambiguous90. 
Broadly consistent with the academic literature, we found little evidence 
of any significant social mixing between residents of the new build 
private houses and the longer-standing tenants of Peak Valley. However, 
we only spoke with a limited number of owner-occupiers – two in total 
– and so more in-depth research is required in order to make a robust 
assessment. A small number of owner-occupiers have sought to get 
involved in governance processes of the estate, applying to join the Land 
Board as well as less formal groups such as the Neighbourhood Watch. 
However, an existing resident reports some differences, and perhaps the 
emergence of tensions, between the two groups:
Figure 30:  location of existing and new 
district centre on site of old housing
 I mean we have local neighbourhood watch meetings and we’ve 
got people from Barratt’s coming up about the Barratt’s houses 
as we call them and they definitely feel that they are a little bit 
different.
Nonetheless, there is little evidence of any significant tensions or 
conflict developing between tenure groups, with suggestions that
 overall the majority of people have been happy to see new 
households move into the area on former derelict land – because 
I think 95% of the residential land portfolio is brown field land – 
and seeing that land being brought back into use. Former Peak 
Valley officer.
Despite the controversy and lack of evidence to support the purported 
causal mechanisms of mixed communities, the tenure diversification 
project in Hattersley has had some positive impacts on the estate. For 
instance, over the years many residents had formed tight-knit inward-
looking communities within certain streets and neighbourhoods on 
the estate, which fuelled existing territorial divides and tensions that 
meant that many residents on both sides of the imagined line between 
Hattersley and Mottram would not dare cross Stockport Road. Various 
interviewees explained how the political geography underpins some of 
the territorialism that has embedded itself across this divide:
 It’s interesting: you cross the Stockport Road, which we’re next 
to, and there’s a different phone code and a different postcode 
on this side of the estate. Some people think they live in Mottram 
on this side because they’ve got an 01457 phone number and a 
SK146 instead of a 3… Community and youth worker.
 It could be a whole world apart between Mottram and Hattersley 
and I think it’s fair to say anybody in Mottram 10 years ago would 
never dare to go down towards Hattersley… but there was just 
almost like a wall them that you just wouldn’t even penetrate.  I 
would imagine if you’re neighbours now they’re going to Tesco 
by themselves or even go to the leisure centre in Hattersley. 
Tameside officer.
The tenure diversification approach has helped heal this divide in a 
number of ways, such that residents from each have begun to use 
facilities on the ‘other side’. We heard anecdotes of various other 
territorial boundaries at smaller-scale geographies across the estate. 
Some streets had reputations amongst residents from other parts – 
with little interaction between them. Tribal loyalties emerged among 
neighbours of particular areas, contributing to gang culture amongst 
the younger population – in turn fuelling anti-social behaviour, 
criminality and an atmosphere of fear. There was not a great deal of 
social mixing across territorial boundaries even between Peak Valley 
tenants from similar cultural backgrounds whose grandparents, in 
some instances, would have grown up on the same street in inner-city 
83 ODPM, Sustainable Communities: Homes for all: A Five Year Plan from the office of the Deputy Prime Minister (ODPM, 2005): p.53
84 Dick Richardson, Rachel Gee, and Sharron Power, Fresh Hope Fresh Air: Starting A New Life In Hattersley (Mancunian Reunion Project, Tameside MBC, 2008).
85 ODPM, Sustainable Communities: People, Places and prosperity: a five year plan from the Office of the Deputy Prime Minister. (2005): p.52
86 PVHA, “10 Year Legacy & Financial Business Plan 2017-2022.”
87 Tameside MBC, “Supplementary Planning Guidance: Hattersley and Mottram.”
88 Rebecca Tunstall and Alex Fenton, “In the Mix: A Review of Mixed Income, Mixed Tenure and Mixed Communities,” 2006.
89 Alan Berube, “Mixed Communities in England: A US Perspective on Evidence and Policy Prospects,” Water, 2005.
90 M. L. Joseph, R. J. Chaskin, and H. S. Webber, “The Theoretical Basis for Addressing Poverty Through Mixed-Income Development,” 
Urban Affairs Review 42, no. 3 (January 1, 2007): 369–409.
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Manchester. One consequence of demolishing large swathes of social 
housing – particularly the largest clearance sites around Stockport 
Road – was to break up this pattern of socio-spatial segregation and 
therefore break down some of the social structures, such as gang 
culture, that were hindering upward mobility:
 The by-product of knocking all these houses down is that a lot 
of the territorial elements in the community were broken down; 
as somebody who lives here, a positive by product of that was it 
broke down a lot of the territorial nature of the families that might 
have, you know, since the 1960s lived in that little corner of the 
estate. So actually if they needed another house they would wait 
for one to come up on their street or house swaps and things like 
that – actually some of that was all changed and broken down by 
knocking down this patch of grotty wooden houses [on Stockport 
Road] that were only to make spaces for this development… 
Again it’s little things that have happened, it might not have been 
the intention of them at the time, I think the by-product of it has 
been quite positive, I mean I am sure there’s negatives as well but 
I try and look for the positives. Charity worker.
A result of breaking up some of the social housing and offering tenants 
new homes spread out across the estate was to overcome some of the 
more negative aspects of close-knit communities through higher spatial 
mobility. This process was strengthened by relocating the district 
centre with all its community facilities and Peak Valley’s offices at the 
centre of the divide, on Stockport Road, renamed The Hub, thereby 
creating a symbolic bridge between the two sides. We discuss this 
intervention in section 4.4.
However, a problematic adverse effect of breaking down boundaries 
and increasing spatial mobility has been what many see as the 
displacement of anti-social behaviour and minor criminality from 
Hattersley to neighbouring town centres, such as Hyde:
 I mean as somebody who’s done outreach into these hot spots 
there are hot spots well not so much at the moment interestingly.  
Our rascals, a lot of them are heading into town centres to cause 
trouble now which presents us with challenges of engaging some 
of those guys because actually we can’t engage them as easily in 
the community now.  Youth worker.
This reflects a common concern with the Mixed Communities agenda – 
that by moving people around and encouraging spatial mobility it tends 
to displace issues rather than resolve them directly91. Nonetheless, 
there is certainly a sense among residents that the estate is now a far 
safer place than it has been in the past:
 I think the crime rate’s gone down…if definitely feels like a safer 
place to live…oh if I come home go home about 3 o’clock in the 
morning and I can walk like from the taxi home…and I don’t feel 
like anything would happen…and I walk round the estate with the 
dog and that’s fine yes… don’t really see anything happening… 
91 Mark Davidson and Loretta Lees, “New-Build Gentrification: Its Histories, Trajectories, and Critical Geographies,” Population, Space and Place 16 (2010): 395–411; Mark Davidson, “Love Thy 
Neighbour? Social Mixing in London’s Gentrification Frontiers,” Environment and Planning A 42, no. 3 (2010): 524–44; Gary Bridge, Tim Butler, and Loretta Lees, eds., Mixed Communities: 
Gentrification by Stealth? (Policy Press, 2012).
92 Ian Cole and Barry Goodchild, “Social Mix and the ‘Balanced Community’ in British Housing Policy – a Tale of Two Epochs,” GeoJournal 51 (2001): 351–360.
because you used to have like kids standing in the, all kids 
because I was a kid as well.  But like the old community centre 
and stuff they used to be like people stood in there like a gang 
of groups and then you used to feel intimidated walking past 
them… stuff like that but nowadays I don’t really see much. Local 
resident.
The flipside of creating more spatial mobility is the breaking down 
of community togetherness which has both positive and negative 
outcomes. Whilst some of the problematic elements of community 
bonds, such as gang-based crime, may have been reduced, so too 
may have some of the more positive aspects been weakened, such 
as networks of solidarity and mutual aid amongst neighbours. One 
resident describes this shift from highly insular yet also interdependent 
social structures towards more open, yet perhaps more atomised 
communities with less interdependencies:
 Some of those depths of community ties – we’re on an island 
– they will have been reduced for sure.  A positive side of that 
is within that depth of community spirit where we’re tight and 
we’re looking after each other you might have had a low level of 
reported crime because crime was happening but perhaps the 
community felt that they could deal with something or that they 
wanted to deal with it themselves where the ability to I mean 
the community police and friends will tell you.  But I think there 
was less fear of reporting crime now so crime stats could well 
have risen but actually the feel, living here the feel of some of 
the nonsense that goes on perhaps open dealing or you know 
there certainly was open drug dealing I mean on my street when 
I moved in where that just wouldn’t happen now because people 
know it would get reported.  
4.2.2 School catchment area 
restructuring
It is perhaps too early to evaluate the effects of the tenure 
diversification approach, for its greatest benefits are likely to accrue 
through combination with the schools restructuring programme. 
Specifically, it is the combination of both housing tenure and school 
catchment area mixing that will have the biggest effect on life chances 
in Hattersley – perhaps not so much for older residents but certainly 
for those younger generations currently going through the education 
system. The process of ‘territorial stigmatization’92 of Hattersley 
also extended to school students on the estate, whose employment 
prospects were often hampered the moment they left school by 
unfavourable associations in the minds of local  and perhaps even 
national employers, as this community worker describes:
 I mean back then in 2001 there was the Hattersley high school, 
Hattersley Comprehensive, and there was certainly a stigma 
attached to going to that.  So if you had a Hattersley High on your 
CV it wasn’t the easiest place to get a job from because they’re 
dispersed around a number of schools now and it’s not you know 
this is a Hattersley kids school so therefore whichever local high 
school you’ve got on your CV is less of a barrier to employment
A local councillor explains Tameside’s rationale for focusing on 
the schools as an indirect, long-term route to socioeconomic 
empowerment:
 One of the issues in Hattersley was you went to a primary school 
in Hattersley, you went to the Hattersley Comp and you stayed 
in Hattersley and then you just went on the dole basically.  So 
that’s what you tended to do and that’s what all your peers did, 
so you’re in primary school, you go up to secondary school, 
no aspiration there, now what are you going to do when you 
leave school, “oh I’ll just sign on.”… There was no ambition to go 
anywhere else….I’m not saying all the kids there but we’d had a 
real problem in the Hattersley school and they had about 300 
children and it was built for over 1000 so we had all of the people 
who want to go to school in Hattersley and some of the parents 
were choosing to send the children to other schools other than 
the Hattersley Comp as well.  So we took the school out of that 
estate and we built it in the end of Godley just down the road 
away from there…. we have two schools now – Alder Secondary 
School and then Longendale – and the children from Hattersley 
can go to either, and then they’re mixing with other children as 
well… so now when you say what are you doing when you leave 
school, “oh I’m going to go college, I’m going to go to University.”  
As the councillor describes, part of the problem with one large 
feeder school serving a mono-tenure ex-council estate – asides from 
stigma – is that it concentrates children from disadvantaged families 
in one learning space which may therefore mean lower standards are 
achieved due to the compound effects of fewer resources to address 
greater learning needs. Moreover, this situation, as a microcosm of the 
estate itself, intensified over time as social housing was ‘residualised’ 
– increasingly an option of last resort, rather than a mainstream tenure 
choice.93 This general trend was exacerbated by Manchester City 
Council’s purported practice of moving some of its most ‘problematic’ 
and disadvantaged tenants to Hattersley, as this local councillor attests:
 there was other suggestions that they were also rehousing people 
who didn’t want to live in Manchester outside of Manchester… 
People felt that there were some very difficult households being 
rehoused here… speeding up a traditional cycle of decline as a 
housing area… 
As conditions worsened, some of the more aspirational and upwardly 
mobile residents who may have bought their home through Right 
to Buy decided to move away from Hattersley. With this population 
decline, the ‘Comp’ saw its student numbers fall, from over a thousand, 
as the councillor imparts above, to around 300. Not only did this make 
the school increasingly unviable to run, from a financial perspective, 
but so too decreased the diversity of its cohort still further, as more 
upwardly mobile families sent their children to other nearby schools. 
93 DCLG, “Evaluation of the Mixed Communities Initiative Demonstration Projects: Final Report,” Communities (Department for Communities and Local Government, 2010).
94 David Imbroscio, “Beyond Mobility: The Limits of Liberal Urban Policy,” Journal of Urban Affairs 34, no. 1 (February 26, 2012): 1–20.
Without the presence of these more aspirational children with greater 
educational support at home than their peers, the children ‘left behind’ 
lacked the kind of role models that would stretch their learning, and as 
a result standards declined still further, in a vicious downward spiral. 
This is the chain of events that the regeneration process of tenure 
diversification and school catchment area restructuring sought to 
reverse.
The introduction of the new build homes for sale may have helped 
reverse the trend of falling educational attainment in Hattersley in 
a number of ways. First, it tends to ameliorate the territorial stigma 
attached to Hattersley as a whole. This is evident by the fact that the 
new Barratt houses have proven exceptionally popular on the market, 
despite the notoriety of the estate. One claim frequently made by 
various interviewees was that the new development is Barratt’s most 
successful in the country or that it is the bestselling new estate in 
the Northwest. The process of building new homes in Hattersley for 
the first time in decades, alongside other investments, has helped 
transform the image of the estate – and in turn transformed Barratt’s 
perception of it also – as one local councillor attests:
 One of the things that Barratt’s found was they tended to sort 
of build on the edge, they wanted to just build on the edge 
of Hattersley and not call the houses ‘Hattersley’, call them 
something else, with names like ‘Hillside View’, so anything but 
Hattersley.  But they found that it was the best sales they had 
in the North West the Hattersley site and that’s given them the 
confidence now to build on the old school site they’re going to 
build 200 houses and that’s right in the middle of the estate.  So 
that’s where they’re building at the minute, you go up Field Farm 
Road there’s, that site they’ve got there is right in the middle of 
the estate and they’ve got the confidence now to build there.  
Some see Barratt’s new-found willingness to invest in new housing 
right at the heart of the estate as symbolic victory for Hattersley:
 That particular one [Hillside Central] is in my view a real game 
changer because it’s like an estate within an estate.
In this way, through the momentum achieved by high sales and 
ongoing construction, the estate has undergone a dramatic rebranding 
which has helped attract new residents with the “potential expenditure 
and social characteristics that are important in establishing a vibrant 
and stable community”.94  Moreover, this means that – for the first time 
in Hattersley’s history – upwardly mobile residents are not forced out 
of the estate in search of a bigger family home but can rather buy such 
a home within its boundaries. As a result, a councillor remarks, many 
former, perhaps more ‘aspirational’ tenants who had moved away have 
actually begun to move back to the estate, into the Barratt homes:
 What we’re finding now with the new housing we’ve got up in 
Hattersley that’s people who are born in Hattersley and brought 
up in Hattersley and moved away, they’re coming back now and 
buying the houses in Hattersley.
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This effectively puts an end to the trend towards concentrating 
deprivation on the estate – by diversifying the income spectrum of the 
population.
In summing up Hattersley’s tenure diversification approach, it must be 
noted that it was designed primarily to provide a funding mechanism 
for more direct means of regeneration. Any supposed benefits from 
social mixing can be seen as secondary effects. Moreover, the plan 
avoided the hostility that is usually associated with mixed communities. 
Perhaps the most damning critique of the mixed communities agenda 
is its tendency to displace existing residents in favour of more 
upwardly-mobile incomers – that it is ‘gentrification by stealth’; a form 
of ‘state-led gentrification’95. Such a charge cannot be levelled at the 
Hattersley tenure diversification programme, for all tenants of the old 
housing demolished to make way for the new have been rehoused 
by Peak Valley in better new-build housing. In many respects, this 
is one of its great achievements – to be able to fund improvements 
and replacement of existing stock, as well as new infrastructure and 
facilities, through the introduction of homes for sale, without displacing 
any existing residents.
4.3 Peak Valley’s relational 
approach
In examining Peak Valley’s role in the regeneration of Hattersley and 
its interaction with its community, there has been no criticism voiced 
of  their activities. This we attribute to their ‘relational’ – as opposed to 
‘transactional’ – approach to the delivery of their housing service. Such 
an approach potentially embodies and harnesses the concept of ‘social 
capital’ – high levels of which have been associated with socially and 
economically prosperous communities.96 It has also been instrumental 
in cementing valued and trusted working relationships with all 
stakeholders. This has enabled a successful governance of the estate 
with key partners Tameside MBC and the local community. It has also 
enabled a productive working relationship with Barratt, the developer 
of the new-build homes.
In this section, we first look at Peak Valley’s corporate governance 
structures, namely their Board of management and internal scrutiny 
mechanism, Peak Performance. These internal structures  reflect 
Peak Valley’s stakeholder engagement philosophy of transparency 
and involvement and as such we will go on to explore how they have 
Figure 31: the Peak Valley team outside their offices in the old district centre
95 Loic Wacquant, “Territorial Stigmatization in the Age of Advanced Marginality,” Thesis Eleven 91, no. 1 (November 1, 2007): 66–77.
96 Robert Putnam, Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community (Simon & Schuster, 2000).
engaged and managed relationships with external partners. Following 
this, we  pay close attention to how Peak Valley has engaged with its 
wider local community with a view to enabling more effective local 
governance of the estate.
4.3.1 Peak Valley’s Board of 
Management.
The association was governed by a Board of non-executive members 
who delegated day-to-day operational control to the Managing Director 
and the Senior Management team. Since April 2017, this Board was 
subsumed into a new ‘common board’ in a move to simplify existing 
governance structures in the group. The Peak Valley Board was also 
struggling to attract new members and it is now better able to access 
investment through a larger group structure. It is mentioned here as its 
loss appears to signify for several interviewees, including Peak Valley 
tenants and external partners, a potential return to a more remote 
landlord, as once embodied by Manchester City Council.
Members of the Board consisted of two ‘independents’, one of whom 
was the Chairperson, two Peak Valley tenants, another resident and a 
local authority (Tameside MBC) nominee. They were advised by senior 
management of Peak Valley and met frequently to determine policy 
and to monitor the performance of the association. This arrangement 
appears to have worked to the satisfaction of residents
 ‘…it worked very well really I thought it worked very well and we 
were in I think we were in a very privileged position because we 
did, we managed to have our say we managed to be able to have 
an input’
The move to a common board has generated concern that this 
prefigures a wider, physical disengagement from the local community. 
One local councillor commented 
 there are concerns because when you think I used to be on the 
Peak Valley board so then I’m no longer on the Peak Valley it’s 
gone …my concern is that Onward have got to keep it local and 
they can’t manage this estate remotely.  You know we’ve got 
to make sure that there’s people in there and they’ve got to be 
involved in what’s going on and to continue the legacy that Peak 
Valley did.  You know we’ve got to still keep improving it and 
we’ve still got to look at how the estate’s changing over the years, 
still get involved you know be a partner be a true partner of the 
Council.
This resident’s concern, reflected in a number of interviews, was that 
this loss of local connection will result in a loss of local knowledge, 
which, in turn might lead to a diminished housing and estate 
management service: 
 and I worried so much because so much that was my main concern 
when this was all coming to an end.  How do these people, what 
do they really know about us? I know they might know the bad bits 
but what do they really know about us and how can they possibly I 
won’t say do a good job because they probably will.  But I just feel 
as though we’re losing our connection now
4.3.2 Peak Performance
Peak Performance was Peak Valley’s internal scrutiny mechanism. 
It consists of nine tenant volunteers who each ‘champion’ a service 
area provided by Peak Valley. They hold Peak Valley to account for 
meeting published service milestones collated through the tenant 
survey (STAR). The tenant champion and Peak Valley staff member 
responsible for the service area meet monthly to review the service 
performance. The tenant champions also accompany Peak Valley’s 
community officer on estate ‘walk-abouts’ to meet other tenants and 
examine gardens and properties.  Peak Valley have appreciated the 
importance of this scrutiny panel and have invested in training to equip 
their tenant champions with the knowledge and confidence to hold the 
organisation to account. 
The scrutiny panel was established following initial complaints from 
tenants on the quality of early modernisation work undertaken by 
CASE, a company contracted by Peak Valley to carry out improvements 
to the housing stock.  Peak Valley realised it required a more agile 
and sensitive consultative mechanism to enable it to respond faster 
and effectively to tenant concerns. When quizzed about how the 
panel currently functions the tenant chair of Peak Performance simply 
responded, ‘it’s brilliant’. He did, however, express some concern 
about how the panel might function effectively under the organisation 
restructuring and the move to Onward:
 When it gets taken over, well not taken over, but under the new 
regime it’s a bit complicated because say like, our repairs man 
here he oversees all repairs and what you.  He don’t work here 
anymore he works in Didsbury so it’s hard to get a champion 
meeting with him so we can get our information and performance. 
So we’ll cross that bridge when we come to it…
4.3.3 Relations with external partners
From the outset Peak Valley or Portico appeared to position 
themselves well with the key component parts of their local 
governance network. This was how an ex-Tameside MBC officer recalls 
them:
 I remember when we had the beauty parade for the first stock 
transfer you know there was a high level of honesty with Portico 
that, you know, they clearly wanted to be involved but there 
were viability issues.  That culture seemed to permeate the 
organisation at Portico so everybody you dealt with was very, very 
straight forward. The culture was to be very honest but once they 
said they would do something they went off and did it..
A local youth worker provides a similar sentiment:
 …as somebody who’s watched them and watched them with an 
eye I think perhaps an analytical eye I think actually they have 
had integrity they’ve done what they said they’d do.
This evident capacity for honesty and straightforwardness is an 
obvious asset in developing the kind of trusted relationships that are 
clearly required if working partnerships and networks are to function 
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effectively. Peak Valley’s own legacy feedback97 reflects upon how 
effective relationships with partners have resulted in delivering 
successful regeneration outcomes. We have noted above how the 
Land Board has benefited from such working relationships but the 
outcomes on the ground, in terms of physical improvement, are also 
appreciated by residents:
 Peak Valley were marvellous in the way they had this time table 
and the time table had been kept to and you know I honestly 
can’t say that anybody’s been displeased with the way that things 
have turned out.  Because basically it’s been fantastic.
A good working relationship with the property developer Barratt has 
been essential in delivering the new build homes. This relationship was 
forged in the difficult circumstances of the 2007 financial crash when, 
according to an ex-Peak Valley officer, Barratt
 were in breach of the agreement in many respects because 
they just couldn’t afford to start selling houses but we worked 
with them we didn’t sort of beat them over the head with the 
agreement that would have been pointless…But having done so 
you know that relationships been cemented and its worked very 
well and long may it continue to do so.  
From Barratt’s viewpoint this relationship now expedites delivery 
schedules in that Peak Valley represents   
 somebody I could ring and ask for assistance for and even if it’s 
sending some of the documents that we need to get signed, you 
know to do with road adoptions and things like that.  If they’re 
landed and they have to be a party to that just having a point of 
contact you can send them to and ring and sort of chivvy up… 
Barratt staff
An important relationship for any social landlord is with their own 
tenants and we have explained above how Peak Valley has integrated 
tenant involvement into their decision-making structures. The 
existence, value and utility of this relationship is acknowledged in this 
comment by a Tameside MBC official:
 …to be honest we use that relationship that they have with the 
tenants you know why not sometimes there will be very, very 
difficult situations or tough decisions that have to be made 
and far easier for it to come from them because it’s sometimes 
received much better than it would be coming directly from the 
Council. 
However, another Tameside MBC official suggests that Peak Valley’s 
evident skill in developing good relationships with partners is not 
simply about a culture of honesty and straightforwardness it also 
embodies a public service philosophy that emphasises the relational 
aspect of public service delivery:
 But it’s not a  transaction this, is it?  There’s too many people who 
define a public service as a transaction, what a landlord does in 
terms of rent paid and that’s just not what Peak Valley are nor 
what public services should be…
This is interesting and echoes a wider, current debate amongst public 
administration academics and practitioners about how public services 
can better address the increasingly complex needs of residents. 
Commentators98 have argued the New Public Management paradigm 
– privileging a bureaucratic, market led means of service delivery 
– rested upon assumptions that public services were products that 
were delivered to people. This, they argue, has been proven to be an 
inefficient, often unjust and costly way of meeting the contemporary 
requirements of individuals and communities. Rather, what is required 
now is a new model99 of governance that emphasises a holistic, inter-
agency and relational approach to service delivery; and, moreover, one 
that is predicated upon a notion of public service delivery as a process, 
the end outcome of which is likely to be more effective the more 
involved the service user is in the design and delivery of that process, 
towards a process of co-production. 
There is nothing novel about multi-sectoral local partnerships 
assembled to tackle discrete policy objectives. Such initiatives have 
often been put into practice in contexts of industrial and economic 
decline, fragmented neighbourhoods, hard-pressed public services, 
and sustained under-investment in voluntary and community sector 
organisations. However, this way of working, or governance model, 
has attracted sustained criticism for delivering aspects of one policy 
objective at the expense of another100. This is particularly true of 
regeneration projects101. Indeed, Hattersley Neighbourhood Partnership 
would serve as an example of such a partnership. Furthermore, such 
a critique could be currently levelled at the Hattersley regeneration 
initiative where the physical infrastructure has been upgraded but with 
little improvement in the overall levels of deprivation. This may well 
be a failure of the wider governance network and it is moot if Peak 
Valley, and indeed the Hattersley Land Board, should be assessed 
upon criteria other than the objectives detailed in the Collaboration 
Agreement. 
In the absence of a more detailed comparative study it is also hard to 
assess the extent to which Peak Valley embodies the more relational 
principles promoted by the protagonists of ‘New Public Governance102 
– as opposed to New Public Management – models of service 
delivery. It is arguable103 that small housing associations, such as Peak 
Valley, are particularly well-suited to delivering these kind of relational 
services: they generally deliver a local housing management service; 
they have a knowledge and understanding of the area; and, they 
tend to have strong relationships with local networks that can help 
to make things happen. The next section will examine how far this is 
97 PVHA - Performance Legacy Report 2017
98 Osborne, S (2013) A New Theory for Public Service Management: Toward a (Public) Service-Dominant Approach. American Review of Public Administration 43 (2) p135-158
99 Muir, R., Parker I (2014) Many to Many: how the relational state will transform Public Services. IPPR
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Inclusion Partnership in Scotland. Critical Public Health 20(1), 117–127
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true for Peak Valley and its objective to engage the community in the 
development and regeneration of Hattersley.
4.3.4 Relations with the local community
No-one interviewed as part of this evaluation failed to mention the 
word ‘community’. It was typically prefixed by the adjective ‘strong’ or 
‘unique’ or ‘different’ and we came to understand that this notion of 
community was central to not only the cultural identity of Hattersley 
residents, both old and new, but also to our account of the impact Peak 
Valley has visited upon Hattersley.
 ‘…we have a massive, massive strong community who looks after 
each other’. Local resident.
 We worked across Tameside and I can honestly say working 
across the entire Borough this is a completely different set of, 
I mean, there’s a completely different community here, totally 
different residents, they react differently to different offers and 
different opportunities.  It’s very, very different.  Local councillor.
 ‘But there is a definite community feel and it comes to the fore 
really when there’s a problem you know somebody, one of our 
ex-pupils died and his mum came in and all the families knitted 
together and paid for the funeral and things like that and it’s a 
really generous community, in that they’ve got no, little money but 
when they need to pull together they really do, I would have to 
say that that is the strength of this area.’ Local Headmaster.
 ‘I moved to Hattersley November 2015 and ever since then I’ve 
been I’ve been more better and welcoming I find Hattersley has 
Hattersley residents as a family because they’re so, they’re like a 
family to me they’re so supportive and unlike where I come from…’ 
New resident
From the outset Peak Valley confronted a challenging set of 
circumstances: a physical environment in need of substantial repair and 
a relatively well organised, if generally inward looking, community that 
had learnt to be cynical of their previous landlords. Unsurprisingly, the 
early meetings with community members were challenging. A PVHA 
official involved at the time remembers:
 ‘When we first started with that group there was over 30 
members, 30 resident members, a number of officers like myself 
reported to that particular group and that met monthly, and to say 
it was a lively group would be an understatement.  It was very, 
very lively and quite confrontational at times but nonetheless 
it did serve a really a really good purpose in generating local 
resident support and in some respects shaping the regeneration 
plans for the area’. ex PVHA official.
Many had been working to improve the conditions on their estate 
for many years and the following provides a sense of the depth of 
these activists’ commitment. Here she recalls how she felt when the 
original preferred bidder for the stock transfer announced they were 
withdrawing:
 ‘….it was Harvest and they were involved and they promised 
us all sorts of things and then a fortnight before Christmas we 
were sat in this meeting and they said it was undo-able because 
it was going to cost so much money, you know, to sort out the 
environment as well as the housing that they didn’t think it was 
possible to do.  So, I sat in that meeting that day and that night I 
cried because we’d worked so hard to get to that point and it was 
the week before Christmas, I’ll never forget it and so we had to 
start all over again’ Local resident.
Moreover, whilst it was true that some of the residual feelings of 
community insularity had begun to be addressed by the various 
preceding regeneration activities initiated by Tameside MBC, it 
remained a strong and abiding presence. The frustration of working 
with this mentality is palpably illustrated here:
 ‘There’s a whole community that’s been developed there that has 
looked at itself as like just an island really and they barely think 
of themselves really as even part of Tameside...it’s so hard to get 
people from there to actually go out regardless of what transport 
is available, we’ve spoken previously about infrastructure.  You 
know it can still be there, but it’s almost psychological, the barriers 
are there regardless of whether we create opportunities or not.’ 
Local council official.
In examining Peak Valley’s role in the regeneration of Hattersley and its 
interaction with its community we have struggled to find any substantial 
criticism of their activities. So, what did they do to mark themselves as 
a different social landlord to their predecessors, particularly with regard 
to the local community? The answer, we believe, lies in the comment 
made by the Tameside MBC official that Peak Valley did not define their 
service as transactional, choosing instead to emphasise the relational 
aspects of their service.
A relational approach to public service delivery can embody, and 
harness, the concept of social capital. Robert Putnam famously 
described social capital ‘as the glue that holds society together’104 
and his research associated high levels of social capital in an area 
with high levels of socioeconomic prosperity. The concept became 
popular amongst the New Labour Government as, like other forms of 
capital, it could be viewed as a resource generated through individuals 
associating together, beyond the sphere of the family or market, in 
common endeavours whether social, recreational or political to solve 
common problems. It is through participating in such social networks 
that individuals increase levels of interpersonal trust, which in turn 
boosts their propensity to engage in collective activity. In this way, 
various policy interventions – particularly in the New Labour era105 – 
were designed to boost this resource and thereby develop sustainable 
and cohesive communities. However, it is useful, for our purpose here, 
to distinguish the two inter-related components of the concept. One is 
the structural component, the social network  with relational ties to, for 
example, friends, family, neighbours, colleagues or acquaintances. The 
second component is attitudinal or cognitive and is the shared norms 
and trust that are the foundations of co-operation. 
104 Putnam, R ( 2000) Bowling Alone; The collapse and revival of American Community. Simon & Schuster, London, New York
105 see for example: Department of Communities Local Government (2006) Strong and Prosperous Communities.
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It is apparent that Peak Valley has been successful in securing the trust 
of the community. An architect involved in the regeneration put it like 
this:
 They [Peak Valley] were always being very open with the 
community, they’ve always been very transparent, they’ve looked 
at one area, basically delivered what they promised… so they’ve 
tackled it in bite size pieces over a number of years and I think 
building trust with people was so important and that you know 
they’d had consultation in the past.  They’d had people drive up 
the M67 promising things and it would just go into the corridors 
of power and either get kyboshed or we can’t afford that or you 
know well what benefit would we get
However, it is the ‘network’ or ‘relational’ component of social capital 
which is of interest here. Social networks, put simply, fall into two 
categories. They are either dense, comprising closely linked ties and 
are, classically, kinship and more likely to be ‘closed’ or exclusive 
networks. Or they are looser, more expansive, inclusive networks of 
ties to ‘other’ people outside of ones’ immediate environment of family 
and neighbours. It is apparent which form of network predominated ‘on’ 
Hattersley:
 ‘So, you might have had a half dozen communities along here that 
would of all known each other across the back gardens and had 
that open and free flowing and real depth of relationship.  Those 
people have been displaced and that greater depth of community 
spirit will have been affected but it’s still hanging around that 
culture is of dense support networks and a real sense of identity 
where people help each other out because it’s on an island right?’ 
Local youth worker.
This type of network is characterised by high levels of ‘bonding capital’ 
– a supportive resource in times of adversity but one that can inhibit 
the development and deployment of ‘bridging capital’ the resource 
that enables contact with wider networks which can, critically, be the 
conduit for alternative information and opportunity.  It is also the bridge 
between an inclusive or exclusive community. Peak Valley’s task was to 
develop this bridging capital without undermining the strong, supportive 
networks that held the community together through hard times and 
enabled it to participate so robustly in the regeneration process.
PVHA’s strategy was one of intensive place-based housing 
management. It opened an office on the estate with an in-situ director 
and housing management team. Crucially, it took an early decision 
to recruit, as part of this team, local residents. It involved residents in 
all aspects of the ongoing regeneration of the estate, working with 
structures that already existed, the Hattersley Community Forum and 
the Neighbourhood Partnership and creating bespoke ones such as 
the Hattersley Development Steering Group. It organised for groups 
of residents to visit other sites and places undergoing regeneration to 
gain a sense of alternative solutions and what might be possible on 
Hattersley. It opened its own organisation to resident scrutiny through 
the Peak Performance mechanism and, when austerity bit after 2010, 
it developed and resourced its own Community Investment strategy. 
PVHA staff became local school governors and participated in the 
running of the local football club. In other words, they attempted to 
immerse themselves in the fabric of the community and cultivate 
community capacities for local governance. 
In addition to this there was an element of social engineering. The 
local secondary students were obliged to travel outside the estate 
to attend school and alongside this there was an expectation that 
incoming residents purchasing the newly built properties would add 
some bridging capital to complement the store of bonding capital in 
the community. So did all this work? From the criterion of gaining the 
trust of residents the answer is unequivocally yes. PVHA appears from 
our evaluation to be an organisation with an enviable and possibly 
rare reputation, amongst Hattersley residents and indeed wider 
stakeholders, for integrity:
 ‘I think the biggest achievement is not just about the properties of, 
you know, doing up the properties and building new ones it was it 
was the consultation with community’ Local resident
 They don’t talk above you, they talk to you and that is so 
important.  They don’t think because they’re, you know, service 
providers are any better than the people that they’re serving and I 
think that’s so important’. Local resident
 ‘…it’s like they’re family and I’ve seen tenants go to that window 
and do that to a manager when they’ve come out and they know 
what they’re talking about and they’ve sorted out the problems 
and we just don’t want that personal thing to go that personal 
touch’ Local resident.
 ‘… I think that people that have lived here for years and years 
have a good idea about what works and what doesn’t work and 
you know people just kind of wanted, we wanted to get rid of this 
stigma if you like which we really worked hard at and Peak Valley 
have also worked hard…’ Local resident
However, from the criterion of developing the social capital resource in 
the community – particularly by adding more ‘bridging capital without 
undermining existing networks – the answer is less clear. There has 
been a decline in the level of community association and involvement 
with the regeneration process. This is unsurprising as the motivating 
factor, the poor repair of the physical infrastructure, has, apart from the 
public realm, been resolved. Everyone we interviewed agreed that the 
estate was now a qualitatively better place to live. This sentiment is 
exemplified by a local youth worker suggesting that 
 …it’s gone from an area where in 2001/2 there was no way I would 
of wanted to bring my kids up here to a place where I am now 
settled with young kids.
The plethora of community groups and activities supported by the HNP 
appear to have largely disappeared. It may be a consequence of the 
dismantling of the HNP in 2010 or the fact that some of the community 
activists of that time have moved from full-time activism to full-time 
employment. There are still individual resident and tenant involvement 
on the Land Board though how representative these people are 
remains a legitimate query raised by our evaluation. Similarly, PVHA’s 
internal, tenant-led, scrutiny mechanism remains..
The Hattersley Community Forum is still going. Notwithstanding this, 
these women now present as a group largely nostalgic about their 
former levels of community activity and concerned about their role in 
the future.
‘…it’s just, it’s just a very, very long hard road that we’ve travelled you 
know and the community have been involved in lots of different 
ways for lots and lots of years.  Now we seem to have lost that 
you see ..’ Local activist 
Aside from the HCF, other local associations appear active and relevant 
to the community, namely: Friends of Hattersley Railway Station; 
Hattersley Community Gardens; the Eden (youth) project; the Hattersley 
Football Club; and, Mancunian Reunion. However, our interviewees did 
present us with a sentiment that their long valued ‘sense’ of community 
was diminished and various reasons for this are offered:
 ‘Now one thing that has changed in my time is a little lessening 
of the sense of community and that’s down to the movement of 
the community centre from its old site on Hattersley Road.’ Local 
councillor
 ‘…. over the years the pubs started arising and they used to have 
lots of social clubs. There was a real community spirit about it and 
there still is today but you know the Carnival, Hattersley Carnival 
and all sorts used to go on in Hattersley, clearly that doesn’t 
happen anymore.  A lot of the pubs have closed down they’re not 
there anymore.’ Local Councillor.
 ‘… it’s a better place to live, it’s always been don’t get me wrong, 
its always been a good place to live and what I find now what 
we’ve lost which I think is everywhere is a community.  You know 
when it first formed the community here people came from all 
different areas but what we found was it was a really close-knit 
community.  Everybody knew everybody else, we’ve still got 
that slightly but we’re not the same anymore.  I don’t know my 
neighbours that live down the road from me anymore.’ Local 
resident 
This apparent decline of community mindedness may be a 
consequence of the lack of social space to congregate and, again, 
this brings into question the role and function of the Hub. Several 
interviewees pointed to the closure of the old community centre in 
2012 and the opening of the Hub as the tipping point for community 
association in the area. As one resident says:
 ‘I feel looking back … the community centre went and that wasn’t 
attached to anything that was its own little hub, you know, where 
people can go.  Here [the Hub] you’ve got the community centre 
where the housing is – who’s going to want to come in here, who’s 
going to want to relax in case somebody walks past saying you’ve 
got debts and you’ve got the Police there, then you’ve got Tameside 
[MBC] up on the top floor. Do you see where I’m coming from?’ 
This is a common explanation for the drop in community activity among 
residents today. For Putnam, however, the definitive explanatory 
variable for the decline in levels of social capital was age. It was, he 
found, the process of generational change that was replacing a civic 
minded generation with less involved children and grandchildren. 
The challenge was, he argued, to replenish the stock of social capital 
through policy and structural responses to address the supply and 
demand for opportunities for civic engagement. 
This requirement to develop the next generation of community activists 
is clearly understood by most of our interviewees. Many of the older 
community activists regret their inability to involve more young people 
in their activities. However, the impact of the structural regeneration of 
the estate may address the problem of this missing civic generation. It 
appears that prior to regeneration anyone between the age of 25 and 
45 who had an opportunity to move left the estate and it was older, 
working-age families or retired people who were the more settled and 
the more established in the community. But now:
 ‘… people buying houses and moving into the estate are people 
in that missing generation that was you know 25 to 45 bracket 
where perhaps a bunch of people had moved out, actually the 
nice, new Barratt houses are encouraging people in that bracket 
to move back in...  It’s by the nature of that it’s going to be first 
time buyers which is going to be that 25 to 35 bracket and so 
interestingly it’s been a by-product of that regeneration...’ Local 
councillor
However, the evidence for the emergence of a less insular and more 
expansive community remains mixed. Some interviewees felt that 
there remained an ‘us and them’ mind-set amongst existing residents 
and that the attempt to dilute this mentality with ‘incomers’ from the 
‘Barratts’ Homes’ was work in progress:
 ‘I think in the long term the mix of private and rented will be 
fortuitous but at the moment  I think some of the people of 
Hattersley feel like they’ve been a bit short changed. There is 
still some of that mentality there.  The difference between council 
house tenants and owner occupiers. I mean we have a local home 
watch meeting and we’ve got people from Barratt’s coming up, 
the Barratt’s houses as we call them, and they definitely feel that 
they are a little bit different’ Local Councillor
In discussing the extent to which community insularity may have 
declined it is important to assert that high levels of social capital are 
not always associated with a ‘public good’. On the contrary, there is a 
‘dark side’ to social capital that is most likely to be found within closed 
tight knit communities. Here, levels of criminality can prosper secure 
in the knowledge that their close ties within the community will shield 
them from any criminal justice proceedings. This was – and perhaps 
still is – true for Hattersley. We were told of criminal networks linking 
Hattersley back to the communities from which the original residents 
were decanted in East Manchester. This, albeit a small minority of the 
community, remains a problem on the estate:
 ‘…but you do have your minorities and within this community, I 
mean, I’m thankful that I’ve known them all my life, 46 years.  You 
know played with them, went to school with them, you name it, the 
lot.  But what you’ll find is if an outsider comes into this community 
you’ve not got a cat in hells chance of knowing anything or 
anything about anybody.’ Local resident. 
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However, the side effect of diminishing levels of social capital means 
these networks are now more vulnerable as a local youth worker 
explained: 
 ‘… but some of those depths of community ties … will have been 
reduced for sure.  A positive side of that so within that depth of 
community spirit where we’re tight and we’re looking after each 
other you might have had a low level of reported crime because 
crime was happening but perhaps the community felt that they 
couldn’t deal with something or that they wanted to deal with it 
themselves …But I think there is less fear of reporting crime now 
so crime stats have gone up but actually the feel, living here the 
feel of some of the nonsense that goes on perhaps open dealing 
or you know there certainly was open drug dealing I mean on 
my street when I moved in where that just wouldn’t happen now 
because people know it would get reported.  So, it’s interesting 
because living locally I see the openness of crime has reduced.’  
And the consequence is:
 ‘… without a doubt it’s a safer environment to move around, in 
without a doubt.  I mean we used to, it wasn’t always a safe place 
to live and work for sure..’ Local resident.
4.4 Partnership-based 
Governance
Alongside Peak Valley’s relational approach, we identify a general 
partnership-based form of governance as a critical factor in the 
successful achievement of regeneration objectives. This success 
is largely the result of the distinctive governance approach to 
regenerating Hattersley, which was underwritten legally by the 
Collaboration Agreement, but crucially hinged upon a pragmatic and 
flexible approach to delivering a common vision:
 it [the masterplan] was set in stone in terms of this vision. What 
it didn’t set in stone and what was given enough flexibility – 
because again that’s another problem with having a vision and 
master plan which is too prescriptive it then becomes almost like 
a chain around your ankles.  This is flexible enough to allow things 
to move as opportunities emerge, so things like the train station 
or the public realm masterplan, all of that’s happened or allowing 
us to change things around, to say “well don’t do the public realm, 
give us less but we’ll do it ourselves”.  That’s worked a treat I think, 
but the central objectives, moving the schools out, bringing new 
types of residents to the area, have remained constant. Tameside 
MBC officer.
Whilst the Collaboration Agreement itself was an important milestone 
which provided the ‘hard’ legal backbone, the success of the process 
was, as we explain in this section, largely the result of the ‘softer’ 
powers exercised by the key public partners, notably Tameside MBC. 
Contemporary governance practices employ a variety of structures 
and means for governing such as, for example through local networks, 
partnerships, and the deployment of ‘soft’ or convening power. 
Accordingly, we will explore how some of these means are manifest 
within the local regeneration process and codified as ‘hard’ powers 
in the bespoke governance mechanisms developed specifically 
for the estate, such as the Hattersley Land Board and Hattersley 
Neighbourhood Partnership. The section concludes by presenting 
governance concerns that residents and other local stakeholders have 
expressed as the management of the estate is transferred to Onward 
Homes.
4.4.1 Tameside MBC
It is hard to assess the impact Peak Valley has had upon Hattersley 
without understanding the role of the local authority.  Power and 
control within local governance networks can often be obfuscated 
and contentious but the ‘soft’ or convening power of Tameside MBC 
has undoubtedly been – and still is – instrumental in shaping the 
regeneration of Hattersley. 
The Hattersley estate falls within the geographical, and therefore 
political, authority of Tameside MBC. Perversely, and unfortunately for 
Hattersley residents, for the first 40 years of its existence the estate 
was the property of Manchester City Council. Working within this rather 
schizophrenic administrative arrangement was politically challenging 
for the local council and its officers.  This challenge – to effect 
positive change upon the estate without ownership of the stock – was 
underscored by the fact that Hattersley fell within the electoral ward of 
the longstanding leader of Tameside Council from 1980 to 2010, Roy 
Oldham:
 It was particularly dear to his heart because he greeted the 
people from Manchester into this estate back in the ‘60s and ‘70s 
and it was an estate he walked at the weekend and talked to 
local people. ex Tameside MBC employee
This served to focus local council officers’ views on what was likely to 
be an acceptable standard of intervention in Hattersley:
 We tried to maintain the local environment to as high as possible, 
it had to be to as high as possible a level because the estate 
was in the ward of the leader of the Council, you know, he wasn’t 
going to have anybody adversely affected he was responsible 
for…
However, more than this, it was a political relationship that was to 
prove critical in securing the support of a traditionally risk-averse local 
authority to a raft of policy initiatives, a ground-breaking stock transfer 
deal and an on-going commitment to the estate:
 We had a very pragmatic Labour leader of the Council really.  His 
view was that he would literally do, you know, virtually anything if 
it brought investment to the area and delivered a big improvement 
on what the authority had got. ex Tameside MBC employee
This political relationship between local ward councillors, the local 
community and the council remains important. One of these councillors 
is the current Deputy Leader of the Council and is chair of the 
Hattersley Land Board.
The council sought to intervene strategically in those policy areas 
where it felt it could make a difference on Hattersley.  This has been 
covered in the previous section but to recap: this involved obtaining 
for the estate SRB and European monies in the 1990s and, in 2001, the 
Neighbourhood Management Pathfinder programme, and the decision 
to rationalise and relocate Hattersley’s schools. 
The development of a ‘masterplan’ – what became the agreed 
Supplementary Planning Guidance106 (SPG) in 2004 – was a significant 
step change in Hattersley’s fortunes and is illustrative of the pivotal, 
convening, role played by Tameside MBC. A council official alludes 
to this role in developing an effective partnership to execute their 
masterplan:
 My view in terms of what’s actually fundamentally changed 
Hattersley in terms of where it is has been is the holistic mixture 
of which Peak Valley has been a significant part.  So, there was 
a plan, literally there was a [master] plan and there were some 
significant players around that plan.
The process to adopting the SPG as the planning guide to re-
developing Hattersley necessarily involved the key stakeholders, 
namely, Peak Valley (or Portico as they were then known) and the 
local community. This process, driven by Tameside MBC, was critical in 
securing the backing of the then Government agency for regeneration, 
English Partnerships, without whom the stock transfer would have 
collapsed. This ex-Tameside MBC official recalls:
 English Partnerships at a very early stage wanted reassurances 
from you know the Local Authority and Portico that we could do 
this and that we had the backing of the local Council and backing 
of Manchester Council and the backing of the local residents.  I 
think because of all the work we’d done with local residents and 
because of our work with Portico and we had done a lot of work, 
I think they were just about you know prepared to go along with it 
all…
The involvement of residents in this process also proved decisive in 
effectively sealing this plan as the touchstone for all future regeneration 
activity on the estate. Tameside MBC conducted a series of master 
planning exercises with around 30 residents, an urban design 
consultant, local planning officers and local ward councillors. This group 
agreed the principle of aiming for an economically-viable regeneration 
model for Hattersley. In other words, one that promoted a mixed tenure 
estate with new private sector housing developments for sale. The 
significance of this plan is illustrated by this ex Peak Valley official 
recalling that “I carried it around with me everywhere, it just became 
second nature to pick it up and consult it.”
Following the stock transfer, the Collaboration Agreement – embodying 
the principles agreed in the SPG – served to tie Tameside Council into 
the governance of the estate through the Land Board. Their on-going 
influence and commitment to the estate through this mechanism is 
outlined here by a council official:
 We treat it [Hatterlsey] high up as anything else to be honest 
among the portfolio of what I do.  So, I go to Hattersley and 
service the Hattersley Land Board every month, so I tend to be 
lead on this and represent at that to that Land Board from the 
Council’s point of view on a whole range of things.  From housing 
development to work we’ve been doing around the train station 
to the public realm improvements to CPO to enable that new 
retail park. So, if you ask me within …. my role I’d probably say 
Hattersley takes about 40% of that..’
An indication of the successful deployment of ‘soft’ power within a 
local governance context is the extent to which it serves to enable 
effective working relationships and partnerships.  It is apparent from 
the comments made by the architect who worked upon the early re-
development schemes on Hattersley that Tameside MBC were efficient 
in this regard:
 So, when we were successful with the bid we sort of said because 
of the enormity of the task we said we need key contact, key lines 
of communication into planning highways we need to have that 
partnership approach.  So, you know, if we’re doing something 
with Barratt’s, we’re not stepping on each other’s toes, we’re not 
building in each other’s way you know we try and coordinate 
service installations you know so, we’re not bringing new suppliers 
to our site only for you to dig that up so Tameside [MBC] kept all 
this from happening…
We have largely taken an institutional view of the local governance 
process here. However, the role individual officers have played in this 
narrative should not be under-stated. If local governance is understood 
as a network of key agencies and local actors then individual actions 
and commitment at certain junctures in the process can often be 
decisive. This is certainly true of Tameside MBC where some officers 
were dedicated to finding a solution that would make a positive 
difference on the estate. This comment captures their endeavour:
 …we seemed to exhaust every avenue to try and get things 
done, well we did exhaust every avenue and we went to every 
Government department and every regeneration agency and 
every you know and we ended up with something which was quite 
unique really.  Because nothing else would work there was no sort 
of tool in the tool box of housing regeneration policy and local 
Government policy that appeared to be around that could, lose all 
these terrible problems. 
This is true also of certain individuals within Peak Valley, not least the 
ex-Director, who worked closely with council officers – through the 
governance structure afforded by the Collaboration Agreement – to 
achieve objectives. 
However, sustainable, accountable and effective governance 
cannot rely, in the long-term at least, on the fortuitous influence and 
commitment of certain political actors. People come and go, institutional 
structures are more durable. This is true for Hattersley, where key 
supporters and allies have changed over the years – although some 
106 See https://www.tameside.gov.uk/tmbc5/hattersleyspg.pdf
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notable people have been present for sustained periods – but 
governance processes have continued in the spirit with which they 
were initiated. A large part of this is not just down to the governance 
culture and ‘soft’ convening powers that Tameside MBC and Peak 
Valley have cultivated over the years, but it is also written into the ‘hard’ 
powers of the Collaboration Agreement, signed by all partners at the 
outset. This is a legally-binding document and stipulates precisely the 
duties and responsibilities of all parties, which requires by law they be 
met. The culture of partnership-working and mutual commitment that 
has developed in Hattersley has been legally underwritten in this way. 
The Collaboration Agreement has been important in securing the long-
term buy-in of partners in requiring a governance body to carry out and 
oversee the delivery of its objectives, called the Hattersley Land Board.
4.4.2 The Hattersley Land Board
The Hattersley Land Board is the governing body established to 
provide strategic management of the regeneration objectives set down 
in the legally binding Collaboration Agreement. Importantly, the Board 
will continue to exist until these objectives have been fulfilled. The 
Board membership has representation from Tameside Metropolitan 
Borough Council (TMBC), Peak Valley, Onward Homes, local residents, 
and Homes England (HE), previously the Homes and Communities 
Agency which was the successor body of English Partnerships, which 
was absorbed into the HCA in 2008. The Board meet on a 6 weekly 
cycle at The Hub. Linked to the Board, the Hattersley Project Group 
(officers from TMBC, Peak Valley and HE) meet regularly to service the 
Board. 
From the outset the Board has attracted representation at senior 
management level from Tameside MBC and Peak Valley. The same is 
true politically as the Chair of the Board was the Leader of Tameside 
and is now the Deputy Leader. The importance of this level of 
representation is stated by this ex council official:
 ‘it’s a strategic management board which ties in everybody at 
a very high strategic level and I think you know residents and 
everybody involved realise that if you want a comprehensive 
regeneration of the type we’ve had to do in Hattersley then it just 
gives it that importance.  Because it is notoriously difficult to do 
these things, at the end of the day if you don’t like get high level 
buy in to it you’re fighting a battle against people you work with 
half the time’ 
Unusually for local regeneration partnerships Board representation 
also includes HE. This is unsurprising given their level of potential 
investment in the estate.  However, it is perhaps this level of exposure 
to financial risk that partly explains the high level of strategic 
management at the Board as it serves to reassure the HE that their 
investment in the estate is in relatively safe hands. As a council official 
stated ‘…it manages risk fantastically in a way.’
The Board appears to work effectively. Apart from improvements to the 
public realm it has delivered the Collaboration Agreement’s objectives 
largely to schedule, notwithstanding some delays associated with 
the uncertainty caused by the financial crash in 2008. Moreover, it 
appears to have evolved into a ‘trusted space’, as a forum for resolving 
differences, however robustly they may be presented. It is characteristic 
of a trusted relationship, as described by this council official:
 I think it’s a pretty good relationship now with Peak Valley. After a 
length of time it ends up, so you can put stuff on the table without 
you know having to worry too much about upsetting each other 
and you can have quite a frank kind of robust discussions about 
differences.
Local resident representation on the Board also appears, at least from 
those residents participating, to have been productive. This is one 
resident representative:
 I think it works very well yes, you see we get what I call our higher 
ups from the Council come and they have a lot a lot of input.  
Because a lot of it happens from the Council, there’s this very big 
interaction with the Council and the councillors and Peak Valley.  
We’ve all got an interest and I think it works really well
Other residents looking at it from the outside are more circumspect. 
Whilst acknowledging the success of the Board in delivering its 
objectives they worry about who is being represented and about local 
accountability. This is epitomised by a comment from one local resident:
 ‘because I mean so far you know in a way the Land Board is 
a success story of controlling land in a way which is publically 
responsible and relatively accountable and they’ve done the 
success and they’ve got the contract going with Barratt’s who 
then produced the houses that they need to produce without 
speculating around.  Yet you’re raising issues here about 
democratic accountability and local governance, which aren’t 
necessarily reflected in that structure, but it’s quite a closed door 
quango isn’t it really’
This criticism may be valid in so far as there is clearly a question mark 
over the representation of residents. Residents on the Land Board 
do not appear, for example, to be drawn from, or accountable to, a 
properly constituted, democratically-elected residents’ association. 
It may be the case that there is a loose connection to the Hattersley 
Community Forum but we have not found any explicit evidence of this. 
Moreover, there are questions over the Forum’s democratic credentials. 
However, all local ward councillors do attend the Board and this should, 
in theory at least, provide a structured route for local democratic 
engagement.
4.4.3 Hattersley Neighbourhood 
Partnership
The Hattersley Neighbourhood Partnership was one governance 
structure that provided an effective conduit for residents’ involvement 
in the governance of the estate. Although it no longer exists – wound-
up in 2010, one of the early casualties of a change in government and 
the on-going austerity agenda – we include it here as an important 
local initiative in bridging the gap between residents and governance 
processes.
The Partnership was established to deliver the Neighbourhood 
Pathfinder Programme developed by the New Labour Government in 
2001. It comprised local residents and representatives of a range of 
service providers, such as police, health, and local authority, supported 
by a small professional team led by a neighbourhood manager, 
based in a local office in the old district centre, and sought to co-
ordinate regeneration activity across the estate through a number 
of themed groups, namely: jobs and training; environment, housing 
and regeneration; children and young people; health and leisure; 
community safety; and older people.  Once the stock transfer had been 
achieved it worked with Peak Valley and the Land Board to achieve the 
regeneration objectives. At its peak, it claimed to be involved in over 
40 different community groups and activities and published a monthly 
magazine the ‘Hattersley Terrier’107. The official evaluation claimed that 
pathfinder programmes typically broadened ‘… resident engagement 
beyond a handful of people in the early stages to develop a strong 
core of 20–60 residents who are engaged in the more deliberative 
processes within the Pathfinder – on the Board, in working groups or 
helping to monitor services’.108 They also claimed improved resident 
satisfaction with their area and an increased proportion of residents 
who felt able to influence local decision-making. Interestingly, opinion 
on its local impact appears divided:
 …there was a lot of money [from the Pathfinder scheme] for these 
resources to start to happen and so they had all these different 
groups, and it was very good and it gave us the help we needed, 
because you know Hattersley has not always had a good 
reputation which is really hard.. Local resident.
 I think actually, that neighbourhood partnership got under the 
skin of it, but it was still, the first time I was in, so I thought the 
neighbourhood partnership was quite good. Tameside MBC 
official.
 There was a huge team located at the old district centre at the 
time, in terms of what they actually, really achieved I would say it’s 
remarkably limited. Former Peak Valley official.
The Hattersley Neighbourhood Partnership was also instrumental 
in launching the resident led initiative, ‘Mancunian Reunion’109. This 
aimed to reconnect Hattersley residents with their Manchester roots 
and in partnership with Tameside Library they collated and archived a 
valuable oral and written history of this period. It also served to nurture 
community bonds around notions of identity and belonging. 
Alongside this, the Hattersley Neighbourhood Partnership injected 
resources into community development. There existed a network 
of different community groups – some, like Hattersley Community 
Forum, longstanding; others springing up, led by community activists, 
to champion the various themes sponsored by the Hattersley 
Neighbourhood Partnership. 
In this context, the Neighbourhood Partnership was an important arena 
for connecting those participating residents – and by extension their 
networks – with governance issues; it was a way of developing bridging 
social capital. For the local ward councillors, the Neighbourhood 
Partnership was an important initiative as it co-ordinated different 
agencies’ activity on the estate. This, they feel, is a current gap in public 
service delivery on the estate – one which, interestingly, a number 
of interviewees claim, the Hub was intended to fill. In the absence of 
any formal governance process for community involvement since the 
discontinuation of the Hattersley Neighbourhood Partnership, it is the 
Hub that is now expected to fulfil much of this function. We explore 
below in the following section on ‘Interventions’ whether The Hub lives 
up to these expectations.
4.4.4 Governance concerns moving 
Onward
Onward have conducted their own market research into tenants’ 
views of the merger of distinct housing associations within the 
Symphony Group, including Peak Valley, to form Onward. The response 
was overwhelmingly positive. However, some of the residents we 
interviewed expressed surprise and a degree of confusion about the 
proposed merger:
 I didn’t realise it was that close and on that note I’ve got a few 
concerns.  Because you’ve got this Onward, don’t know where 
they’re from, don’t know who they are, don’t know how long 
they’ve been established for
 see the way I’ve read through the short letter that I got about it, 
it was as though because it mentions Wigan and Liverpool and it 
was as though it was all different Councils from all different areas 
are coming together as one, that’s the way I read it because it 
does mention Liverpool
Similar to Onward’s research were comments that emphasised the 
importance of a ‘local’ or ‘personal’ service, or one that ‘knows’ its 
tenants. Such comments emphasise the importance of Onward taking 
steps to maintain the strength of local relationships that were such a 
valued feature of Peak Valley’s housing management service.
 Onward have got to keep it local and they can’t manage this 
estate remotely.  You know we’ve got to make sure that there’s 
people in there and they’ve got to be involved in what’s going on 
and to continue the legacy that Peak Valley did.  You know we’ve 
got to still keep improving it and we’ve still got to look at how 
the estate’s changing over the years, still get involved you know 
be a partner be a true partner of the Council.  So and the Land 
Board the Land Board you know eventually will wrap up but. Local 
councillor
 I mean the big worry that the residents have is that you know the 
organisation has become remote again and there’s a feel of a loss 
of control. Local resident
 Onward’s a bit more corporate isn’t it. Local resident
107 see http://www.hattersley.org.uk/hnp/index.html
108Communities and Local Government ( 2008) Neighbourhood Management Pathfinders: Final Evaluation Report p 6
109 see https://mancreunion.wordpress.com/about/
70  |  THE HATTERSLEY AND MOTTRAM HOUSING ESTATE: AN EVALUATION OF ITS REGENERATION KEY FACTORS OF SUCCESS  | 71
The closure of Peak Valley’s Management board and the loss of familiar 
staff at the local housing office in the Hub has clearly fuelled these 
concerns. This is mixed up with memories of pre-Peak Valley landlord, 
Manchester City Council and sentiments of loss of involvement largely 
nurtured by the Hattersley Community Forum. There is also a concern 
that Onward may have competing priorities and, as a consequence, 
Hattersley may lose out:
 I think the group board the Onward group board will take the 
view well hang on a minute you’re saying that there’s been 
100 million pounds of investment into that area, we’ve got 35 
thousand properties across the North West and some of the areas 
that those are located in you know are in very deprived areas 
and need a significant long term investment.  I think you know 
Hattersley’s done very well thank you very much, arguably job 
done. Local Councillor
However, views from those tenants still involved in mechanisms like 
Peak Performance are more ambivalent: 
 the [Peak Valley] board and it was handy in a way because it’s 
like on your doorstep and if you had issues you put it to them.  But 
now it’s a common board I don’t know if it’s going to be better it’s 
one of them the proofs in the pudding isn’t it?
The opinion of Tameside MBC, Onward’s main partner on the Land 
Board, on the merger is nuanced. Some officers when viewing 
Onward’s representation at Land Board meetings are sanguine, as they 
see this as a sign of the organisation’s commitment:
 But on the ground they’re still as fully committed to the 
programme in Hattersley as they ever have been.  So when I look 
at the last Land Board I’ve got an Exec Director from Onward, I’ve 
got a Director of Development from Onward, I’ve got another Area 
Director so the three of them turned up so I mean you can’t get 
higher interest than that.
Onward’s problem is that they are, by comparison with Peak Valley, a 
de-facto remote Landlord. The new Director responsible for Hattersley 
will not be based there full-time as opposed to the previous Director 
who was a constant presence and by his own admission ‘lived and 
breathed’ Hattersley. The manager of the repairs service has also 
moved out of Hattersley to Didsbury, Manchester. Alongside this, other 
staff who have become re-assuring, familiar faces to tenants have 
moved out of the local office and new members of staff are not yet well 
known. Whilst this does signal change it does not necessarily mean a 
deterioration in the quality of service and Onward clearly have work to 
do to convince existing partners and stakeholders in their governance 
network. But perhaps more pressing than this is how new governance 
mechanisms will be devised to meet the challenge posed by this 
worried resident:
 How do these people, what do they really know about us, I know 
they  might know the bad bits but what do they really know about 
us?
Onward’s commissioning of this report, perhaps, represents the first 
step in that learning process
4.5 Tackling socio-economic problems 
Urban regeneration policy at the time of the stock transfer, driven as it 
was by recommendations of the Urban Task Force110 and concerns of 
the New Labour Government’s Social Exclusion Unit111 was based upon 
narrowing the gap between the poorest neighbourhoods and the rest 
of the country to achieve the vision that ‘… in ten to twenty years’ time 
nobody should be seriously disadvantaged by where they live.’ 112. 
Our evaluation attempts to explain a singular paradox: Peak Valley’s 
tenant surveys113, and indeed its own legacy review114, reveal high, 
widespread and rising levels of satisfaction with all aspects of the 
organisation’s activities; and yet Hattersley remains in the top 5% of 
the most deprived areas in the country, a position it has maintained 
since Indices of Multiple Deprivation (IMD) were first collected in the 
1990s. It is now estimated that around 95% of Hattersley residents live 
in the top 20% of the most deprived areas in England as captured by 
income, employment, education and health domains115. Almost half of 
the children (47%) on the estate live in poverty116. The causes of such 
persistent spatially-concentrated deprivation are complex and not the 
purview of this report. The fact that tenant satisfaction and service 
performance have continued to rise in Hattersley since 2006 despite 
no improvements in life chances, is instructive of the positive impact of 
the interventions made by Peak Valley and its regeneration partners. 
Our findings point to a number of explanations:
(i) The Hattersley estate regeneration has focused primarily on 
physical improvements to housing, amenities, safety and security, 
and infrastructure over and above more social and economic 
interventions. Indeed, the IMD score that relates to barriers to 
housing and services shows an improvement for Hattersley, in 
stark contrast to consistently high deprivation on other domains. 
For the physical and financial accessibility of housing and local 
services, the area is only in the bottom half of most deprived 
areas in England117 – suggesting a very high performance in 
this area relative to other domains. Tenants are happy with the 
improvements made to their housing in particular – both the 
upgrading of existing stock and the construction of new housing 
– as well as in other physical infrastructures, such as the railway 
station, whose redesign has proven a significant success in 
making it safe and attracting greater use. 
(ii) The statistical paradox suggests that regeneration efforts 
undertaken by housing associations and local authorities are not 
enough alone to address fundamental structural inadequacies in 
the local economy, largely created by the economic restructuring 
of the 1980s, with which successive governments’ urban 
regeneration policies and area based initiatives have struggled 
to contend. This has left local governance organisations such as 
Peak Valley with limited agency to effect and offset these deep 
and complex socio-economic problems. This may point to a wider 
national failure, despite government policy, to develop sustainable 
local policy solutions that work with and for local communities. 
Within this constrained context, the post-2006 regeneration process 
may nonetheless have made significant impacts on life chances, but 
which have yet to materialise. Whilst relatively cosmetic improvements 
and consequent changes in satisfaction levels have been quick 
to emerge, the socioeconomic impacts of the regeneration of 
the Hattersley estate have been slower to take effect. There is a 
time lag between the interventions made and their translation into 
socioeconomic benefits; whilst satisfaction levels are more immediately 
discernible from general service and environmental improvements. 
We believe this is due to the generational nature of the specific 
regeneration process in Hattersley: young people have most to gain 
and are only beginning to enter the labour market. The fundamental 
intervention that will affect the life chances of younger generations is 
the innovative dual strategy of school catchment area restructuring and 
housing tenure diversification. 
110 Department for Environment Transport and the Regions, 1999 ‘Towards an Urban Renaissance’
111 Social Exclusion Unit ( 2001) A New Commitment to Neighbourhood Renewal: national Strategy Action Plan, London SEU.
112 ibid page 8
113 See Peak Valley STAR surveys
114 see Peak Valley Performance Legacy Review 2017
115 Community Insight Profile for Hattersley, 2017. Symphony Housing Group.
116 Ibid. Poverty here is defined as living in in families in receipt of out of work benefits, or in receipt of tax credits where their reported income is less than 60% median income.
117 English Indices of Deprivation 2015 available online https://www.gov.uk/government/statistics/english-indices-of-deprivation-2015
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CHAPTER 5
CONCLUSION
CONCLUSION5
Our report has evaluated the impact of the interventions by Peak Valley 
Housing Association upon the Hattersley estate since 2006. We have situated 
our evaluation in a broad historical context using resident and stakeholder 
recollections as testimony to the ways in which various government’s urban 
regeneration policies, and those of local agents such as Tameside MBC, have 
shaped the local social and physical infrastructure prior to the stock transfer 
to Peak Valley in 2006. In doing so we have distinguished the key role played 
by Peak Valley in the regeneration process for Hattersley, but also drawn out 
other important factors which have contributed to its success. These can be 
summarised as: 
1) The Collaboration Agreement was a singular ‘act of genius’ without 
which the regeneration of the estate could have taken a very 
different turn. This is partly because the demolition of some of the 
worst social housing and redevelopment as new homes for sale is 
the key strategic move – codified in the Collaboration Agreement – 
that pays for all other improvements, including to the existing stock 
and to the public realm, as well as for new retail, transport and 
community facilities. Moreover, the decision not to sell the land but 
only a licence to build and sell new homes, we believe, was key to 
keeping the private sector developer on, albeit a slightly delayed, 
schedule particularly given the financial crash of 2008.
2) The general approach to regeneration was a tenure diversification 
programme that entailed demolishing the most poorly designed 
and maintained housing stock and the consolidating of these sites 
across the estate for redevelopment by Barratt as homes for sale. 
This was devised by the regeneration partners as an innovative 
means to attract the private sector investment required to fund the 
substantive interventions made to the housing stock, retail offer, 
public realm, community facilities and transport infrastructure. 
However, the tenure diversification approach was also supported 
by English Partnerships – the government agency who provided 
the crucial financial guarantee to underwrite the investments 
– who were at the time influenced by the Mixed Communities 
agenda. This held that tenure diversification was itself a direct 
intervention for regeneration, acting to counteract the additional 
disadvantages accruing through the spatial concentration of 
poverty over and above deprivation per se by cultivating more 
bridging rather than bonding social capital. 
3) Peak Valley’s relational – as opposed to transactional – approach 
to its housing service delivery has been instrumental in cementing 
valued and trusted working relationships with all stakeholders. This 
has enabled a successful governance of the estate with key partners 
Tameside MBC and the local community. It has enabled a productive 
working relationship with Barratt, the developer of the new-build 
homes. This approach has been enhanced by Peak Valley’s physical 
presence on the estate. This is not solely about the on-site location 
of a local housing office, though the accessibility of this is an 
important factor – it is also about how Peak Valley have embedded 
themselves into the living fabric of the community, through for 
example: hiring local residents to staff the office; enabling staff to 
become governors of the local primary schools; their involvement in 
the local football club; and, sponsoring community garden projects. 
It is this depth of immersion in the everyday, quotidian life of the 
estate that explains how the organisation has become, certainly in 
one resident’s eyes, ‘…like family’.
4) Peak Valley did not step into an empty cultural or political space 
when assuming housing management responsibility for the estate. 
a) A cadre of community activists had been developed over the 
years running up to 2006, largely through adversity, when 
they ‘…were the only ones running the estate’. Regeneration 
interventions by Tameside MBC – most notably the Single 
Regeneration Budget (SRB) and Neighbourhood Partnership 
Pathfinder initiative – had further developed this layer of 
community activism. They were a key component part of 
the governance platform, the Hattersley Land Board, which 
facilitated Peak Valley’s role in the regeneration process. 
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b) Tameside MBC has been highly invested in the Hattersley 
estate for several decades, which has helped drive forward 
the regeneration process beyond the capabilities of Peak 
Valley alone. Part of this derives from the loyalty and political 
commitments to Hattersley shown by a number of powerful 
local politicians, many of whose constituents live on the estate. 
Some of these councillors have taken on key functions of 
the Land Board and helped direct council funds towards the 
regeneration of Hattersley. Council officers too have played an 
important part. The move to develop more bridging capital on 
the estate had already begun with Tameside MBC rationalising 
and relocating Hattersley’s schools. This is arguably one of the 
most decisive factors in the regeneration process.
In assessing the overall success of the regeneration approach, we 
highlight the following points. Resonating with the academic critique of 
the mixed communities agenda, the regeneration process in Hattersley 
appears to have done more to improve the material environment 
and cosmetic image of the area – thereby attracting newcomers and 
‘diluting’ the deprivation – than to directly improve the life chances of 
existing residents themselves. The lack of any significant change in 
deprivation scores in Hattersley over the past decade, despite visible 
improvements to the estate and to facilities, supports this assessment. 
In drawing this conclusion, however, we wish raise the important 
caveat that tenure diversification has had most impact in combination 
with Tameside MBC’s earlier interventions in restructuring school 
catchment areas. We believe it is too early to measure the full effects of 
this approach, which may well skip a generation and inhere in greater 
opportunities and a more socially mixed learning environment for 
young people, and will therefore likely become manifest as the younger 
generations leave school and move through the labour market. 
Existing evidence suggests that tenure diversification works best when 
combined with school catchment area mixing.110 The future outcomes 
for younger Hattersley residents shaped by this dual approach will 
therefore have important implications for housing and education policy.
The emphasis on bridging over bonding social capital, on spatial as well 
as social mobility, may have adversely contributed to ‘hollowing out’ 
what was once a very tight-knit and mutually supportive community. 
Many residents feel that despite the cleaner, safer environment, better 
amenities and more responsive and effective services on offer by 
Peak Valley, something perhaps more intangible has been sacrificed in 
this modernisation process. We can certainly see this reflected in the 
loss of some 10 pubs across the estate over the last decade or so – 
something which Peak Valley cannot, of course, be held accountable 
for. The Hub might therefore provide a better case in point. Located in 
a far more accessible location and in modern, purpose-built premises, 
The Hub has nonetheless failed to attract the same extensive use of its 
community facilities as were once enjoyed in the dilapidated old district 
centre. At the same time, Tesco now dominates the retail offer, and 
whilst providing the estate with a much-needed source of employment 
and affordable food, has effectively replaced what was once a diverse 
range of frequently family-owned businesses, albeit rapidly dwindling 
by the 1990s. Whilst The Hub and the Tesco Extra are undoubtedly 
improvements on what went immediately before, they nonetheless 
reflect wider cultural trends towards social atomisation, privatisation 
and rising mobility, both social and spatial. 
There is a risk, then, that the tenure diversification approach 
accelerates these trends; that it has only made Hattersley more 
attractive to newcomers – who have snapped up the well-designed 
and comparatively cheap Barratt houses in their hundreds – and failed 
to embed sufficient opportunities for existing residents to partake of 
what benefits this brings. Hattersley is at risk of becoming a dormitory 
settlement, in which increasing proportions of its residents commute into 
Manchester for work each day, and drive to Tesco to shop, rather than 
work or shop locally or contribute to the estate’s community life.
Just as the mixed communities agenda has been critiqued111 for 
individualising and spatializing what are essentially structural problems, 
mostly with the labour market, so too can the Hattersley estate 
regeneration be critically appraised as focusing too narrowly on raising 
the spatial mobility of residents, as if this by itself will lead to social 
mobility. Indeed, this is a product of the ‘mobility paradigm’ that is said 
to permeate the thinking of neo-liberal urban policy on both sides of the 
Atlantic.112 Demolishing mono-tenure concentrations of social housing 
and introducing new private tenures to raise local purchasing power 
and social aspirations; encouraging people to send their children to 
schools outside the estate, in more socially mixed catchment areas; 
rebuilding community and retail facilities towards the periphery of the 
estate in more accessible locations; enhancing transport connections 
to major centres, as in the railway station – all these interventions 
no doubt made great headway in breaking down some of the social 
boundaries within Hattersley that could be seen as problematic for 
socioeconomic empowerment, and no doubt they have broken down 
internal and external perceptions alike of Hattersley being like an ‘island’ 
isolated from the rest of society. Yet at the same time, some of the more 
positive aspects of bonding social capital have been broken down also. 
Moreover, this tends towards an indirect form of regeneration that relies 
too heavily on mobility – on (re)connecting people with neighbouring 
communities and the possible opportunities that exist outside the estate 
as opposed to creating new economic opportunities within Hattersley 
and focusing on increasing the capabilities of residents themselves. At its 
worst, the tenure diversification approach could be seen as a way to hide 
or dilute persistent deprivation in Hattersley rather than tackle it head on.
Skills training has been a key feature of Peak Valley’s interventions 
in Hattersley, but one that we feel has not been central enough. Nor 
has there been enough attention turned towards developing the local 
economy by encouraging entrepreneurship, for instance, or a more 
localised community or social economy based around co-operatives 
and locally-owned assets. There are a number of examples across 
the country of how communities in deprived urban areas have sought 
to address their isolation from economic opportunities by developing 
their own endogenous routes through to wealth generation. Alt Valley 
110 111 Ruth Lupton and Rebecca Tunstall, “Neighbourhood Regeneration through Mixed Communities: A ‘social Justice Dilemma’?,” Journal of Education Policy 23, no. 2 (March 2008): 105–17
 http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/02680930701853013.
112 Imbroscio, “Beyond Mobility: The Limits of Liberal Urban Policy.”
.
Community Development Trust in the Croxteth area of Liverpool is one 
such example where an area largely comprised of ex-council housing 
and with a similar demographic and socioeconomic profile as Hattersley 
has been transformed through the work of asset-based community 
development that was first initiated through local activism in resisting 
the closure of a school in the 1980s. There are lessons to be learnt from 
endeavours such as Alt Valley. 
Peak Valley’s challenge was to develop and manage the inter-related 
component parts of social capital, namely trust and the networking 
features related with bonding and bridging capital. It is evident that 
Peak Valley have developed trusted relationships. However, given 
the prevailing high level of deprivation on the estate it is not yet 
clear if it managed the trick of nurturing bridging capital – important 
for developing inclusive and prosperous communities – whilst 
maintaining healthy levels of bonding capital, a feature of strong, robust 
communities. As we have mentioned, the tenure diversification and 
school rationalisation may deliver the required levels of bridging capital 
nevertheless, it is apparent that some residents are mourning the loss of 
associational activity and community spirit. We argue that while this may 
be a function of appropriate social space to congregate it is also likely 
to be a function of age. Interestingly, the new build homes may serve to 
supply this missing generation of community activists as it appears that it 
is largely the 24-44 age group   that are moving into these properties. 
Nonetheless, in examining Peak Valley’s role in the regeneration of 
Hattersley and its interaction with its community, there have been no  
voiced criticism of their activities. This we attribute to their relational 
approach to the delivery of their housing service. Such an approach 
potentially embodies and harnesses the concept of social capital. High 
levels of which have been associated with socially and economically 
prosperous communities. In summary, Peak Valley have:
•	 made a significant contribution to the  regeneration of the estate 
by developing innovative approaches to funding, designing and 
delivering largely successful interventions;
•	 garnered an enviable institutional reputation for integrity – we 
found this to hold true for all stakeholders involved in the 
regeneration process;
•	 provided a local, accessible housing management service; and
•	 afforded sufficient weight to their social responsibilities to make a 
positive difference to how they are perceived upon the estate.
In light of the concerns raised in this report, the main issues to address 
for the future management of the Hattersley estate are:
(i) Ensuring that there is sufficient community involvement in the 
design of public realm improvements being developed by Tameside 
MBC/Land Board, including through the planned public consultation, 
as well as in any future redevelopment plans for the estate. 
(ii) Rethinking and addressing the chronic under-use of The Hub 
without unsettling community relations and in ways which promote 
co-located multi-agency working.
(iii) Related to (ii) is the need to address the lack of social space on the 
estate for community association. There is a resident perception 
that The Hub has too much institutional oversight to work as an 
attractive community centre. The loss of pubs – from 11 to 1 – over 
the years has also served to diminish the facilities for social activity. 
(iv) Embedding a governance mechanism to address the ‘how will 
they know us?’ question. New resident/tenant recruits to the Land 
Board is a start but needs more collective community involvement 
beyond the Land Board, in ways which replace the role of the 
Hattersley Neighbourhood Partnership.
(v) Developing new governance approaches for managing all 
housing, increasingly split between owner-occupiers, buy-to-let 
landlords, Right to Buy owners and Peak Valley, which threatens 
the integrity of estate management.
(vi) Tackling the persistent levels of socioeconomic deprivation 
through policy innovation. Jobs fairs and skills training initiatives 
have had limited success and other solutions are needed. These 
should look to develop the endogenous capacities of Hattersley 
and its residents rather than rely on spatial mobility to connect 
residents with exogenous economic opportunities.
We feel that an approach to dealing with these issues holistically is 
required. For example, the public realm could be viewed as a ‘common 
asset’ and, as such, the plan to develop it could involve meaningful 
and on-going community engagement that might inspire community 
management of this asset. This notion of developing ‘commoning’ 
projects is increasingly seen as viable policy option for many urban 
centres both in the UK and worldwide.113 Such a venture could also 
include a view to develop Hattersley’s social economy. This is socio-
economic regeneration from the ‘bottom-up’ and could conceivably 
address levels of deprivation and play into the cultural and social 
isolationism prevalent amongst certain residents. Again, there are 
numerous examples of such initiatives to draw upon.114 The problem 
of The Hub, which is neither community centre nor co-ordinating hub 
of local service delivery, is one that clearly requires wide stakeholder 
engagement to provide it with a meaningful identity and function. Such 
a process of engagement would, we feel, necessarily distinguish local 
community requirements from institutional ones.
This evaluation of Peak Valley’s impact on the regeneration process 
in Hattersley is premature. The Collaboration Agreement commits its 
signatories to a further ten years of regeneration activity. Moreover, 
as we have emphasised, the ongoing generational impact of tenure 
diversification and school rationalisation may yet affect the social and 
economic prosperity of the estate. It is arguable that it is only at this 
future point that the impact of Peak Valley can be fully appraised. 
Nonetheless, it is evident that Peak Valley have made a remarkable 
contribution to Hattersley’s regeneration, one that has left a largely 
positive legacy for the new social landlord, Onward Homes, and which 
may inform the development of future estate regeneration policy for 
years to come.
113 Sheila Foster and Christian Iaione, “The City as a Commons,” Yale Law & Policy Review 34, no. 2 (2016): 281–349.
114 Helen Heap, Alan Southern, and Matthew Thompson, The Scale, Scope and Value of the Liverpool City Region Social Economy (Liverpool: University of Liverpool., 2017), 
https://www.liverpool.ac.uk/media/livacuk/publicpolicypractice/images/the-scale-scope-and-value-of-the-liverpool-city-region-social-economy.pdf.
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APPENDIX 1 – INTERVIEWEES
Type Name Position
Peak Valley
Phil Corris  Former Managing Director
Sam Cooper Community Investment Office
Nicholas Monkridge Talent Match
Huw Davies Former Chair (also Tameside officer) 
HCA Julie Museoglu Business Support Officer
Councillors
Jim Fitzpatrick Cllr Hyde Godley
Gillian Peet Cllr Longendale
Janet Cooper Cllr Longendale
Tameside MBC
Steven Pleasant Chief Executive 
Ade Alao Head of Investment
Carole Bryant Project manager economic growth
John Huges Housing Growth lead
Denise Lockyer Hattersley Library
Lavinia Ferguson Employment and skills
Private Sector
Dave Smith Director, John McCall Architect
Ian Hilliker Technical Director, Barratt Homes
Residents
Brenda Duddridge resident
Sophie Harrison Barratt home-owner
Gareth Howell Barratt home-owner
Patrick Ghadiali Tenant
Community Organisations
Babs Allen  Hattersley Community Garden
Chris Bird Chair, Hattersley Football Club
Simon Davidson Christian missionary, youth worker
Elsie Dixon  Chair, Hattersley Community Forum
Sharon  Power Founder, Mancunian Reunion; Neighbourhood Partnership
School Steve Clarke Primary school Headteacher

Copies of the report can be accessed at:
www.liverpool.ac.uk/heseltine-institute
For further information please contact:
heseltine@liverpool.ac.uk
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